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Abstnct. 
The Temperance Movement was one of the most important and influential of the great 
nineteenth century social and moral reforming campaigns, firmly integrated with the dentral 
Victorian values of self-help, hard work and sobriety. As the values of the Victorian period 
dissipated with the rapidly changing social and ethical mores during the twentieth century, 
most historians have seen a similar demise in the role of the Temperance Movement. 
The drink question, however, remained a significant issue with two Royal Commissions, 
unprecedented state intervention during the First World War and innumerable bills and 
legislative debate between 1895 and 1933. Equally, the Temperance Movement maintained 
its resolve, resolutely campaigning and lobbying, proving itself to still be a key factor in the 
drink debate. This thesis studies the role and activity of the Temperance Movement in the 
continuing natioSl concern around drink between 1895 and the Peel Commission to the 
conclusion of the Amulree Commission in 1933. The thesis concentrates on the major 
temperance societies and examines their effect on English attitudes to the drink question 
Despite its continued activity, the Temperance Movement failed to make a significant 
mark on policy toward drink during this period. The reasons for this are several - loss of 
political support, the changing nature of drink issues, and fragmentation in the Movement 
The Temperance Movement was very heterogeneous, some organisations seeking moderate 
reform or moral suasion but the more radical campaigners demanded central or local 
prohibition. Such demands were the root cause of temperance division and a large factor in 
the loss of Liberal political support. With the Conservatives tied to the Trade, the 
Temperance Movement sought the assistance of the Labour Party but Labour's response 
during the period was vague and indecisive. 
Social and moral arguments used by the Temperance Movement in its attempt to secure 
the abolition of the drink trade were being steadily eroded as secularism, post war cynicism 
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and a huge increase in leisure activities undermined older values. Demand for alcoholic 
beverages fell dramatically as did reported cases of drunkenness. Despite these changes 
drink remained on the political and social agenda, but with many temperance reformers 
disillusioned and dispirited the Movement failed to present a comprehensive and coherent 
abolition strategy 
2 
Contents. 
Abstract. 	 1-2. 
Contents. 	 3. 
Acknowledgements. 	 4. 
Introduction. 	 5-16, 
Chapter 1. Temperance and Politics. 1895-1900. 
	 17-49. 
Chapter 2. A Force to be Reckoned With? 1900-19 14. 
	 50-86. 
Chapter 3. Regulation and Deregulation. 1914-1929. 
	 87-117 
Chapter 4. The Royal Commission. 1929-1931. 
	 118-147 
Conclusion. 	 148-155. 
Appendix.l. 	 156-158 
Bibliography. 	 159-168. 
3 
Acknowledgements. 
I am indebted to the University of Central Lancashire for giving me the opportunity to take 
this research degree. 
A special vote of thanks go to my family who had to put up with the many editions that I 
cajoled, or should that be forced them into reading and a thank you to Jude Boxhall who was 
for most of the research period an archivist of the Livesey Collection at the University. 
I would also like to take this opportunity of thanking the many people who have helped me in 
the research particularly the staff of Mill Hill Library, Blackburn. 
Finally, I would like to say a very special thank you to my supervisor Keith Vernon for his 
unremitting help and guidance and his patience and tenacity in reading and correcting the 
many drafts that I submitted. 
Introduction. 
The control of addictive substances has long perplexed western societies; they are 
potentially very harmful and need to be controlled, but elimination of their use through full 
prohibition presents numerous problems. Today there is great debate around the 'drug 
question'; in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, it was the 'drink 
question,' and temperance reformers were as anxious to find the correct solution to their 
problem as are their modem counterparts. Temperance was one of the most important of the 
nineteenth century's great social and moral reform campaigns and ranked high among the 
public issues at the turn of the century. It was a campaign that had at its roots the central 
pillars of Victorian values - thrift, sobriety and hard work. In the nineteenth century the 
growth rate of the Temperance Movement was noteworthy. Many of the societies that were 
formed had close religious ties and could therefore rely on a somewhat captive audience. 
Militant reformers ensured that temperance remained in the focus of public attention in the 
nineteenth century and in doing so could rightfully claim to have been successful at seeking 
temperance reform. Whilst the significance of temperance in the Victorian period is beyond 
doubt, its impact in the twentieth century is much more difficult to ascertain. The drink 
question remained a topic of considerable debate and enquiry; temperance organisations 
continued to lobby and campaign yet what, in the early decades of the twentieth century, did 
all this actually amount to? 
At the turn of the century, the Temperance Movement was a vast and heterogeneous 
body with many different organisations, each with their own approach to the problem of 
drink. Most flmdamental was the divide between those favouring abstinence and moral 
suasion and those advocating legislative prohibition, but there were other divisions on 
religious lines and between moderate and hard line reformers. This investigation 
concentrates on the period 1895-1933; a period highly significant as it was during these years 
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that, despite considerable discussion of drink, the Temperance Movement was steadily 
marginalised into obscurity. Taking a broad approach, the thesis offers a study of the 
Temperance Movement and its responses to the drink question primarily at the level of 
national debate. It looks at the way the Temperance Movement was viewed by its adherents 
and by its main opponent, the liquor industry, and particularly by political parties and their 
supporters. This analysis will also highlight the most compelling impediment to the progress 
of temperance - lack of structural integrity. Although this wider perspective means that the 
activities of multifarious temperance considerations cannot be considered in detail, happily it 
can provide a framework of the changing positions of the Temperance Movement in the early 
twentieth century. In following this line of enquiry the thesis will be thematic and somewhat 
episodic but as is the nature of most historical research it will also follow a chronological 
line. This is important as the Temperance Movement had several pivotal points in its history, 
which are crucial when attempting to respond to the question: Was the Temperance 
Movement a force to be reckoned with? 
Literature Review 
Many historians have concentrated on the rise in alcoholic consumption in the early and 
mid-Victorian periods and the resulting response by the Temperance Movement. Brian 
Harrison made a major contribution to our understanding but did not go further than 1875. 
From its inception, the Temperance Movement's doctrine of personal abstinence and moral 
suasion seemed to offer a solution to many of the ills that plagued society during the major 
part of the nineteenth century. Temperance reform became so much a part of social and 
political debate that Harrison is right to suggest that the Temperance Movement had achieved 
'a partial victory over their enemy.' (1) By the end of the nineteenth century however social 
changes had brought doubt to the mind-set of many temperance reformers and the 
2. 
Temperance Movement had not fully achieved a single one of its objectives. L L. Shiman 
argues that among some teetotalters there was a growing suspicion that their traditional 
position suggesting a causal relationship between poverty and drink may have been 
erroneous and that perhaps there were other reasons for poverty besides drink. She suggests 
that in the twentieth century 'temperance was never the vital force that it was in the 
nineteenth century,' arguing that, 'the Temperance Movement did not make England free 
from drink,' and its decline was attributable to 'its frames of reference and values lacking 
validity.' (2) J B. Brown, however, suggests that many radical temperance reformers by the 
early twentieth century accepted the widespread existence of 'economic' poverty i.e., poverty 
caused through no moral fault of the pauper, a fact demonstrated in the work by J.Rowntree 
and A.Snowden (3) At the same time the growth in socialism emphasised that environmental 
changes could dramatically change the lives of many. As Victorian certainties eroded, the 
Temperance Movement faced the problem of defining the nature of the drink question. 
The practice of personal abstinence from intoxicants or 'teetotalism' had been the moral 
objective of a determined Temperance Movement in the early Victorian period, but with the 
formation of the United Kingdom Alliance in 1853, prohibition became the goal of many 
temperance reformers. Supporters of prohibition were not satisfied with the minimalist 
position of moral suasion and demanded enforced total abstinence for the individual which 
fundamentally altered the nature of temperance campaigning. The answer to the drink 
question for prohibitionists was legislation and they would have been encouraged by the 
statements made by social commentators such as T H Green, who asserted in 1881 that 
'drink is the greatest impediment to freedom that exists in England.' Green used temperance 
legislation as an example of the way in which the liberal state was justified in interfering in 
individuals' lives in order to encourage the achievement of their true potential. (4) This 
brought the Temperance Movement directly into political manoeuvres as it sought positive 
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legislation. In the first instance the Temperance Movement needed a sympathetic political 
party that was both in tune with its thinking and one that could secure temperance law. 
Steeped in Methodist doctrine the Temperance Movement found a political ally in the 
sympathetic Liberal Party. Fahey suggests that the Liberals became so enthusiastic over 
temperance that during the late I 880s and early I 890s the British Liberal Party endorsed 
Direct Local Veto, under which localities could by referendum prohibit the sale of alcoholic 
drink. (5) This Veto was championed by Liberal MP and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir 
William Harcourt, who was supported by the Advanced Temperance Party which was 
dominated by the United Kingdom Alliance (UKA). (6) 
With a Conservative Party supporting the freedom of the Trade and a Liberal Party 
seemingly committed to temperance legislation the drink question had become a political 
issue. Fahey has suggested that it was expedient for the Liberal Party to embrace temperance 
but it soon became clear that some Liberal MPs had begun to doubt the wisdom of such an 
allegiance. Dingle focused his research on the UKA between 1873 and 1895 and formed the 
conclusion that the UKA had forced the Liberal Party into such a political predicament over 
its campaign for some form of prohibition that the prohibitionists' vote had become 'too dear 
at the price.' He also argued that the prohibitionists were wrong in assuming that the 
reverses suffered by the UKA were no more than a temporaiy setback. (7) Evidence to 
support this will be seen in the conclusions reached by the Peel Commission when it 
suggested a postponement of the Veto for an indefinite period. Dingle may be right in 
suggesting that calls for prohibition or the more watered down version of Local Veto had 
reached its pinnacle at the end of the nineteenth century and Brake has suggested that it was 
'a movement that seemed unable to break from its past.' (8) 
Drink however remained an issue of considerable debate, to which the Temperance 
Movement contributed, nor was their influence in Parliament completely ineffective. Many 
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MPs supported temperance but whatever their fervour, they could not muster sufficient 
support to carry any substantive bills. The fight against intemperance was not confined just to 
seeking prohibition. Many of the other less radical societies continued to seek a solution 
through moral suasion and in their research, G.F.Williams and G.T.Brake argued that 
notwithstanding legislative failures, the Temperance Movement had never been stronger and 
up to the First World War remained a threat to the Trade. (9) This is supported by K. 
Hawkins' research which indicates that whilst the more extreme temperance organisations 
continued to lose support in the country as a whole, the continuous flow of Local Veto bills 
suggests that those MPs who favoured temperance were still capable of taking the offensive. 
He suggests that the failure of the Temperance Movement to get any of these bills enacted 
was not due to the power of the pro-trade lobby (10) The political and propaganda strength 
of the liquor industry or the Trade as it became known, has been somewhat down played by 
historians such as Hawkins and Gutzke. Gutzke suggests that economic inequalities between 
brewers and retailers was a source of unease. Their economic solidarity was the fundamental 
source of the Trade's political power yet by the beginning of the twentieth century economic 
rivalry had engendered discord. Brewers reduced the funding to many Trade associations, 
hindering agitation against Liberal legislation and demoralising provincial retailers. (11) The 
arguments raised by Hawkins and Gutzke have a certain validity but, despite any divisive 
shortcomings that the Trade may have had, it retained enormous unity and power when 
threatened. 
Arguably the most significant advance in temperance reform came during the First World 
War which has been analysed by Turner. He suggests that both the temperance question and 
the fortunes of the brewing industry were in flux on the eve of the war, although with a 
Temperance Movement stagnant and embarrassed. (12) The outbreak of war, however, 
brought some encouragement for the Temperance Movement as it spotted an opportunity for 
wartime prohibition which it lobbied for fiercely. Controls which were far short of 
prohibition proved enormously effective in reducing consumption and drunkenness but, as 
Turner argues, these should not be seen as a temperance measure. (13) By comparison the 
American experiment with Prohibition (1920-1933) was an outstanding achievement for 
temperance crusaders which, whatever its consequences, gave considerable support to 
campaigns in other countries. With Local Veto still an issue with many the Temperance 
Movement turned to the Labour Party for support. Drink clearly continued to be an issue of 
debate in the Labour movement and its solutions varied from Local Veto and nationalisation 
to personal abstinence. In his study Jones concentrates on these dilemmas facing the Labour 
Party and concludes that Labour activists did not know how Labour would deal with the 
drink problem when it came to power and chose the easy option by appointing another Royal 
Commission. (14) 
The literature thus leaves us with a number of questions, alternative interpretations and 
major omissions. Some see the Temperance Movement as effectively finished at the end of 
the nineteenth centuiy, others during the First World War. Some see a powerful movement 
and a weakened Trade. Drink and temperance are dismissed as an issue at the turn of the 
centuzy, yet there was a major Royal Commission in 1929. Noticeably absent from much of 
the accounts is study of what the Temperance Movement did do in this period. What did it 
contribute to the debate? How did it relate to the political parties? Did the analysis of the 
drink issue change? What was the position on licensing reform, control, nationalisation and 
American Prohibition? In the following chapters, through a study of the leading temperance 
journals and advocates, the disparate positions of the Temperance Movement will be 
analysed alongside the existing studies of major pivotal points in the drink question in this 
period. 
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Thesis Structure 
The prime objective of the Temperance Movement was the abolition of the drink 
traffic. Moral suasion was seen as potentially the best way of achieving this goal but with the 
birth of the I.JKA and its prohibition aims, legislation became the target. In the nineteenth 
century many attempts had been made to get temperance legislation through the House of 
Commons but with little success. The first chapter will briefly examine the position of the 
principal demands which comprised the Temperance Movement as it approached the end of 
the nineteenth century and will be combined with an analysis of its political fortunes. Its 
main political ally, the Liberal Party, had vigorously campaigned during the 1895 general 
election on a manifesto that declared its support for the implementation of Local Veto. The 
Liberal Party's failure to win at this election was largely blamed on this pledge and it was 
not until 1905 that it managed to get back into government. It won the subsequent elections 
of 1908 and the 'constitutional crisis' election of 1910, but from 1916 formed only part of a 
coalition until 1922, when the Labour party became the party of opposition to the 
Conservatives. Despite the loss of the 1895 election, the Temperance Movement managed to 
secure a Royal Commission on the Licensing Laws which began its enquiries in 1896 and 
produced Majority and Minority Reports in 1899. It was an ideal opportunity for the 
Temperance Movement to present its case and to secure change to the legislation and the 
study will attempt to show why it failed to do so. 
Liberal defeats at the 1895 and 1900 general elections and unfavourable conclusions from 
the Peel Commission left the Temperance Movement somewhat bewildered but still 
determined to see its policies accepted. The second chapter will examine the strength and 
fortitude of the Temperance Movement at the beginning of the twentieth century through, to 
the start of the First World War. The Liberal Party still well-disposed held power from 1905 
until the war time coalition government. During this period a bill was introduced into 
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Parliament which had as its principal objective a reduction in the number of on-licenses. The 
temperance organisations led by the UKA, mobilised support throughout the country and the 
Trade apprehensive about the continual activity of the Temperance Movement, both 
nationally and locally, and the frequent appearance of 'local option' bills in Parliament, 
launched a vigorous opposition. The bill was successful in its passage through the House of 
Commons, but was rejected by The House of Lords. However strong the support for change, 
still had sufficient influence in the corridors of power to thwart change. Nevertheless, 
temperance forces had never been stronger, more ably led or supported, or with so much 
parliamentary influence as in 1908. There was no inclination to accept defeat and it is 
therefore right to suggest that, up to the First World War, the Temperance Movement 
remained a threat to the Trade and a force to be reckoned with in Parliament. 
No event of the twentieth century had more far-reaching and long lasting effects on the 
control of retailing and consumption of liquor than the 1914-1918 war. Drink was seen as a 
threat to the war effort and temperance advocates like Lloyd George remained convinced 
that 'drink is doing more damage in the war than all the German submarines put together.' 
(15) For many in the Temperance Movement the solution could only be found through 
prohibition, but the government went for control and areas of state management like the 
Carlisle experiment. This experiment in the public ownership of the liquor trade meant that 
the municipality of Carlisle controlled the manufacture, distribution and sale of the majority 
of alcoholic beverages consumed within its boundaries. The regulation of licensing hours and 
most of the control measures imposed by the Central Control Board, became largely 
responsible for a dramatic fall in liquor consumption. It was a reduction for which the 
Temperance Movement claimed a large responsibility but which, in many ways, undermined 
its credibility. Many, including some temperance reformers, began to question this credibility 
gap and concluded that state control had been successful. In 1921 this regulation experiment 
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was ended with the introduction of a Licensing Act. It was an Act which the Temperance 
Movement bitterly opposed, prophesying a return to the pre war levels of drinking. In 
America, however, temperance campaigning achieved fill prohibition on the 16th January 
1920. The third chapter will review these wartime control measures and will examine how 
prohibition was achieved in the United States but not in the UK. It will also examine how 
the Temperance Movement responded to these issues and in doing so will draw comparisons 
from the secondary literature. Dramatic falls in the levels of alcoholic consumption were due 
to the regulations but they coincided with huge increases in leisure activities as many 
abandoned social institutions like the public house and the church. The decline in church 
attendance was mirrored in the attendances at many temperance society meetings prompting 
the Temperance Movement into serious introspection. Traditional views on Local Veto had 
been replaced by an acceptance that the idea of control could be seen as a temperance 
measure and a belief that the way ahead could be found through education and more social 
responsibility. An examination of these conflicts of interest will conclude the chapter. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, the Temperance Movement continued its 
socio-political crusade, but its efforts were pinned to a set of Victorian values which were 
being steadily eroded by a more secular leisure seeking public. Its energy, already dissipated 
by division, began to ebb away, despite feelings of strength and confidence. The 
Temperance Movement did rely upon political support and with the Conservatives tied to the 
Trade it sought cooperation with an acquiescent Liberal Party. When this relationship began 
to fail it turned to the only other game in town; the Labour Party. However, the growth in 
socialism caused further political dilemmas for the Temperance Movement. It was 
challenged by Labour and socialist propaganda as its sentiments were perceived to be 
counter productive since it disguised the capitalist roots of economic and social depravation 
(16) In the nineteenth century the Labour movement was certainly concerned about the drink 
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question, mainly because drink was regarded as a cause of self-inflicted poverty. The Labour 
Party does not appear to have embraced temperance with the same apparent fervour as the 
Liberals but as Jones suggests, temperance was still salient in the inter-war years causing 
much dissension in the ranks of organised labour. (17) 
This study will be concluded by an examination of the second Royal Commission into the 
licensing laws which was established by a Labour government in 1929. This was set against a 
background where the Trade, between 1921 and 1933, relentlessly sought changes to the beer 
duty and to the licensing laws. The Royal Commission of 1929-1931 provided once again 
an ideal platform for the Temperance Movement to express its views, particularly in the light 
of the American prohibition experiment. With a centwy's experience dealing with many 
shades of political points of view, it had seen its political fortunes both decline and flourish, 
it had witnessed a society trawnatised by war and the imposition of draconian legislation, but 
once again it failed to rise to the occasion. 
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Chapter 1. 	 Temijerance and Politics. 1895-1900, 
Introduction 
From its early beginnings in the 1830s, the Temperance Movement had tried to persuade 
people to abstain from the consumption of alcoholic beverages, highlighting the medical and 
economic pitfalls awaiting the drinker. With the inception of the UKA in 1853 and its 
demands for prohibition, attention shifted away from a persuasive course of action to a 
political one. With the Conservatives resolutely supporting the Trade, the Temperance 
Movement formed an alliance with a responsive and almost acquiescent Liberal Party. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century industrial growth had spawned many trade unions 
and with them came the demand for political recognition. Many barriers continued to 
confront the overtures made by the Movement towards this body of people, not least was the 
belief that the 'teetotalers were in league with the employers in keeping the level of wages 
low.' (I) Middle-class professionals, social reformers, the clergy and the Temperance 
Movement, joined forces in questioning the damaging effects of excess drinking. National 
efficiency and eugenics became subjects that were openly discussed and were thought to 
have their origins in the social conditions of the working class which, again, was tied in to 
alcoholic consumption. Despite the fact that towards the end of the nineteenth century the 
figures for drunkenness began to fall, the Temperance Movement continued to cant its old 
themes, stressing the social, moral and economic waste symbolised by the national drink bill. 
If the Temperance Movement had a long way to go in convincing the labour movement that 
they had their interests at heart, there was a growing awareness of the political strength of 
the Trade. There was also the perception, particularly amongst temperance reformers, that 
the Trade's huge financial resources enabled it to act as a powerful pressure group, ensuring 
the failure of any attempts to legislate against it. There is no doubt that the Temperance 
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Movement, together with its political supporters, had fought tong and hard to get changes to 
the licensing laws through the House of Commons (see appendix 1). MPs from both parties 
actively supported such legislation, but it is legitimate to state that the Liberal Par4' was 
recognised as the party of temperance, whilst the Conservative Party was the party of the 
Trade. 
For there to be an understanding of temperance and politics we need to examine briefly 
the structure of the Temperance Movement as it approached the end of the nineteenth century 
and the nature of temperance as a political issue. The 1895 Liberal/temperance pact failed to 
convince the electorate of the merits of Local Veto and a victorious and somewhat 
magnanimous Conservative government appointed a Royal Commission to investigate the 
licensing laws. This section deals with both these issues and concludes with an examination 
on the Movement's position. 
The Temperance Movement. 
The founders of the Temperance Movement sought to change society's attitude towards 
drinking by moral suasion through a personal pledge to renounce alcohol. With the birth of 
the IJKA in 1853, prohibition offered a solution and with it the need for legislation. The 
movement needed an understanding public and a political party that were sympathetic to its 
demands and capable of effecting change. The growth in the number of temperance societies 
and their individual membership, however, was both a blessing and a curse. They could 
legitimately declare themselves to be a powerful social force, capable of pressure group 
activity in the pursuit of legislative change, but because of the way individual temperance 
societies approached the solution to the 'drink problem,' they failed to achieve a consensus. 
The radical UKA led from the front with its demands for prohibition, but it was joined by 
other societies who variously demanded: total abstinence for the individual, Sunday closing, 
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Direct Local Veto and no compensation. (2) These societies formed the Advanced 
Temperance Party which had amongst its members, the British Temperance League (BTL), 
the UKA, the Independent Order of Good Templars, the National Temperance League and 
many others. The Advanced Temperance Party consisted of so many societies that it tended 
to dominate over other temperance campaigners in its agitation against the drinking customs 
of society, and the public house that ministered to them. The Advanced Temperance Society 
claimed to have made 'six million people free from this mass of human corruption' and that 
if there was a universal acceptance of total abstinence it would see 'the practical extinction 
of poverty, drunkenness, crime, and vice.' (3) Although the figures produced by W. S. Caine, 
secretary of the Advanced Temperance Society, are unlikely to be accurate, it was extremely 
difficult to estimate the proportion of non-drinkers in any given population. The IJKA's 
secretary, James Whyte, giving evidence before the Peel Commission in 1898, suggested the 
number of total abstainers in the UK to be about eight million. (4) Rowntree and Sherwell 
in their research estimated the number of 'teetotalers and practical abstainers fifteen years 
and over, as three million.' (5) Wright suggests that by the end of the nineteenth century, the 
efforts of the various temperance organisations may have increased the proportion of the 
adult male population which abstained as compared with the previous generation. (6) 
Blurring the issue still further was the increasing tendency of women to drink; a thct borne 
out by the increasing workloads of the Police Court Missions to Women. (7) 
The demands made by the Advanced Temperance Party were not echoed by societies such 
as the influential Church of England Temperance Society (CETS). This society, founded in 
1862, had two distinguishing characteristics. (8) In the first place it consisted of two sections 
- one for teetotalers and one for those who pledged themselves only to moderation. For that 
reason the society was uninterested in prohibition; favouring changes to the licensing system. 
At first the CETS was viewed as being apolitical as its diocesan structure meant that it was 
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highly decentralised. No branch could be formed without the permission of the parish 
incumbent and the history of the CETS can be said to be the history of the many clergymen 
who unstintingly devoted their time and efforts to the temperance cause. Though many 
clergymen saw drink as their greatest hindrance, and the principal reason for the depravity 
that was to be found in many working-class districts, there were 'cosseted clergymen' who 
had little idea of such problems and who refused to join the campaign. They did so because 
they did not want to offend many of their conscientious workers, or incur the wrath of many 
of their elders and deacons, many of whom were interested in the manufacture and sale of 
alcoholic beverages. 
Many of the clergy who had identified themselves as temperance advocates became 
responsible for major changes in their parishes. Schools, hospitals and the rebuilding of 
almshouses were just a few of the innovations. Besides the wide spreading temperance work 
in many towns, it was in the cities where the changes were judged to be needed the most. In 
the Liverpool diocese of 203 parishes there were 128 adult branches, 149 juvenile branches, 
and 20 women's branches. Public meetings and conferences, as well as simple scientific 
lectures on the harmful effects of alcohol, were held throughout the diocese. At the same 
time, Police Court Missions to Women were being set up. By the end of the century, the 
CETS was the largest temperance society in the UK. In 1899 it had 7000 branches, 100 
Police Court Missions and between 150,000 and 200,000 subscribing members. The CETS 
did try to become more involved in seeking changes to the legislation; in 1885, E. Howard 
MR and vice-chairman of the CETS, introduced into the House of Commons a bill drafted 
with the help of the CETS providing for licensing boards with the power to control the days 
and hours of opening and closing, but not in anyway to extend them. Refusing the 
continuance of a licence would be offset by compensation to the value of the goodwill of the 
business and any expenses incurred in its refusal. The Advanced Temperance Society refused 
to support a Bill that contained a compensation clause - a position which estranged it from 
much temperance opinion. (9) 
Adding to the confusion were other religious forces like Methodism which was 
particularly strong in the north midlands and the north of England. (10) The Methodist 
reaction to the 'evils of drink' had not always seen it condemned. Many officials and 
ministers of the Wesleyan Methodist Society were bitterly opposed to teetotalism. They 
treated the advance of teetotalism with contempt and scorn and denounced temperance 
reformers as 'dangerous fanatics' and 'teachers of heresy.' The Rev Dr. John Edgar had 
declared that, 'he entertained the most confirmed abhorrence of teetotalism, as insulting to 
God and disgraceful to man.' (11) Change was on the way however, with publications like 
the Wesleyan Methodist Magazine suggesting that more Wesleyan Methodists had been 
'degraded by the sin of intemperance than any other.' and that the way forward must be by 
'the guard of abstinence.' (12) This was echoed in the Wesleyan Times when it declared its 
support for total and entire abstinence. Support for temperance quickly grew, and resulted in 
the final establishment of the Wesleyan Temperance Society under the direction and auspices 
of the Annual Methodist Conference. (13) A series of resolutions passed at Conferences in 
the I 880s and I 890s demanded a more effective control of the liquor traffic, a reduction in 
the number of public and beer houses and Sunday closing. Opinions appearing in the 
Methodist Recorder were pessimistic, however, regarding the chances of achieving changes 
in the legislation, believing that the Conservatives relied too heavily on the Trade at the 
polling booths, and that the Liberals were equally unreliable. From the Recorder's 
perspective 'all conceivable types of government are, at this present moment, dominated by 
the Trade.' (14) 
Within the Temperance Movement other organisations quickly developed whose 
structures and ideologies were to prove counter productive to its general aims. One such - 
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organisation was the Band of Hope whose principal aim was to ensure that children were 
imbued with the principle of self help and alive to the dangers of drink. It was a generic 
organisation, but despite its original and all enveloping objectives many questioned its ability 
to produce adult teetotalers (15) It did help to transform attitudes towards the role of children 
in society, but divisions within its general structure became evident when provincial Band of 
Hope societies, like the Lancashire and Cheshire Band of Hope Union, opposed the 
middle-class methods of Metropolitan Unions. Almost from the beginning, the Metropolitan 
Organisations had a board which consisted of a titled patron, a churchman, and sixteen vice 
presidents, twelve of whom were ministers of religion. (16) Further evidence of the split 
along class lines, can be seen in the vain attempts by many of the Temperance Movement's 
Bands of Hope, to accommodate the children of the slums. ill educated children were seen as 
a drain on the limited resources available and as a consequence were excluded from the 
system. Thus the very class of children whose futures were likely to be tied into an 
environment of intemperance, were excluded from the movement. (17) Ironically, many that 
fitted into the 'middle class category' viewed the children's Temperance Movement as 
strictly working-class organisations and avoided them. Temperance reformers unhappy with 
this situation and attempting to overcome the Movement's lower-class image, set up a special 
association for middle-class children which they called the Young Abstainers. (18) When the 
CETS was organising juvenile groups in the last decades of the nineteenth century, it also set 
up a separate society to work among the middle-class children. (19) 
With the many temperance societies seemingly following different strategies, such as 
moral suasion or prohibition or that followed by the CETS, it is difficult to draw a balanced 
picture of temperance sentiment in the UK at the end of the nineteenth century. Each society 
believed that its solution to the drink question was the right one and as a consequence 
became guilty of acting as 'the sum total of all their assemblies in England.' (20) Although 
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the IJKA's demand for prohibition dominated, there were so many proposals for legislation 
that the UKA secretary, W S. Caine commented that 'the moment the practical politician 
leaves our anchorage he is tossed upon the sea of the licensing reformer.' (21) Of the many 
bills before Parliament in 1893 it was the CETS Bill, the Manchester Bill, and the 
Westminster Bill that were continually referred to. The CETS Bill suggested that a local ad 
hoc board, popularly elected, should be given powers that would run right up to prohibition. 
The Manchester Bill would prohibit by a three-fourth majority, and the Westminster Bill by a 
two third majority. From the IJKA's point of view, and that of the Advanced Temperance 
Party, the demand was for 'a bare majority on the principle that if any difference is to be 
made at all, it should rather lean to the side of sobriety than of intemperance. (22) They 
demanded 'a Veto for the United Kingdom to be applied wherever and whenever there is a 
community ready to free itself from the curse of drink.' (23) 
These three bills were far more stringent than the Local Control Bill proposed by the 
Liberal MP Sir W. Harcourt in that they did deal with the number of licensed premises and at 
the same time gave safeguards to the clubs. Harcourt was a veteran prohibitionist and largely 
responsible for the Liberal leadership adopting the Veto. (24) Under Harcourt's Bill there 
was no provision to close all the taverns in any one parish, if the licensing justices thought 
otherwise. The magistrates could licence the sale of drink even where veto was adopted, and 
they could licence any tavern if it were called a small hotel. (25) The Bill provided that the 
taverns not called hotels or restaurants alone should be vetoed, but that 'four-sixths' instead 
of 'five-sixths' should be a sufficient majority. (26) A Mr. LowTy, a Liverpool member of 
the Committee of the National Conservative and Unionist Temperance Association, which 
was amalgamated with the CETS, believed that prohibition was an impossible achievement, 
but was in favour of a 'gradual reduction.' (27) Lowzy was against direct popular control 
suggesting that 'it was one sided' and Local Veto 'was an uncertain method of reducing 
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public houses.' (28) Lowry may well have been referring to the Trade's grip on a large group 
of working-class males, already handily organised with a vested interest in protecting the 
pub. Friendly societies and trade unions, two numerically large and important instinitions, 
held meetings in public houses not simply out of choice, but necessity. 
The disunity brought about by the many different approaches to liquor reform tended to 
undermine the apparently buoyant position of the Temperance Movement, and at the same 
time succeeded in confusing the public's perception of its true aims and objectives. National 
opinion had accepted the existence of moderate drinking, but at the same time had also 
recognised that some detailed reform was needed. The creation of this moderate opinion was 
seen by many outsiders as the finest achievement of the temperance reformers, but others 
castigated this caution. The moderates, cautious about property rights, aimed only at 
removing the worst abuses from the liquor traffic but did not seem to know how while 
radicals often suspected their own goal was impossible. (29) How this was to translate into 
practical policies therefore seemed an intractable problem. 
The Politics of Temperance 
By the late nineteenth century temperance had become a major political issue. The 
Liberal Party allied itself to many of the Temperance Movement's convictions, whereas the 
Conservative Party, in their desire to protect the 'freedom of the individual' became 
increasingly' tied to the Trade. The social and economic changes which maintained drink as 
a major issue were far reaching and gave added urgency to temperance demands. Through 
the nineteenth century, the evolution of the Temperance Movement became linked to and 
dependent upon a sympathetic social system in which it could operate and recruit. Initially, 
moral suasion was seen as the optimum solution to the drink problem, but by the end of the 
century it was clear to many temperance reformers that: 
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the reform of the liquor laws has become a political question of the first magnitude which 
no politician can ignore and no MP or aspiring candidate can hope to evade or ignore. (30) 
Prohibition demanded by the UKA was the dominant, approach to legislative change while 
more moderate groups favoured licensing reform to limit the Trade. Politicians had not 
ignored the 'drink question' in the past, but reference to Appendix I confirms the number of 
times that licensing bills had failed. 
Demands for prohibition had turned temperance reform into an overtly political issue 
which had a considerable number bills, however unsuccessful. The issue moreover had 
become party political as Liberals increasingly supported temperance, and Conservatives the 
opposing Trade interests. Home Rule for Ireland had increased ideological schisms within 
both sides of the political divide and Liberal Unionists demanded a new temperance 
initiative that would not only unite the party but would, it was hoped, gain the Liberal Party 
more support. With W S. Caine as the Liberal Unionist's Chief Whip and the formation of 
the Westminster Licensing Reform Committee, composed chiefly of Liberal Unionists, the 
opportunity for temperance reform had never been more favorable. At the turn of the centuiy 
the changing social, economic and political climate offered other opportunities for the 
Temperance Movement to adapt its propaganda which seemed to be producing results. 
Increasing concern over the squalor that blighted the lives of many working class families 
had resulted in many social surveys. Typical of such research was that undertaken by Charles 
Booth when he investigated the poor of London. Such surveys enabled the Temperance 
Movement to highlight, with some justification, that drink was the cause of so much poverty. 
(31) A study by Seebohm Rowntree in 1901 in York added to this poverty argument. 
Concern was also being expressed over physical and racial degeneration and moral decline. 
A new factor in the political fortunes of the Temperance Movement was the growth in trade 
unionism, which had found a political voice through the formation of the Independent Labour 
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Party in 1893. The growing strength of unionism, the formation of a possible third force in 
British politics, and the identification of the causes of many of society's ills meant that the 
Temperance Movement was offered many other avenues from which they could iarner 
support and at the same time provide credence to their arguments. For favourable legislation 
to reach the Statute Book, the Temperance Movement needed public opinion on its side and 
Members of Parliament who reflected such opinion in their voting patterns. The Temperance 
Movement could not sponsor its own parliamentary candidates, and even if it could, the two 
way party political system, Liberal/Conservative, that still existed at the end of the century 
would have made sure that temperance candidates received little sympathy from the 
electorate. Many MPs, however, openly supported and campaigned for temperance 
legislation, primarily in the Liberal Party. T. H. Green, the liberal political philosopher and a 
vice-president of the UKA, had asserted in 1881 that 'drink is the greatest impediment to 
freedom that exists in England. (32) Green was in favour of the liberty of the individual, but 
wanted state action to limit the liquor traffic. Liberalism was avowedly more 'ideological' 
than Conservatism. Most Liberal voters did not, even so, spend hours brooding over tracts on 
the philosophy of liberty, but they frequently expressed a desire to advance the cause of 
individual freedom and remove the obstacles in the path of the talented. (33) As it often 
does, political pragmatism overruled ideology and the Liberal Party favoured radical 
temperance reform because it thought that it would win them votes and these extremists, 
often ill-disguised prohibitionists were themselves ardently political in their methods. They 
favoured heavy taxation of the Trade and a sharp reduction in the number of liquor outlets 
without compensation. For many temperance reformers there existed a mutuality between the 
Liberal Party and the more radical temperance societies. This was confirmed by the secretary 
of the UKA, W. S. Caine, when he said that, 'we can secure nothing without their (Liberal) 
help. We are equally sure they cannot carry the constituencies without ours. (34) By 1895, 
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temperance reform had become a manifesto commitment. The call for Local Veto or Local 
Option and its first definition Direct Veto, had been around since the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Veto implied ban or prohibition whereas option signified choice. 
Whatever term was used it still meant the same thing, the right of 'any community to free 
itself from the curse of the liquor traffic.' (35) 
For the Conservatives it was the freedom of the individual that was paramount and 
temperance reform threatened the right to hold property in freedom. They argued that 
confiscation of licenses might establish a precedent for interference with other types of 
property and were therefore sympathetic to the Trade's claims of unfair treatment. The very 
profitability of the Trade gave it 'unlimited funds' to fight the anti-drink campaign whilst the 
large number of licensed premises, (156,000 in 1896) were a ready-made network of meeting 
places and propaganda points. (36) The potential power of the Trade was noted by Ensor 
when he concluded that, 'nearly every public house in the UK was an active committee room 
for the Conservative Party.' (37) It is understandable that the Conservatives were reluctant to 
inflict damage on an industry that performed such sterling service at election times. Thus 
Conservatives were reluctant to stop people from having a drink, if they could pay for it, 
while the Liberals thought that some restrictions were beneficial to the individual and to 
society generally. 
The Liberal Party approached the 1895 general election with a campaign that was 
specifically geared towards Local Veto. The Party had committed itself in the Newcastle 
Programme of 1891 to the enactment of permissive legislation granting a referendum for the 
Local Veto of the licensing of the sale of drink. (38) There was a history of Direct Veto 
Bills that had come before the House of Commons but had failed to reach the statute book. 
(see Appendix 1) In 1864 the first vote was taken on the Direct Veto, then embodied in the 
Permissive Bill introduced by Sir Wilfred Lawson; it was defeated by a majority of 257. In 
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1868 the majority against fell to 106; in 1871 to 72; in 1879, on a resolution, it was 88. It was 
also in 1871 that H. A. Bruce, the Home Secretary, saw his Licensing Bill withdrawn. In 1880 
however, the Temperance Movement witnessed its first success when the same resdiution 
was carried by a majority of 26. In 1891, a Conservative government carried the second 
reading of the Direct Veto Bill for Wales by a majority of seven and in 1893 Sir William 
Harcourt, a member of Gladstone's cabinet, introduced a Veto bill. Harcourt's experience at 
the Home Office had convinced him that many crimes were entirely due to heavy drinking 
suggesting that 'eight out of ten men sent to the gallows owed it to excessive drinking.' (39) 
The bill, however, depended on a two thirds majority in a referendum on prohibition which 
was unlikely anywhere, and excluded from the scope of the referendum many of the places 
where the middle classes got their drink, such as hotels and restaurants. (40) Harcourt's 1893 
bill failed to get a second reading and was withdrawn and the public's unpopularity towards 
Local Veto was endorsed at the 1895 election. Wright and Fahey suggest, however, that the 
Liberal manifesto commitment to Local Veto was not as clear cut as it would seem. Although 
Gladstone had endorsed Direct Local Veto, he doubted its practical value as a method of 
temperance reform. (41) The nature of the Vetoistm position meant that it tended to attract 
support from those temperance reformers who were by their nature the most uncompromising 
or, as many as their opponents claimed most fanatical. Secondly it was the Vetoists who had 
a more immediate motive than any other group for promulgating as vigorously as possible the 
idea that Direct Local Veto was the only acceptable solution. (42) What these attempts 
clearly show is that there was a willingness on the part of both Liberal and Conservative 
governments to at least debate the Local Veto issue, despite, apparently, being unwilling to 
see it reach the Statute Book. What it did for the Temperance Movement was give it a 
platform, no matter how tenuous, that allowed its arguments to be aired. 
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Local Veto was an integral part of the Advanced Temperance Party's licensing reform 
platform and despite these continual setbacks was unlikely to surrender what they perceived 
as 'our impregnable position,' which looked like it might succeed. (43) By 1895 however, 
several of the more thoughtful temperance leaders, like A.F.Hills, warned that 'neither 
progressive prohibitionists nor moderate reductionists can afford to fight without each others 
help.' (44) The Bishop of Chester, Dr. J. F. Jayne thought that the weakness of temperance 
policy lay in its inherently negative characteristics. He suggested that disinterested trusts 
might control drink sales under the auspices of the state as in the Gothenberg system. (45) 
Such companies should ensure that licensed houses became genuine refreshment houses 
which might promote the 'innocent enjoyment' of the people. (46) Jayne was not alone in 
rethinking licence reform. Others like the Bishop of Manchester and the wealthy Unionist 
shipbuilder, Arnold Hills, proposed varying schemes. None was more radical than the 
suggestion that the UKA and the CETS join forces. But Caine declared in 1893 that the 
position of the Advanced Temperance Party remained as it always had; Sunday closing, 
Direct Veto, No Compensation. (47) Caine went further by accusing those who followed a 
different line that all they did was confuse practical politicians. 
The forces of temperance did combine effectively enough at moments of great importance 
like general elections, but their different approaches to establishing a permanent solution to 
the liquor problem were always just below the surface. The inflexible nature of the vetoist 
solution for instance, attracted fanatical supporters of outright prohibition which in turn made 
it almost impossible for any other moderate temperance proposals to be voiced. The claim by 
the supporters of Local Veto that one of the two major parties had adopted the specific policy 
they advocated was justifiable. The problem with this stance was that it presented the 
supporters of temperance and the general public with a take it or leave it situation. Electors 
were asked by the North of England Temperance League to 'weigh well the issue; consider 
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what defeat means and what victory will give.' (48) Moderate temperance reformers from 
organisations like the CETS, earnestly canvassed Parliamentary candidates, of all 
persuasions, for their support. Those temperance supporters already unhappy with the 
vetoists election manifesto, were also plagued by the old problem of whether a vote should 
be cast for party or for temperance reform? 
Added to the problems of the Temperance Movement during the election campaign was 
the 'volcanic energy' with which the Trade clashed head on with the anti-drink brigade. (49) 
London publicans, for instance, were able to mount a cohesive strategy against all the 
temperance candidates, mainly due to customer affiliation. Cards and posters were placed in 
the windows of many licensed houses, proclaiming that 'this house will be closed if the 
Liberals get elected.' Many people were not clear on what Local Veto meant, and the Trade 
was quick to exploit this ignorance proclaiming that 'all public houses would be closed and 
total prohibition imposed on the working classes.' (50) The Trade countered the Local Veto 
attack by suggesting, to the working class in particular that publicans were able to offer 
cheap, warm and well-lit rooms. Brewers defended the Trade as 'defending the right of your 
lodge to meet were it likes free from dictation,' and assailed Local Veto as 'an outrageous 
specimen of class legislation.' (51) Public houses were the only places of relaxation outside 
the home which were usually within easy walking distance, opened their doors from early 
morning to nearly midnight and charged no entry fee. (52) Trade societies were also quick 
to protect their interests. The Yorkshire Victualler Defence League issued an appeal to its 
members to use their 'enormous power' in defence of their just rights and for the protection 
of their houses. (53) Trade societies spent a great deal of their income on campaign literature. 
In the general election of 1895 the National Trade Defence League produced nearly 900,000 
leaflets, 90,000 posters and 77,000 small cartoons, while the district offices added hundreds 
of thousands more pieces of propaganda. (54) The Trade Defence League, a co-ordinating 
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association for all the individual trade defence organisations throughout the country, entered 
the fray with gusto; the League claimed to have spent only £5,000 on this campaign but the 
prohibitionists were sure they had spent a great deal more. (55) 
The Liberal Party entered the 1895 general election with a manifesto committed to Local 
Veto but this temperance ideology failed to convince the electorate of its merits and the 
Liberals lost to the Conservatives. Whatever strengths the Conservatives had in their 
approach to the 1895 general election, it did not win them the election; it was the Liberals 
who lost it and blame was quickly apportioned. (56) The Liberal Westminster Gazette had 
always resented the commitment to the Veto and in a poll of the 157 unsuccessful Liberal 
candidates on the causes of defeat, it recorded 134 who found the Veto harmful, 16 of no 
great harm and seven helpful. Although the candidates emphasised the damage done among 
the working class, they believed the Veto was unpopular with all classes. (57) The 
Temperance Movement had its first full inquest at the National Temperance Congress at 
Chester, only a few months after the ill-fated election. Many suggested that a 'more realistic 
approach to the temperance question be found other than that taken by the prohibitionists.' 
(58) The Advanced Temperance Party, had forced the Liberal Party into such a political 
predicament over its campaign for some form of prohibition that the prohibitionist vote had 
become 'too dear at the price' and for historians like Dingle, marked the end of the UKA's 
hegemony in the world of temperance. (59) Despite the Liberal/temperance setback at the 
1895 general election, however, a Royal Commission was appointed in 1896: 
To inquire into the operation and administration of the laws relating to the sale of 
intoxicating liquors, and to examine and report upon proposals that may be made for 
amending the aforesaid laws in the public interest. (60) 
This commission provided the ideal, if unexpected, platform for the Temperance Movement 
to promote its cause but, as the temperance demands of different organisations were poles 
apart, could they present a unified front? 
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The Peel Commission 
Despite the fact that temperance had suffered a real blow to its campaign, new temperance 
initiatives, discussed before the 1895 election, were beginning to materialise. Pressure from 
the Church of England hierarchy and from the Westminster Licensing Reform Committee, 
composed chiefly of Liberal Unionists and led by Francis Fox, resulted in a meeting between 
the Bishop of London, the Liberal unionists and the government. At the meeting it was 
proposed that the government set up a commission or committee of enquiry. The demand for 
an enquiry was not directed by political opponents or by radical temperance organisations, 
but by men from the government back benches and the Church of England. Anxious not to 
be seen as unwilling and inflexible to positive change, and not wanting to be left out of plans 
that might jeopardise their profit margins, H. Cosmo Bonsor NIP representing the National 
Trade Defence Association, canvassed support for the idea among the Trade. (61) It was, 
therefore, and somewhat ironically, the Salisbury government which revived and redirected 
the Temperance Movement by creating the Royal Commission on the Licensing Laws in 
April 1896. (62) Political cynics such as Lawson viewed it as nothing but a way of 
postponing the issue until the next general election, 'the only reason for the enquiry was a 
move to postpone any dealing with the liquor question.' (63) Edward Porrit, implied that 
Salisbury and Balfour might have agreed to an enquiry only in order to postpone passing a 
measure of temperance reform which could offend the Trade, thus ensuring the continued 
vigour of Trade support. (64) 
The Commission's terms of reference were those proposed by the Westminster Committee: 
To inquire into the operation and administration of the laws relating to the sale of 
intoxicating liquors, and to examine and report upon proposals that may be made for 
amending the aforesaid laws in the public interest,' with the addition of a trade amendment, 
due regard being had to the rights of the individual. (65) 
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Whilst this wording represented a compromise between the Temperance Movement and the 
licensed trade, it also provided a potential battle ground. In an effort to promote fairness and 
balance, the Commission consisted of eight members of the licensed trade, eight temp rance 
reformers and eight neutral members; the government perhaps hoping that this mix would 
produce a report embodying compromise between extreme opinions. 
The setting up of the Commission came at one of the most critical moments of temperance 
history. The Temperance Movement's most ardent supporters, the Liberal Party, had been 
resoundingly beaten in the 1895 general election and a post mortem on this defeat by Liberal 
MPs suggested that the call for Local Veto was responsible. The 1.JIKA leading spokesman 
and its long time president, Sir Wilfred Lawson, MP had been so confident of the attitude of 
the people that in a letter to The Times he said that he had no manner of doubt that vast 
numbers of the people are eager to obtain this power to abolish drink.' (66) After the 
election, Lawson conceded that the election result 'delivered a devastating blow to the 
Temperance Movement. Drink swept the country more thoroughly than it had done before.' 
(67) The electorates opposition to the Liberal Party's commitment to Local Veto was made 
clear at the 1895 election. It not only aroused hostility from the Trade but also, it would 
appear, among a large section of the working class who were most likely to suffer from the 
restrictions. It is also probable that increases in consumption were due to the celebrations of 
working class drinkers. By 1896 the Royal Commission had been appointed under the 
chairmanship of Lord Peel, a liberal Unionist and former speaker of the House of Commons. 
(68) The investigation was extensive and far reaching; it was appointed in the spring of 
1896 and it was the summer of 1899 before its Final Report - in reality two distinct reports - 
was presented to Parliament. During that time the Commission held 134 sittings, questioned 
259 witnesses and heard 74,451 answers. The quality and clarity of the evidence given by 
many of the witnesses who appeared before the Commission varied considerably but in the 
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final analysis amounted to a complex mass of factual and statistical data, information, 
arguments, grievances and outright propaganda. It would be impossible within the remit of 
this paper to investigate all that was said during this three year enquiry here I shall 
concentrate on those witnesses appearing on behalf of the Temperance Movement. The Peel 
Commission gave the Temperance Movement a public forum in which to plead its case and 
the question is, did they? 
That there was disharmony within the Temperance Movement has been established and 
was public knowledge before the Commission was called. Moderate temperance supporters, 
like a founder member of the CETS, a Mr. Touchstone, thought that it was mischief to 
contemplate prohibition even as an experiment. As far as he was concerned. 'it would throw 
back the temperance question.... The Local Veto bill would not stop people from drinking, it 
would only bring the law into disrepute.' (69) Any talk of prohibition and there will be 
reaction to it. (70) E. Stafford Howard, vice chairman of the CETS suggested that the society 
looked upon the Trade 'as legitimate in the sense that there is no wrong in people drinking 
alcohol; in strict moderation, and in the sense that the Trade is sanctioned by law ...' (71) 
William Joyson-Hicks, a member of the CETS executive committee confirmed that his 
society 'was in no way a prohibition society. The CETS had two pledges, a moderate pledge 
and a total abstaining pledge.' (72) 
Despite misgivings from the more radical temperance men such as Caine and Lawson, 
when they wrote in a letter to The Times that, 'whatever conclusions the Commission may 
reach, the UKA, as a body, would continue to press for Local Veto.' (73) Such statements by 
Caine are hardly surprising considering the track record of the Local Veto campaign. Local 
Veto was the theme tune sting by those witnesses who appeared before the Commission from 
hard line societies like the UKA who had prohibition as its sole objective. In his evidence 
Samuel Pope suggested that the UKA principle of 'veto' was primarily set out as 'a simple 
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measure whereby non-teetotalers could help to remove the disgrace and land-shame of 
drunkenness.' (74) He believed that 'the drink evil is one of the most consuming evils in the 
country; that no regulation of the drink traffic in any other way is or can be satisfactory.' (75) 
For Pope, Local Veto would only be an extension of the present system, which was already 
local and permissive, by associating the people with the licensing authority. (76) He agreed 
with Local Veto up to the point of total prohibition as it seemed the practical way of carrying 
it out, so that one locality did not have to wait on another.( 77) Pope also concluded that 
there was a strong demand for some measure of popular control, especially among the 
working classes, as it was they who had experienced the most casualties from the excesses of 
drink. (78) Their commitment to popular control, however, was inconsistent. C. E. Sutcliff, 
a member of the executive committee of the British Temperance League gave evidence based 
on a test poll conducted in Burnley in 1887, when three questions concerning the Veto and 
the number of licenses in the town were asked. Sutcliff was of the firm opinion that 
'magistrates could only grant licenses subject to the will of the people.' But when asked how 
often the 'will of the people' should be questioned Sutcliff was unable to respond. (79) The 
Commission again placed Sutcliff in a difficult position when he affirmed that a large 
majority of the Burnley ratepayers were, 'in principle' in favour of Local Veto. (80) But, 
when pushed, confirmed that he would only trust the ratepayers to suppress the sale of drink, 
not give them the power to increase it; even if that is what they wanted. (81) Sutcliff was in 
favour of absolute prohibition, and said that he would have laws making the manufacture and 
sale of intoxicating liquor illegal. (82) 
James Whyte, Secretary of the IJKA, was of the opinion that 'the consumption of alcohol 
was on the increase and although open drunkenness is less, soaking drunkenness is more 
common.' (83) The present licensing system was, therefore, a failure, and that 'no locality 
should be saddled with the liquor traffic against its will.' (84) He was in favour of giving the 
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ratepayers in any district the power, by a majority, to totally prohibit the sale of liquor in their 
own neighbourhood. (85) When asked what would be the UKA's policy if it failed to get 
prohibition, Whyte replied that he would go on asking and would not rule out 'limited 
co-operation with other temperance organisations.' (86) This scope for compromise, 
however, proved short-lived. When questioned on Local Veto, Whyte confirmed that 'it was 
that which the UKA solely advocated.' (87) He believed that the people would have the 
power in two directions: 'the power of Prohibition and the power of getting back to their old 
position.' But like other temperance witnesses, he was not prepared to trust the people with 
the power of increase, only decrease. (88) Whyte also reaffirmed his radical but paradoxical 
opposition by stating that they (the TJKA) wanted the suppression of the use of alcohol but 
did not think that prohibition was a practical proposition. (89) Whyte, turning on his main 
supporters, believed that the Liberal Party 'was just like the Tories' and, as far as he was 
concerned, 'the Liberal Party was subject to flying to get votes from anybody that can control 
votes and if they think the Trade is in this position, they are prepared to hedge about it as the 
Tories are.' (90) Whyte also maintained that there was evidence to suggest that there was a 
desire among working men, for local prohibition; illustrated, he argued, by the competition 
that exists to obtain houses in the prohibition areas in London, Liverpool and elsewhere. (91) 
Mr. Crossfield JP in his evidence said that there were large areas in which licensed houses 
were forbidden by the ground-landlord and the working class population were eager to get 
out of a neighbourhood where public houses were plentiful into one where they were scarce, 
(92) 
In appointing a diversity of opinion among the twenty-four members of the Commission, 
the government had perhaps hoped for a report embodying a working compromise. But as 
The Times accurately predicted: 
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Commissions, like the Peel enquiry, constructed upon the representative principle frequently 
fail to arrive at any coherent or authoritative conclusion. The representatives never forget that 
they hold a brief for interested parties, consequently anything like a fairly homogenous 
collective opinion is impossible from the outset... the Commission as a whole is devoid of 
authority. (93) 
Problems soon materialised as accusations abounded about Peel's high handed approach to 
his colleagues. Peel had in fact been converted to the outright annual conditions of licenses - 
to re-endowing licensing authorities, after a certain number of years' notice, with the power 
to refuse renewal without question. His conversion gave temperance reformers great 
encouragement, even though it split the Commission. (94) This split was brought about by 
Peel's draft report which he had circulated to Commission members. (95) The report called 
for substantial compulsory reduction in the number of licensed premises, with only limited 
compensation, and severe restrictions for those permitted to survive. Sir Algernon West, vice 
chairman of the Commission and a recognised neutral, vigorously protested at the way Peel 
abandoned procedural rules in an effort to get this report accepted. West approached Balfour 
for legal clarification and was informed that it was the Commission that was paramount and 
not its designated chairman. In Peel's defence, Whittaker (a temperance Commission 
member) suggested that it was misleading and unjustifiable to argue that the chairman had 
done anything to prevent a full discussion of his draft report. Whittaker also concluded that 
any objection West and his colleagues (eight trade commissioners and all the neutrals) may 
have had to the chairman's handling of Commission proceedings was not the real reason for 
their revolt; what they really objected to was the fact that Peel's proposals offended the 
licensing trade Commissioners. Writing in the Nineteenth Century in March 1900, Whittaker 
observed that the six neutral members who followed West rather than Peel, were supporters 
of Salisbuiy's government and that the licensing question had become inseparable from 
political ones. Whittaker concluded therefore that, 'the close connection which exists 
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between the Unionist Party and the liquor trade is notorious; they stand and fall together.' 
(96) 
Due to Peel's absence through illness, the Commission went into recess, during which 
time West drafted alternative proposals that reduced the number of licenses but proposed 
compensation for the licensees which, effectively split the Commission into two groups, 
each producing its own Report. Both Reports agreed that there should be a reduction in the 
numbers of public houses, but they totally disagreed over compensation. Peel's Minority 
Report was divided up into five major sections. The first three dealt respectively with 
England and Wales; with Scotland Ireland, and the fourth with clubs. The fifth section was 
directed at reduction, compensation and the Veto. Peel insisted on statutory reduction 
according to the proportion of the local population, and that it should begin after a period of 
notice of five or seven years, and that it should be unaccompanied by any form of 
compensation. (97) Peel proposed an end to the practice of grocers only needing a licence 
from the Inland Revenue suggesting that the so called grocers licenses should come under 
the full discretion of the licensing authorities. Peel recommended denying 'off licences, for 
the sale of bottled wine and spirits, to any merchant who sold other goods on the same 
premises. (98) Those in opposition to Peel, accepted the former but not the latter proposal, 
and for many it was this that made Peel sign the Minority Report. West was 'so horrified' 
with these off licence proposals that he warned Herbert Gladstone that they would alienate 
the grocers and the moderates and 'end in as ruinous a result as Local Veto.' (99) With 
regard to the Veto, Peel recommended a postponement, believing that there was no evidence 
to suggest that public opinion in England, was strong enough to justify the introduction of 
Local Veto. What Peel proposed however was the right of Local Veto in Wales and Scotland, 
after five years and seven years respectively, and in England at some time in the indefinite 
future. Whilst agreeing to many of Peel's proposals, the five prohibitionist Commissioners 
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signed an addendum in which they confirmed their belief in the desirability of Local Veto, 
Sunday Closing for England and no money compensation for public houses. (100) 
Those signing the Majority Report agreed that 'a gigantic evil remains to be remedied' 
and that one solution could be found in reducing the number of licensed houses. The Report 
had also concluded that the expectation of renewal had for a long series of years amounted to 
practical certainty in the absence of misconduct. The licensees had consequently acquired an 
actual and well recognised market value, and many, if not the majority, had purchased their 
licensed houses themselves without a license. When licensed property was compulsorily 
taken for public improvements, the licensee should receive the full market value of his 
license, goodwill and premises with an added ten per cent for compulsory purchase; the 
owner, even when his reversion was remote, also received, as in the case of any other 
business, the market value of his interest. The Majority Report acknowledged the probability 
of renewal as being incidentally recognised by public opinion, and came down in favour of 
the principle of compensation. Such compensation to be equivalent to the fair and intrinsic 
value of the license or goodwill, apart from the extreme inflation caused, in some cases, by 
excessive compensation. Awards of compensation to were be paid from monies raised by the 
trade itself (98) 
Aflennath 
With the next general election on the horizon, the two reports demanded some 
response from both political parties. The Conservatives were still unlikely to introduce any 
reforms that would affect their relationship with the Trade, and they could always say that it 
was too late for any measure to be introduced into the existing government programme. On 
the other hand, pressure mounted for some kind of action, not from militant temperance 
reformers, but from the moderate temperance supporters in the House of Lords, like the 
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bishop of Winchester. He introduced a resolution, urging the Government to give legislative 
effect to the relatively uncontroversial recommendations which both reports had in common. 
(102) Both Reports established a number of recommended licenses in proportion to the local 
population and required a reduction to this maximum, and both compelled the license holders 
who retained their licences to pay money for compensation. 
Neither party could totally ignore the temperance issue, but it again fell to the Liberal 
Party, as the main political mainstay of the Temperance Movement, to offer some firm 
legislative commitment. The Liberal MP and leading prohibitionist, T. P. Whittaker, became 
the focus of an organised campaign to get such a commitment. In agreement with Herbert 
Gladstone, Asquith and Campbell-Bannerman, he accepted, on behalf of the Temperance 
Movement, the principle of compensation with the proviso that any compensation paid would 
not be drawn from government funding, but would be provided by the Trade. He also agreed 
to the postponement of the Local Veto in England. In return the Liberal leadership agreed to 
accept temperance reform along the general lines of the Majority Report. (103) The 
compromise in effect was that the Temperance Movement would not continue to press for 
demands over and above those advocated in the Majority Report, and the Liberal Party would 
give high priority to reforms going as far as the Report. 
The declaration that the Liberal leadership was behind these legislative proposals came 
when Campbell-Bannerman suggested on 15 November 1899 that, with Peel's proposals the 
friends of temperance had a 'code of reforms which could rightly be adopted.' He concluded 
by stating that Peel's Report as a whole 'from the beginning to the end of it, I can see nothing 
which is in the least in conflict with Liberal principles and therefore which does not deserve 
Liberal support.' (104) Whittaker then produced a manifesto, signed by Liberal M Ps and 
leading clergymen, which accepted Campbell-Bannerman's proposals as a declaration of the 
Liberal Leadership's intent to enact the principles of the Peel Report. This manifesto was of 
huge importance to both the Liberal Party and the Temperance Movement and its 
significance was not lost on those opposed to anything that might weaken either Party or 
Movement. Many feared a similar debacle to the acceptance of the Local Veto at the 1895 
general election, and warned the Liberal Chief Whip, Herbert Gladstone that the adoption of 
the policies of Lord Peel's Report would once again alienate the voting public. (105) Fearful 
of not only losing public support, but also aware of the alarm bells that had begun to ring on 
behalf of the influential Liberal liquor traders, Gladstone continued to press 
Campbell-Bannerman that his speech had not constituted a party endorsement of the Peel 
Report. Campbell- Bannerman responded with a speech on the 19 December 1899 which 
suggested that the Peel Report should be taken, 'as a basis, without necessarily adhering to all 
the precise and detailed recommendations.' Gladstone believed that this would amount to the 
'greatest good being done,' and that 'public sentiment in Scotland and Wales justified their 
advancement towards Local Veto at a faster pace than England.' (106) 
Among the Temperance Movement, the omens for compromise were propitious, even 
among hard-liners who realised that the Peel Report offered a practical programme. They 
would also have realised that the eight neutral Commissioners or 'Christians at large' as they 
became known, had signed the Majority Report in the belief that only the recommendations 
accepted by the trade members could reach the statute book. (107) Also heavily ranged 
against extremists was the defeat of their main political supporters in Parliament. The 
Commissioners had accepted that most people still regarded alcoholic liquor as 'an ordthary 
article of diet, which is only harmful if taken in excess,' (108) and that the trade 
propagandists denunciation of the Veto, as an interference with personal liberty and the rights 
of property, had found public support. Despite these indications, the radicals could not bring 
themselves to abandon their trenches. 
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The moderates in the Temperance Movement and the leaders of the Liberal Party were 
still up against hard line vetoists, like Sir Wilfred Lawson, President of the UKA and a 
Liberal MP. Lawson led a section of advanced temperance supporters in protest against the 
line taken by Campbell-Bannerman and the manifesto signatories. (109). Whittaker and 
Caine, and most of the prohibitionist leaders saw only frustration ahead if they did not take 
advantage of the opportunity to secure the moderate allies that Peel's Report afforded but a 
special meeting at Newcastle of the General Committee of the North of England Temperance 
League, although welcoming some aspects of the Peel Report, resolutely opposed 
compensation, and recorded its determination to press for total Sunday closing and the Veto 
for the whole of the UK. (110) This meeting and others held in the provinces came out 
against the Whittaker compromise, whereas the London based societies continued to uphold 
them. To a large extent this was because the strongholds of radical temperance opinion 
traditionally lay in areas were Nonconformity was strong. There was also the feeling that the 
Temperance Movement throughout the country was being dictated to by a small clique of its 
self appointed representatives, isolated in their London offices and over-ready to 
accommodate the Liberal Party bosses (ill) The Peel Report remained the basis of the 
Liberal programme for temperance reform but the Report lost the centre of the stage in 
temperance controversy as its most ardent partisans fell under the spell of another 
temperance scheme, disinterested management. (112) 
What then can be said about the Temperance Movement at the end of the nineteenth 
century? From its inception it had certainly made its presence known and it had grown 
enormously. It had convinced many drinkers the value of sobriety and its political ambitions 
reached a peak in the 1895 general election. Local Veto failed to convince the electorate and 
both the Liberal Party and the Temperance Movement were checked in their respective 
ambitions. The Conservative government appointed a Royal Commission, offering the 
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Temperance Movement a monumental opportunity to plead its case which it noticeably failed 
to do. Temperance and the drink question continued to be an issue of considerable political 
concern in the late nineteenth century, as society continually sought answers to the moral 
perplexities that confronted it. Despite the many solutions that it offered in response to the 
drink question, the Movement seemed unable to come up with one that was unchallengeable. 
Moderate viewpoint became stronger but stamped on by reactionary hard liners. Divisions in 
the Movement prevented concentrated action and undermined effectiveness. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, the Temperance Movement had reached a position where it could 
effectively influence a political party to pursue a temperance agenda. Its prime objective was 
to successfully neutralise the liquor industry by moral suasion and the value of total 
abstinence or by effective legislation. It did persuade many to abstain but not enough, it was 
unsuccessful at comprehensive legislation and the Trade continued to prosper. Did these 
failures signal the demise of the Temperance Movement or was it still a force to be reckoned 
with? 
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Chapter 2. 	 A Force To Be Reckoned With? 1900-1914 
Introduction 
The prime objective of the Temperance Movement was the abolition of the drink trade 
which it had set out to accomplish by moral suasion. Not satisfied with this approach, the 
more radical temperance reformers demanded prohibition but, as chapter one shows, the 
electorate in the general election of 1895 were not convinced by the Local Veto arguments 
and the political ally of the Temperance Movement, the Liberal Party, wanted to disassociate 
itself from the Veto completely. At the turn of the century therefore, the Temperance 
Movement was left with something of a dilemma. If the pursuit of prohibition was dead in 
the water and moral suasion seemingly unable to deliver the prime objective, was it still a 
force to be reckoned with? 
This chapter will address this question, but it is worth considering where temperance 
reformers stood at the beginning of the twentieth century. Their focus was increasingly on the 
social ills of the time but they maintained the view that the working class, in particular, 
contributed to its own ills by its drinking habits. The Temperance Movement was a powerful 
force when it came to highlighting such social issues as poverty, but surveys conducted by 
Rowntree and Sherwell and later by Snowden, gave other reasons for the causation of 
poverty. Sherwell also concluded that even if bad housing conditions were the result of prior 
drinking habits, the Temperance Movement had still to face the fact that slums existed. (I) 
Added to this argument was a Board of Trade Survey in 1907 which concluded that working 
class drunkenness was no longer the sharp social question that it had been thirty years ago. 
The Report argued that the chief reasons for this transformation of habit were education, 
greater recreational facilities, improved sanitary conditions and in a few cases 'the influence 
of the Temperance Movement.' (2) The erosion of its poverty argument and a fall in the 
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levels in drunkenness and consumption, prompted many temperance reformers to reconsider 
their position. What (Ireenway calls temperance reductionists, many of them members of the 
CETS, were dissatisfied with the progress of the moral suasionists and at odds with the 
prohibitionists. They accepted the legitimacy of the trade in alcohol, but thought that it was 
dangerous and excessive and should be diminished. But even here there was division with 
some reductionists appealing for a reduction in the number of licenses, others wanting a 
reduction in hours, whilst for others it was local control. (3) On top of which was the issue 
of compensation. Nor, as we saw in the last chapter, had prohibitionists gone away. 
One can see therefore that the pursuit of temperance ambitions at the beginning of the 
twentieth century was unclear. Demand for Local Veto had become muted and the moral 
suasionists had lost the force of many of their arguments which had opened up the 
temperance debate to embrace restrictive licensing of retail outlets, public control and 
ownership of the drink trade and increases in leisure activities. Ironically, this widening of 
the debate makes it possible to argue, suggests Weir that, 'pressure for temperance reform 
was stronger between 1900 and 1914 than it had been during the previous thirty years.' (4) 
Agreeing with this hypothesis are Williams and Brake who argued that, 'notwithstanding 
legislative failure, the temperance forces had never been stronger and, up to the First World 
War, remained a threat to the liquor trade.' (5) Following the defeat of the Liberal Party and 
faced with a triumphant Conservative Party and a powerful vested interest in the Trade, the 
Temperance Movement knew that it had to close ranks. It not only had to adopt policies that 
could be seen by both radical and moderate temperance supporters as acceptable; it also had 
to convince a somewhat sceptical Liberal Party that its future temperance proposals would 
not lose the Liberals a third general election. Could the Movement rise to the challenge? Was 
it a defeated demoralised and out of date organisation or did it still command enough support 
and energy to influence the continuing debate around drink? 
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Temperance. Politics and the Trade 
What then is to be made of the mood of temperance reformers as they entered the 
twentieth century? In the 1899-1900 Report of the Temperance Committee of the Methodist 
Conference there was a firm commitment to a major extension of its work which included 
the establishment of a home for inebriates and the formation of a connexional Band of Hope 
and Temperance Union. This was despite a falling membership and a decreasing availability 
of funds. (6) In the Good Templars Watchword, the official journal of the Grand Lodge of 
England, it was suggested that, 'experience and experiment has shown that individual and 
national sobriety can only be obtained by the complete outlawry of alcoholic drinks.' (7) 
Forever optimistic, the Temperance Record declared on the 6 December 1900 'that 
temperance reform is in the air.' The Record believed that, 'in the political, the social and the 
religious world there is an impression, amounting to a conviction, that something must be 
done,' and that, 'a volume of public opinion is in favour of temperance reform which no 
Parliament can long de&  with impunity.' (8) Professor W. Carter suggested that 'in 
Liverpool the present position of the Temperance Movement is most encouraging.' Joseph 
MaIms, Grand Chief Templar hoped that, 'the splendid progress made in 1902 would be 
repeated in 1903.' Charles Wakely, secretary of the TJKA Band of Hope Union thought that 
1903, 'could be of great significance for the Temperance Movement' suggesting that 'the 
Movement should encourage the wealthy and leisured classes to show a greater 
understanding of the Temperance Movement.' (9) 
Others, however, added a note of caution. J. H. Lear Caton, Secretary of the Birmingham 
Temperance Society, suggested that there was a serious danger in the 'multiplicity of the 
organisation beyond its working strength.' He criticised new temperance organisations, 
believing that they were 'a drag upon the wheel of progress and an assistance to the enemy 
rather than his own side.' (10) There were constant calls for unity and the Temperance 
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Record suggested that, 'if temperance reform of all shades is to be achieved then it must rest 
on a solid basis otherwise it will not be unity but a conglomerate.' (11) Many introspective 
questions were being asked about the influence of the Temperance Movement. The Record 
believed that although there was an acceptance that much had been done there was a growing 
pessimism that the Temperance Movement had had its thy. (12) The Record acknowledged 
the fact that temperance sentiment had, 'permeated society and greatly altered public opinion 
as to drinking' but, despite the enthusiasm by which it pursued its cause, it also believed that 
the Temperance Movement had only touched 'the fringes of the population leaving the great 
mass to a large extent untouched and uninfluenced.' (13) Many temperance reformers knew 
that the local temperance societies left a lot to be desired, but were equally scathing of the 
central temperance organisations and their journals. F. Sherlock, the editor of the The 
Watchword questioned the role of literature in temperance work, suggesting that: 
It was an open secret that the gloomy editions of the temperance press are hated rivals, 
thirsting for each other's blood and on occasions sling ink at one another with even greater 
zest and vehemence than mark their pretty style when discussing that organised hypocrisy, 
which calls itself the Trade. (14) 
Like other journals, the Watchword was a forum for the views of its readers and many 
letter writers questioned the purpose of the journal. They suggested that 'the paper is too 
dry;' 'there is nothing in it;' 'we have no time to read it;' 'it is far too dear and there are not 
enough pictures.' The Watchword defended its role as a temperance journal pointing out that 
its 'large displays of adverts; general items of lodge news; high class illustrations and helpful 
discussions made it well worth a penny.' It did however concede that it was not perfect. (15) 
No doubt temperance journals such as the British Temperance Advocate, the Alliance News 
and the Watchword would have been mainly read by temperance supporters but, in an effort 
to keep their readers informed of temperance news, the journals became dull and repetitive 
for readers and of not the slightest interest to those in society who regarded temperance 
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reformers with disdain. Letters to the Temperance Record showed that many were 
extremely apprehensive regarding the future of temperance. Archbishop Wilberforce 
suggested that, 'the outlook for 1903 was extremely gloomy.' He believed that, 'the masses 
are drinking much and we are slowly losing our commercial supremacy - the liquor traffic 
rules.' (16) Lady Biddulph was of the opinion that, 'its meetings have lost power; they are 
full of believers and do not touch the fringe of belief and ignorance outside them. (17) In 
less emotive language, Sydney and Beatrice Webb suggested that whilst the growth of the 
Temperance Movement since 1830 had been impressive and had had an effect on public 
opinion this had not been reflected in the total consumption of drink. (18) That there was 
pessimism within temperance ranks is also understandable as their flagship of Local Veto 
was resoundingly rejected by the electorate. For over half a century the Temperance 
Movement had been campaigning for the abolition of the drink industry and despite flashes 
of optimism the sense of frustration at the lack of progress was perhaps tangible 
Despite a vigorous campaign the Liberal Party was emphatically beaten in the 1900 
general election, prompting it and the Temperance Movement once again to reexamine their 
temperance strategy. Surprisingly the UKA had publicly welcomed the Minority Report of 
the Peel Commission. (19) It endorsed the idea of municipalization of the liquor trade 
together with 'disinterested management;' a concept developed by the Swedish town of 
Gothenberg. It had been thought that the UKA was a movement that demanded too much in 
the way of temperance legislation and so tried to modifS' its position. In October 1900, 
James Whyte, the secretary of the UKA said that, 'the Alliance does not believe that anything 
short of Local Veto will enable the people of this country to deal satisfactorily with the 
liquor traffic.' (20) But later, in a pamphlet published in 1901, the UKA concluded that 'the 
advantage of Local Veto is that it is not antagonistic to, or incompatible with, any system of 
licensing.' (21) A review by Noel Buxton and Walter Hoare in 1901 suggested: 
that vetoists and advocates of public management have learned to despair of a direct victory 
for their cause and have seen that the wisest course is to join the 'practical reformers' in 
support of a scheme for improving the present licensing system. (22) 
The debate over disinterested management continued throughout the early years of the 
century. The British Temperance League at its annual meeting in Huddersfleld expressed its 
strong condemnation of all schemes for public management, whether put forward by 
municipalities or individuals and called upon temperance reformers everywhere to offer 
strenuous opposition to such proposals. In a fiuther attempt to stem the tide of a more 
pragmatic approach to temperance reform, Whyte denounced those who advocated diluting 
the Veto. Whittaker had published a National Temperance Manifesto which advocated 
disinterested management as an alternative form of local control to the Veto and accepted the 
necessity of compensation, reasoning that the moment was right, 'to provide a rallying point 
for the great mass of reasonable temperance and earnest non-abstaining opinion to 
consolidate if disaster is to be avoided.' (23) Wright suggests, however, that by 1905, a 
large number of temperance organisations, including those with a wholly or strongly 
prohibitionist bias, had declared themselves against management in the public interest. Most 
of these societies belonged to the Advanced Temperance Party (ATP) and were attached to 
the Nonconfonnist Churches. The rift between the two opposing viewpoints widened and 
deepened with the formation of the Temperance Legislation League in 1905. Its aims were 
'to organise and concentrate temperance opinion in the country on reasonable and practical 
lines emphasising the link with the Peel Report and disinterested management.' (24) 
The attempt to formulate a more moderate position based on the conclusions of the Peel 
Report thus only exacerbated the divisions within the Movement, prompting further bouts of 
introspection. In September 1910 an article in the British Temperance Advocate asked: 'What 
is the next step forward'? Organisation or continued chaos'? (25) The secretary of the 
Birmingham Temperance Society, J.H. Lear-Caton again asked whether the Temperance 
Movement had the finest organisation in the country. Caton suggested that there was such a 
bewildering number of temperance organisations that this was not an indication of strength, 
but one of weakness and that what was needed was 'not more organisations but more 
organisation.' He continued his diatribe by suggesting that the Temperance Movement is at 
present 'a mob' and that what was needed was a National Temperance Crusade that would 
produce, 'a system of organisation that would weld together all our stray forces.' From 
others in the Temperance Movement however there was still a great deal of optimism. 
Speaking at the British Temperance League's 78th annual conference, Professor Woodhead 
said that in every part of the country he had found, 'a band of earnest, conscientious, 
persevering, enthusiastic temperance workers.' He believed that they were, 'on the eve of a 
great advance in the temperance cause ... and the whole of the temperance societies in this 
country were stronger than they were twenty years ago.' (26) But the theme of 
disorganisation was back on the agenda, when at a Kent County Temperance Congress the 
secretary of the British Temperance League said: 
Here we have reached the great failure of the Temperance Movement. We have never been 
one in organisation, but an incoherent mass of atoms without cohesion, except in some great 
national crisis, when, for a short time, we have worked together but only to fall asunder and 
become inert again as soon as the crisis has passed. (27) 
The Temperance Movement was up against 'the Trade,' a group of powerful vested 
interests which sought to undermine the Movement at every opportunity although it did not 
have everything its own way. Temperance advocates constantly referred to the social ills 
caused by the Trade suggesting that it was responsible for the low army recruitment and 
physical degeneration hence putting the nation at risk. At the same time, the medical 
profession continued to add its voice by reaffirming the link between alcohol, infant 
mortality and national efficiency. George Sims in a series of newspaper articles entitled The 
C'y of the Children suggested that working-class mothers frequented pubs where they gave 
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their babies and toddlers alcohol, and exposed them to deadly respiratory diseases. His 
discoveries provoked a national campaign in which a committee of Liberal politicians, 
leading medical authorities, temperance officials and religious leaders eventually secured 
legislation excluding children under fourteen from licensed premises. (28) In the 
communications media of the early twentieth century, the Temperance Movement 
continually repeated the message about alcohol's pernicious effects on health, reproduction 
and longevity and emphasised the links of alcoholism with insanity, consumption and infant 
mortality. (29) Crapster suggests that there was a certain justification in the Trade's 
statement that the claims of the Temperance Movement were fraudulent. Although ostensibly 
concerned primarily with the welfare of the drinker, some seemed more concerned to 
destroy the drinks industry: 
If the objective was to reform the drunkard and improve the habits of the people, the brewer 
and the allied trades would heartily cooperate with [the temperance reformers] but that is not 
their objective. There was a vendetta against the brewing trade seeking its total destruction. 
(30) 
As a consequence of all these attacks the Trade's political influence was not constant 
between 1875-1914. Its power to act as a unified force was also in doubt as bitter economic 
rivalry between brewers and retailers added to a growing sectionalism. Tied house practices, 
clubs sponsored or assisted by brewers and direct delivery of beer, all generated retail 
rancour. Gutzke suggests that if the Brewer's Society had proposed guidelines for these 
activities, based on consensus, then the sectionalism would not have been as great. (31) 
Falling membership in the Trade's organisations and a deepening suspicion about Unionists' 
commitment to their cause further disunited the brewers and the retailers. Trade prestige was 
also under attack. Many thought that greed was the main motivation for the Trade's haste in 
buying most ch-ink shops and when the licensed property market collapsed they were 
considered reckless. (32) The Trades' ability to act as a 'pressure group' has also been 
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brought into question by historians such as Fahey and Weir who stressed this disunity; its 
subsidiary role by 1900 in a 'mature' industrial economy, retail apathy and the larger 
incomes of the temperance societies. (33) It is clear that there was a shift in the industry's 
fortunes between 1900-1914 with the fall in beer consumption; mistaken investments in 
licensed properties friction between brewers and retailers and the extension of the tied house 
system; all contributing to disunity. 
All the above would seem to indicate that the Temperance Movement was up against a 
demoralised and disorganised Trade yet for many purposes various trade groups acted as 
allies especially when it came to fighting for its own existence. During the Edwardian 
period three developments strengthened the Trade's armour)'. The liquor industry had spent 
itself into a corner with its high investment in substantial numbers of houses in industrial 
areas; areas that were now declining inner city ones. High growth meant excessive 
competition and shrinking profits for the brewers. (34) The 1904 Licensing Act however (see 
below) gave the industiy the ideal opportunity to unload bad investments. Fewer licenses 
were of benefit to the Trade as most of the custom was transferred to other houses belonging 
to the individual brewing companies. Fearful of more damaging legislation the Trade 
consolidated its three major brewing societies into one comprehensive national organisation 
the Brewer's Society which gave the industry greater influence. Auxiliary industries 
coalesced to form the Allied Brewer's Trade Association (ABTA), which enlarged the 
Trade's electoral power and supplied an independent agency for disseminating propaganda. 
(35) 
In one of its counter arguments, the Trade continuously emphasized the freedom of the 
individual and were adept at quoting John Stuart Mill's comments on liberty. (36) A leading 
London publican warned that if Englishmen accepted the principle of interference in one 
case, other infringements of personal liberties would follow. (37). The Trade was given a 
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further boost by the introduction of the limited liability company as many people became 
shareholders in the Trade. In 1907 one million pounds of preferred stock and bonds of 
brewing companies in the UK were held by approximately 100,000 people and institutions. 
(38) The Daily News published an extensive survey of people holding securities, exclusive of 
bonds, either in their own names or as trustees. The figures showed that this was the case 
with 158 peers with nine of them actively engaged in the Trade as directors. Many other 
names appeared on the list including those of Privy Councilors. The House of Commons was 
also seen to be represented with 87 NiPs holding shares in the liquor industry: 59 
Conservatives, 9 Liberal Unionists, 12 Liberals and 7 Nationalists. (39) 
Crapéter asserts that there were two contributing factors responsible for the Trade's 
political influence. First there were the many Trade associations an industrial press and front 
organisations to mobilize public opinion. At a local level the public house became the focus 
of political activity. (40) In a different context politicians had long since realised that the 
party which could secure the public house could gather support the majority of votes, but the 
principle remained valid. (41) The diversity of the Trade's many commercial outlets became 
'both a political strength and a political weakness' (42) but, because of the numbers 
involved, the Trade could use this to its political advantage. The Trade did not have 
everything its own way and the sectionalism was a constant invitation to the opposition to 
split the Trade front but the power and influence of Trade and Temperance Movement were 
not comparable. 
A Conservative government was elected in 1900, and for those seeking temperance reform 
it was again seen as a disaster, cognisant as they were of Salisbury's attitude to the drink 
seller - protection rather than attack. Salisbury believed that it was 'the birthright of Britons 
to freely indulge in drink' and with a solid vote of at least 400 members in the House of 
Commons, talk of temperance would have been well down the agenda, if it was there at all. 
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(43) This is not to suggest that the Temperance Movement relinquished the right continually 
to seek firm and favourable legislation. It could still rely on Liberal support, all be it that that 
support had been drastically reduced by the general election result. Outside Parliament, 
forces in support of temperance initiated attacks on the government's lack of will to 
implement the Peel Report. Magistrates had come to recognize that there needed to be a 
decrease in the number of licenses and were helped in their endeavours by the Sharp v 
Wakefield case early in the I 890s when it was ruled by the House of Lords that the licensing 
justices had the discretionary authority to deny applications for renewal. (44) During 1903, 
the magistrates revoked 480 licences, causing the brewers' and licensing victualers' 
organizations to lobby the government vigorously for a legislative solution. (45) Balfour 
agreed that the magistrates were guilty of unjust confiscation of property to which neither 
government or Parliament could remain indifferent. (46) The Conservative government 
responded with the introduction of a licensing bill based on Peel's Majority Report which 
gave licensees of on-licences the right to claim compensation for the sale of their license 
other than for misconduct. Jennings suggests that on the whole, the brewers did quite well 
out of surrendering licences. It was mostly beer houses with poor accommodation, often 
older properties, doing a poor trade that were closed. The measure, in other words, worked to 
remove the less profitable outlets. (47) 
As expected, the Temperance Movement abhorred such a bill and had their supporters in 
the House of Commons who said so. Lloyd George declared that it was raising up' a barrier 
almost insuperable, a wall, an impregnable rampart, around the worst and most dangerous 
enemy that ever menaced this Empire.' (48) And in the House of Commons on the 4th of 
July, Lloyd George suggested that 'it (the licensing bill) was introduced purely and simply as 
a matter of bribery and corruption.' (49) The Temperance Movement did everything in its 
power to stop the bill from becoming law. From February the 22nd to the 24th of June there 
were 6,659 petitions against the bill with 224,872 signatures. (50) The Birmingham Evening 
Dispatch reported that missionaries had been busy at street corners and in the open spaces of 
the suburbs for more than a fortnight. (51) In Manchester and Halifax large gatherings were 
reported of 10,000 and 12,000 to 15,000 respectively. The temperance press were typically 
scathing in their attack on the bill, with the Advocate proclaiming that 
This govenment liquor endowment and compensation bill will double the value of licensed 
property; cripple the powers of the magistrates; create enormous vested interests, where none 
exist, and block the path to temperance reform. (52) 
Despite the protests the licensing bill was enacted and the 1904 Licensing Act established 
a statutoxy principle of public house closure in areas where on social grounds they were 
considered superfluous. (53) The legitimacy of the Trade was never in doubt by the 
legislatures of the Act, but the closing of many public house was seen as being conducive for 
social order. Licensing returns show that between 1906-19 14, 5,881 fully-licensed houses and 
beer houses were shut down amounting to an overall reduction of nearly ten per cent in the 
number of on-licenses. (54) The Act meant that the trade was indebted to the Conservative 
Party, a fact not unnoticed by the Licensed Trade News when it declared in December 1905 
that, 'the Trade cannot ... withdraw its allegiance to a party which has been just, fair and 
equitable in its attitude. Identity with the Unionist cause just now is compulsory.' Others 
echoed these views. Edward Johnston advised Finsbury licensed victualers and beer sellers 
that, 'they must support the Unionist Party to preserve the integrity of the Trade.' (55) With 
another general election looming, some in the Trade realised that to identi& with the 
Unionists too strongly would antagonize the Liberal Party and coWd result in disastrous 
repercussions. Gutzke suggests that many ordinary brewers and publicans tried futilely to end 
this transparent alignment with Unionists at the 1906 general election, where Liberals, with 
their anti-compensation policy achieved a spectac War victory. (56) 
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License Removal 
It is understandable that the Liberal Party was somewhat nervous of any stronger 
relationship with the Temperance Movement believing that it was this association which had 
contributed to the Party losing the 1895, 1900 and 1904 general elections. But with the 
Trade and the Conservative Party joined at the hip, there was nowhere else for the 
Temperance Movement to go and they still had their ardent Liberal supporters. Lloyd George 
claimed that one-third of the permanent unemployment of the country was due to drink. He 
was also of the opinion that the 160,000 convictions for drunkenness went to prove that drink 
was 'a greater handicap to Britain's trade than all the tariffs in the world put together.' He 
was enough of a social reformer to recognise that, 'a nation suckled on alcohol is doomed 
and that temperance was an answer to it.' The Trade was also anathema to Lloyd George 
simply because it was one of the pillars of the Tory Party. (57) 
The general election of 1906 gave the Temperance Movement a tremendous boost. The 
Advocate cheerfully reported that, 'never in the history of the Temperance Movement has 
such a phalanx of men so favourable to sound temperance reform been returned to 
Parliament.' (58) The Advocate also reported on promises given by Liberal members that an 
amendment to the 'Brewers' Endowment Act' would be enacted at the earliest opportunity. 
Crapster makes the point however that this new generation of Liberal leaders, although 
sympathetic towards temperance and desirous of drastically reducing the number of licenses, 
did not accept Local Veto pure and simple. They wanted to reduce the number of licenses in 
those areas where Local Veto could not be put into force, and they coupled this reduction 
with a time limit on existing licenses as a sop to those who held that immediate cancellation 
was confiscation. (59) Such reticence by many members of the Liberal Party was justified 
when considering the many political obstacles facing them. The emerging Labour Party 
recognised that many working-class voters looked upon temperance reformers as 'fussy 
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clerics and patronizing black-coats who insist upon saving a man from himself and his simple 
pleasures.' (60). Ben Tillet declared that 'for myself I would back Socialism and beer in 
preference to Nonconformist conscience and tea.' (61) There was also the main weapon in 
the Conservative arsenal to overcome; the liberty of the individual. The working man and his 
beer were synonymous to the Conservative's idea of 'Merrie England' and the right to hold 
property in freedom. (62) 
Despite any reservations they may have had, the Liberals introduced a licensing bill in 
1908. It was described as 'the greatest step forward in temperance ... during the life time of 
any man living.' (63) The purpose of the bill was to modif' the 1904 Licensing Act by 
restricting compensation; accelerating and expanding licensing reductions; increasing 
licensing fees and permitting some Local Veto. A time limit of fourteen years would be 
imposed during which time the levels of compensation would be reduced. It was certainly a 
drastic bill and alarmed many investors. Naturally, the Trade, vehemently opposed such 
legislation, promising fierce and uncompromising opposition. The Brewing Trade Review 
condemned the licensing reduction scheme as iniquitous, pointing to surveys showing the 
loss of two-thirds of licensees in some areas of Manchester. (64) Many, like Winston 
Churchill, thought it 'a measure imposed on an industry by a teetotal riddled government.' 
(65) The president of the Licensed Victualers Society, Alfred Dunbridge, protested that, 'the 
measure was not about the promotion of temperance so much as the annihilation (sic) of the 
Trade.' (66) 
That there was a determination to succeed from both sides is clear in the propaganda war 
that ensued. The bill was denounced as 'a first step in Socialism;' as 'a fanatical attack upon 
the birthright of the Englishman.' Brewers brought out placards with the pious legend, 'Thou 
Shall Not Steal.' (67) Petitions, deputations and mass meetings gave the Trade enormous 
publicity for its cause. Paid music hail entertainers poured scorn on temperance ideas, until 
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barracking from hostile temperance reformers forced them to retreat. Towns and cities were 
plastered with posters and leaflets and the Liberty Van toured rural areas collecting petitions 
and putting up posters in the countryside. Brewing workers were intimidated by threats of 
redundancy or lower wages if the bill was passed. The Trade's ancillary workers faced 
similar threats due to possible loss of orders from the brewing companies. Temperance 
meetings were disrupted with awkward questions against anti-drink resolutions or counter 
amendments. The Association also supported Unionist candidates, lent them speakers, 
canvassers and vehicles. It inundated voters with literature - 120,000 leaflets, 100,000 
pamphlets on unemployment, 25,000 general posters and 700,000 cartoons; farmers received 
35,000 pamphlets and maltsters 8,000 circulars. (68) The mobilization of shareholders as 
trade allies clearly influenced political perceptions. Unionists like Ackers-Douglas, former 
Conservative chief whip, cited the prospective damage inflicted on shareholders as 
justification for opposing the fourteen year time limit in the 1908 bill. Gutzke believes that 
the view so carefully fostered by the Trade, of a large group of shareholders with unsettled 
Liberal loyalties, beguiled Unionists. He also suggests that Trade appeals, in fact, probably 
caused few Liberal shareholders to 'defect.' (69) This is supported by the Licensed Trade 
News when it admitted in 1912 that 'financial identity with a brewer does not always weigh 
strongly enough with a man to induce him to change his political faith.' (70) 
A test of Liberal and temperance loyalties came at the Peckham by-election. The Liberals 
had won the seat from the Unionists in the 1906 general election, but at the 1908 by-election 
it went the Unionists' way with a majority of 2500 votes; a victory for the opponents of the 
licensing bill. 'It was a by-election,' suggests Du Parq, 'which made even the Tories wince. 
The Morning Post reported that, 'never has a more cynical and shameless appeal been made 
to the lower appetites of the electorate.' (71) Two days after the Peckham by-election, Lloyd 
George, addressing the UKA at the Queen's Hall accepted that in the first skirmish the 
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government had been badly beaten,' and appealed to the Christian Churches to be foremost 
in the fight without distinction. He was echoing the thoughts of the Bishop of Chichester, 
chairman of the GETS who had appealed for legislation to diminish temptation adding ... 'I do 
really long to see the Church of God doing its duty in this manner.' (72) Supporters of the bill 
also had to deal with a 'collection of the most potent, insidious and dangerous enemies of 
temperance reform; the editors of the London Press.' The Advocate declared that, 'they 
attack the merits of the licensing bill, deprecating its importance and working for the 
substitution of other measures in preference', (73) On the other hand, the Very Rev C. J. 
Ridgeway, Dean of Carlisle suggested that, 'Attacking the brewers, distillers and publicans 
was doing the temperance cause a disservice.' (74) But the Temperance Movement knew 
that, 'it was facing the fiercest political battle of modern times,' a statement which was 
echoed at many temperanëe meetings. Sir William Clegg thought the bill 'the most 
important social reform movement that we have had during the last fifty years.' (75) 
The passage of the bill through the House of Commons was incredibly slow, hindered by 
one thousand tabled amendments. Liberal members were attacked but the third reading of 
the bill was carried by 350 votes to 113. (76) Getting the bill through the House of Commons 
was one thing; getting it through the House of Lords was another. The Temperance 
Movement expected there to be drastic amendments to the bill in its passage through the 
House of Lords but promised support from the Bench of Bishops, and the belief that some 
important Unionist peers did not wish to be identified too strongly with the licensed trade, 
led to the hope that the amendments would be negotiable. (77) With the huge majority in 
favour of the bill in the House of Commons, the House of Lords voted that the bill be given a 
second reading. On the thy the second reading was to be taken, however, a private meeting 
of Unionist peers, called by the Marquess of Landsdowne, was held to consider the measures 
that needed to be taken towards the licensing bill. The outcome of that meeting, at which 
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over two hundred were present, was to destroy the bill. For the next three days the House of 
Lords conducted a meaningless debate on a bill whose fate had already been decided. It was 
rejected by 272 votes to 96. (78) 
After this defeat the temperance press castigated those involved in the bill's defeat in the 
House of Lords. Most of the onslaught was directed at Lansdowne, who was accused of 
having a vested interest in the liquor traffic; a fact later confirmed by the BTA. Extensive 
research showed that Lansdowne was a trustee to shares in two major brewing companies 
and, therefore, 'tied to the Trade.' (79) The Budget of 1909 was seen as a means of 
redressing the defeat of the licensing bill. One temperance MP, Lief Jones, suggested that, 
'whilst the licensing bill chastised the Trade with whips, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
would chastise it with scorpions.' (80) Lloyd George had his sights on the landed wealth with 
his proposed increases in the tax yield from tobacco and drink, increases in death duties, and 
income tax, and certain land taxes. But again 'the peoples' Budget, with its many provisions, 
was rejected by the House of Lords, prompting a general election in 1910. The outcome of 
the 1910 February election resulted in the Liberals having to rely on Labour support. Despite 
this result the peers remained uncooperative on the Parliament Bill and regardless of royal 
intervention forced another election in December. The result was just the same and the Bill 
went up to the House of Lords. It decreed that the peers would have no power over money 
bills and could only veto other measures for a period of two years. The passing of the 
Parliament Act did not destroy the power of the aristocracy, but it did severely restrict it. (81) 
The passing of favourable legislation had always proved difficult for the Temperance 
Movement. Its failure to get a Liberal government elected in 1895 at what was possibly the 
peak of its political influence was a serious drawback. It also failed at subsequent elections 
but was boosted in 1906 when a Liberal government was mandated to introduce a licensing 
bill. Although successful in the House of Commons, vested interests in the House of Lords 
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stopped the passage of the bill and prevented it from becoming law. What this meant for the 
Temperance Movement was an end to its political ambitions until the outbreak of war in 
1914. 
The Temperance Movement and Religion. 
While the Temperance Movement failed to secure any more favourable legislation and 
experienced waning political support, it was still grounded in a vast network of local groups 
coming under umbrella organisations of the two largest religious denominations, Methodism 
and the Church of England. Through the early twentieth century, however, grass roots 
support for local temperance groups fluctuated while the hold of organised religion was 
itself beginning to fail. This section will consider the nature of religious involvement in the 
Temperance Movement and its work at a more grass roots level which reprises a story of 
division and decline. 
Methodism 
There is no doubt that the question of clerical support is complex and it is a fact that many 
ministers were alienated by teetotalism and hostile towards it, at least until the 
eighteen-seventies. (82) By the turn of the century however, the Temperance Movement, 
and in particular the UKA, relied heavily upon .the strength and enthusiasm of Methodism. 
Radical opinions appearing in the Methodist Recorder called for all temperance reform to be 
shelved until prohibition or Local Veto was enacted. The Recorder was in favour of 
'piecemeal legislation' such as Sunday closing in Momnouthshire, but was equally of the 
opinion that a section of the public would never be satisfied with anything less than total 
abstinence and prohibition from the state. (83) It was pessimistic however of the chances of 
achieving changes in the legislation. They accepted the fact that the Conservative 
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government was largely dependent at the polling booths on the goodwill of the Trade but was 
equally convinced that the Liberals had become acquiescent to Trade demands. From the 
Recorder s perspective, 'all conceivable types of government are, at this present moment, 
dominated by the Trade.' (84) 
By 1900 signs were beginning to show that attendance at temperance meetings was falling. 
Brake suggests that in 1900 there was probably the first sign of decline in the Wesleyan 
Temperance Movement. The Wesleyan Temperance Conference heard that during 1900, 227 
Bands of Hope and 159 adult temperance societies had lapsed, and the membership of the 
Band of Hope had declined by 14,139. (85) Many Methodists found that they could absent 
themselves from class with impunity, not least because their absence would scarcely be 
noticed. (86) Traditional forms of Methodism were fast losing their appeal; the young in 
particular showing their indifference. Such disinterest may have had something to do with the 
essential elements of the classical Methodist ethic of discipline and authority and many 
leisure pursuits were rejected by numerous Methodists. The associations of the football field 
were condemned as 'impure and degrading,' and 'dancing was as wicked as football and 
novel reading led to profligacy.' (87) That Methodism demanded a strict and disciplinarian 
approach to life can be found in many oral history accounts. A Mr F. Gaskin signed the 
pledge at an early age and was still attending Sunday School at the age of twenty-six. He 
remembered the strict discipline of the time and the constant learning of scriptures. A Mrs E. 
Parsons remembered her strict Methodist education and a headmaster who was well known 
for his condemnation of anything alcoholic. Mice Whitehead remembered her father's strict, 
almost fanatical, disciplinarian attitude towards the evils of drink. She regularly attended 
Chapel Sunday School and as her father played the organ he had his family sing hymns every 
night. (88) But rising prosperity and education left many Methodists dissatisfied with this 
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unyielding doctrine and demanded change; a change that would be enforced by a growing 
liberalism. 
In an effort to redress the apparent decline, new ideas were constantly being aired by the 
Methodist Conference Temperance Committee. It wanted to see the establishment of 
scientific lectureships for its thy schools and colleges, the formation of a Commercial Band 
of Hope and Temperance Union, and the appointment of a Police Court Mission. An 
ingenious if dubious solution to the falling membership numbers was proposed by W.G. 
Triggs, the District Secretary of the Bedford and Northampton Circuit. He reported to the 
1899-1900 Conference that his Circuit had 168 Band of Hope Societies with 12,437 
members, and 52 adult societies with 2,420 members. Triggs believed however that these 
figures contained inaccuracies in so far as they recorded details of actually existing societies, 
but did not reveal the number of pledged abstainers. He went on to suggest that by 
extrapolation from other societies, an additional 1,400 abstainers could be safely added. 
Triggs was also of the opinion that representation of the Band of Hope and adult societies 
was absent in many villages, and such places would, therefore, contain within them many 
hidden abstainers and temperance believers which could therefore swell temperance ranks. 
(89) A. H. Rogers, District Secretary of the Birmingham and Shrewsbuiy Circuit, was also of 
the opinion that the method of recording the number of members was imperfect. He believed 
that 'although the completion of the returns were approximately correct, they were not only 
useless for the purpose of comparison but absolutely misleading.' (90) Other delegates, 
representing the districts of Cornwall, Bristol and Bath, and Bolton reported that it was 
difficult to obtain anything like a full return at all. (91) Many suggestions were made to the 
Conference on how the situation might be improved, including the merits of some form of 
effective organisation that could keep tabs on those trained by the Band of Hope. The hope 
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here was that they could be kept in touch with temperance teaching and in some sort of 
membership with temperance organisations. (92) 
There were attempts to understand why there had been a steady decrease in the 
membership of the Band of Hope. It was believed that thy schools were claiming more of the 
children's interest and homework made attendance at evening meetings difficult. The growth 
in alternative entertainment provided stem competition and the fact that industry and 
commerce demanded more from its workers meant that the Band of Hope found it difficult to 
recruit teachers for early evening meetings. In 1911 there was a Great Forward Movement 
which attempted to increase the numbers of the Band of Hope movement by a million. Every 
society taking part was to have a register of members and each society whose register showed 
an increase of fifty per cent in June 1912 would receive a national diploma. Writing in the 
The Pioneer, its editor, the Rev H. Carter, felt that a new temperance society was needed in 
the Wesleyan Church. He thought that the Bands of Hope had done fine work in the past and 
the increasing sobriety of the nation was partly due to their educational efforts, but that they 
could only keep boys and girls as abstainers until they were thirteen or fourteen. When they 
left school and began work they failed to attend Band of Hope meetings and, in many 
instances, drifted into the drinking habit. (93) Carter's solution to this problem lay in the 
formation of the Wesleyan Methodist League of Abstainers which he believed would give a 
more accurate forecast of the true numbers of abstainers. The League, formed in November 
1912, had two sections; the Young Abstainers League (14-2 1 years) and the Adult Abstainers 
League ( 21 years and over). (94) 
Meanwhile brewers and retailers faced considerable economic difficulties from 1900 
onwards. In that year, total beer consumption, which had risen almost forty per cent in the 
previous two decades suddenly slumped, declining twelve per cent in the next decade before 
somewhat recovering. Historians disagree as to the reasons for this change, some suggesting 
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falling living standards, while others suggest shifts in consumer purchasing. (95) Whatever 
the reasons the 1904-1905 Report of the Wesleyan Temperance Committee, 'fully accepted 
that there was a great change in the people with respect to the use of intoxicating lkjuors.' 
but it only proved that 'the teaching of the Temperance Movement was becoming more 
acceptable.' (96) Such was the feeling by some that the 'drinks war' had been won that 
Conference had left the Temperance Committee members with the distinct impression that 
temperance was to be given a lower status within the Methodist movement. The Committee 
naturally felt that such a move would not only be highly mischievous to the temperance 
cause, but also to the general interests of Methodism. (97) They would not have been helped 
by the annual reports from the districts. From Kent it was reported that the fall in Band of 
Hope and temperance membership in some three or four circuits had been dramatic, and the 
numbers for East Anglia also showed a considerable decrease. (98) 
The Wesleyan Temperance Society did favour certain aspects of drink legislation and 
was particularly enthusiastic about the 1908 Licensing Bill. They sent to the House of Lords 
nearly 2,000 separate petitions from circuit quarterly meetings; all in favour of the bill. The 
architect of the House of Lords rebellion, Lord Landsdowne, received a great deal of 
correspondence condemning his involvement and acquiescent attitude towards the drinks 
industry. The president of the Wesleyan Methodist Conference appealed to Landsdowne 'not 
to reject the bill on its second reading' pointing out that a petition from nearly one million 
Methodist followers could not be ignored. There was an attempt by the Methodist 
Temperance Conference to keep the issue nonpolitical but warned Landsdowne that rejection 
of the bill 'would not be either forgiven or forgotten by the Wesleyan Methodist Church.' 
(99) Such pleadings, however, fell on deaf ears. 
Reports from local societies give contradictory messages. There were societies whose 
financial situation was unsatisfactory due in part to their propaganda efforts and there was a 
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continual plea for members to show greater efforts. (100) Two years later the same society 
reported that the 'strength of the movement had never been stronger.' (101) The Can Road 
Wesleyan Temperance and Band of Hope Society, Nelson reported that enthusiasm w.s still 
high and delegates were being sent to many temperance rallies. There was also sufficient 
funds available for expenditure on propaganda literature and contributions to the UKA. (102) 
In some instances, the local societies were heavily involved in seeking changes to the 
legislation. The Colne Temperance Society and Band of Hope at their 1907 Annual Meeting 
endorsed the Prime Minister's assurance that a 'comprehensive measure of temperance 
would be introduced during the forthcoming session.' (103) There was a feeling of high 
expectation from the Temperance Movement generally that the proposed Licensing Bill 
would reach the Statute Book. The 1908 Annual Meeting of the Colne branch suggested that 
'temperance sentiment is spreading amongst all classes in the nation ... and there will be 
great disappointment in the ranks of temperance reformers if the bill is not successful.' (104) 
Many local politicians felt threatened by the temperance lobby and canvassed support 
from the local societies. Societies with no firm commitment to a particular MP or party, 
canvassed the feeling of prospective parliamentary candidates. A joint meeting of the 
delegates from the Band of Hope union in the Clitheroe division was held in Nelson, and the 
candidates from both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party were asked if they 
supported a Licensing Bill, Local Veto and their opinion on the municipalization of the drink 
traffic. The Conservative Candidate (J. Blaney) proved unresponsive and unable to support a 
licensing bill like the 1908 one, the Labour candidate (Mr. Smith) was in favour of anything 
that would forward temperance reform. A committee meeting of the Colne branch pledged its 
support of the Labour candidate and at the same time urged that the replies of both 
candidates should be published. (105) 
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The need to sustain its relationship with the Temperance Movement was never in doubt 
for many Methodists. Despite the optimistic calculations of Triggs, there was also an 
acceptance that Methodism was seemingly failing to attract and keep its supporters.' Some 
Methodists believed that it was due to the rigidity of Methodist teaching and its 
condemnation of many leisure pursuits, particularly those enjoyed by the young. Giving 
credence to this theory were the reports from the local Methodist temperance societies, which 
continued to show dramatic falls in membership numbers. With the falls in alcoholic 
consumption many within the Wesleyan Temperance Movement also became complacent, 
believing that the 'drinks war' had been won. 
The Church of England Temnerance Society. 
Despite the close association between temperance and Methodism, the Church of England 
Temperance Society (CETS) was easily the largest temperance organisation other than the 
Bands of Hope. The foundations of the CETS were laid in 1835 when individual clergymen 
began to form total abstinence societies. In 1862 organised efforts were made to make these 
societies officially connected with, or part of the parochial work of the Church of England 
and in 1873 the Church of England and heland Temperance Reformation Society and the 
Manchester, Chester, and Ripon Diocesan Society were amalgamated, and the name altered 
to that of the CETS. It generally stood aloof from electoral contests, but it did have a 
legislative programme and had the advantage of influence in the Conservative Party. (106) 
The CETS had the ear and voice of many well-established figures, both in and out of 
Parliament who would not have associated with other more hard-line sections of the 
Temperance Movement. The Bishops would plead the temperance cause in the House of 
Lords which provided excellent publicity for the Temperance Movement. It was pressure 
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from the Church of England hierarchy and government back bench MPs who persuaded the 
government to setup the Peel Commission in 1896. (107) 
The growth rate of the CETS was significant and by 1899 it had become one of the largest 
temperance societies in the UK claiming some 7,000 branches and 200,000 members. (108) 
But despite its size, or because of it, the CETS did not have the same influence as other more 
radical societies such as those subscribing to the objectives of the AlP. Because it was a 
church controlled organisation, its lines of authority were closely tied to that of the church. 
No branches could be formed without the permission of the incumbent, who was, whenever 
possible, the president of the branch. Total control was exerted by the branch president and 
no direct action could be taken without going through regular church channels. (109) 
The principal aims of the CETS were the promotion of the habits of temperance, the 
reformation of the intemperate and the removal of the causes which led to intemperance. 
Such aims, the Society proclaimed, would be achieved by pursuing a moral, educational and 
social set of objectives which would also include a realistic programme of legislative reform. 
The CETS favoured the reduction of the number of licensed premises, with money 
compensation; the closing of public houses on Sundays, greater powers to the magistrates but 
as an organisation scorned the Veto. (110) Though its members were not required to be 
teetotalers, and the majority were not, the abstaining minority dominated the Society but such 
opinions put it at odds with many mainstream temperance societies who had banded together 
to form the Advanced Temperance Party. Attacks were made upon it by those like C. Wright 
of Birmingham who suggested in the Temperance Record that the 'degrading sins of 
intemperance' were being disregarded by 'the general body of wealthy members of the 
Church of England.' And the Temperance Chronicle suggested that many clergymen refused 
to have anything to do with temperance 'as they could often be seen at social functions 
drinking their beer and wine.' (111) Evidence to support this can be seen in the comments 
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parish if he chose to do so. Equally, if a minority of parishioners were only lukewarm 
towards temperance and the vicar was an enthusiastic temperance man, he could not carry 
on all the local duties by himself and the branch would cease to function. (118) Further 
problems peculiar to the CETS were the clashes between clerical and lay members of the 
Society. Officially the CETS was a joint venture of the laity and the clergy, but the latter 
tended to dominate the ruling committees, both in London and the provinces. Although the 
usual relationship between the two groups was an harmonious one, there were times and 
places where there was serious friction between the two. (119) 
Writing in the British Temperance Advocate, W. N. Edwards thought that the Church was 
doing very little towards the Temperance Movement. He believed that if the Church 
remained silent on those moral issues embraced by the Temperance Movement then 'we can 
expect very little from Parliament or from men of the world.' (120) J.H.Lear-Caton, 
Secretary of the Birmingham Temperance Society, noted that the Temperance Movement, in 
its relations to the Church, had passed through various stages of evolution producing 
'instances of precocious development, beyond the general attainment of the time.' He 
suggested that the Christian Church began its relationship with temperance with an 'attitude 
of open hostility,' which was followed by 'passive antagonism and indifference,' and was 
now at the stage of 'gracious toleration.' ( 12 1 ) 
At a local level, societies like the Walton-fe-Dale CETS, formed in 1884, followed the 
general rules and incorporated the two sections of total abstainers and non-abstainers but 
seemed uncertain what exactly it should do. At this level it was not so much a question of 
divisions but more a question of numbers and the pursuit of temperance. From 1900 the 
Walton-le-Dale Society reported attendance at its meetings as low as 22 and as high as 350. 
Many of the local societies seemed to be more interested in the provision of entertainment 
than anything temperate. At a meeting of the St. Andrews Temperance Society, Ashton-on 
76 
Ribble, there was only one item on the agenda and that was to discuss forthcoming artists and 
the provision of Lantern Lectures. The CETS union in Preston had declared that attendances 
at branch meetings were causing great concern and many were questioning what a 'CETS 
branch ought to do. At a meeting on 7 December 1908 the St. Andrews Society thought that 
the parochial branches of the CETS could best help the temperance cause by supporting the 
Bands of Hope as much as possible and the Police Court Missions. This was the last recorded 
meeting in the minute book and is typical evidence of the decline of the CETS at a local 
level. (122) An ardent temperance reformer, A. J. Crespi, believed that this decline was in 
part due to cold and damp venues, but was also convinced that a proportion of the blame 
could be laid at the door of 'the clergy making speeches that are false from the first word to 
the last.' Crespi was convinced that 'Christian workers and so forth ...do our cause great 
harm.' (123) 
This section has examined the relationship between the two major religious groups in 
British society and the Temperance Movement. As drink was seen as a demonstrable evil the 
forces of Methodism and the Established Church became linked to the temperance cause but 
detrimentally followed different lines of reasoning. The strictness of the Methodist regime 
proved its undoing as changing secular attitudes accompanied huge falls in membership 
numbers. The CETS could rightly claim to have the largest membership in England but it to 
suffered from a declining membership. The CETS rules also hindered temperance progress as 
its rules allowed for the inclusion of non-abstainers. This created huge divisions within the 
Temperance Movement which added to the natural disharmony between the Established 
Church and Methodism. 
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Conclusions. 
This chapter began with the question, was the Temperance Movement still a force to 
reckoned with? From the beginning the Temperance Movement had relied upon religion, not 
only because it provided a strong moral platform, but also because Methodists and Anglicans 
had ready made organisations that were ideally placed to promote temperance reform. But 
because of the schisms that existed between the two doctrines it exposed the Temperance 
Movement to similar divisions; divisions that were to prove highly detrimental to the 
Temperance Movement's aims and objectives. There is no doubt that the bond between 
religion and temperance was strong, so when the forces of Methodism and the Established 
Church began to falter, similar results were produced within the Temperance Movement. 
There are many reasons why both church organisations declined and despite some optimistic 
but conflicting views, the decline strongly affected the Temperance Movement. If the 
strength of a pressure group is to be measured by the quantity and quality of its supporters, 
then the years between 1900-1914 witnessed a Temperance Movement disillusioned by 
internal arguments and weakened by a falling membership. 
Were the failures of the Temperance Movement the result of a weakened and demoralised 
membership, or was the Trade just more powerful? Gutzke suggests that historians have 
misjudged the effectiveness of the Trade as a pressure group. It can be acknowledged that 
the Trade was weakened between 1900-1914 and there was disunity. That there was conflict 
between retailers and brewers is clear. But the Trade was more than a match for the 
Temperance Movement, particularly when it came to propaganda stressing, as it did, 
individual liberty. This argument was strengthened by the introduction of the limited liability 
company, allowing many to become shareholders in the Trade's many companies. That the 
Trade became a vested interest is also true and politicians had long realised that the party that 
could secure the public house could secure a large percentage of male voters. The failure of 
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the Temperance Movement to achieve any major results in this period may be partly 
attributable to the weakness in its arguments, but it was also due to the Trade's actions 
against it. 
From the political perspective the Temperance Movement never really recovered from the 
defeat of the Liberal Party at the 1895 and 1900 general elections, and despite the Liberals' 
winning the 1906 election still failed to get any of its legislation through. That the 
Temperance Movement succeeded in retaining the support of at least one political Party does 
suggest that it was still a political force to be reckoned with. This said, the Temperance 
Movement was not successful in achieving major changes to the legislation. The Liberals 
approach to the 1900 general election did not have the same temperance zeal to it as did the 
1895 election, but in the 1906 general election there was a clear intent by the Liberals to 
introduce a licensing bill. Although the bill had a successful passage in the House of 
Commons, it failed in the House of Lords. Despite ardent support from Lloyd George, the 
government gave no sign of reintroducing their temperance bill, and to the many letters, 
deputation's and memorials, all that was forthcoming was abundant declarations of 
sympathy, but no promise of temperance legislation. (124) 
Through the Edwardian period, the Temperance Movement remained an active, 
campaigning organisation with considerable popular support. Although the Trade was still 
highly influential, many within the Movement were hopeful and optimistic. The clear 
sighted however, recognised that with declining numbers, a lack of organisational cohesion 
and continual legislative failures, the Temperance Movement did not have the same clarity of 
purpose. 
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Chanter 3. 	 Regulation and Deregulation. 1914-1929. 
Introduction 
The retail sale of intoxicating liquor for consumption on the premises has been subject to 
statutory control in England since the year 1495 and under a system of licensing since 1551. 
(I) That there had to be some form of Parliamentary control of such products was generally 
accepted, but despite restrictions such as limited hours of sale, the Trade operated freely and 
was so adept at using this freedom principle in its propaganda that the selling and buying of 
alcoholic liquors became an important element in national life and a political minefield. On 
the other hand, mindful of the problems that continued to plague English society through the 
'evils of drink' the Temperance Movement continued its campaign from both political and 
moral platforms. Tuner suggests that both the temperance question and the fortunes of the 
brewing industry were still in flux on the eve of the First World War. (2) The Temperance 
Movement, however, was stagnant and embarrassed. It had not been persuasive in attempting 
to get total abstinence and its prohibition [Local Veto] endeavours were singularly 
uninspiring. Membership levels continued to fall and divisions within the Movement 
continued to impede progress. 
Despite the abundance of legislation on social welfare in the Edwardian period The 
Advocate noted that there was no sign that the government's Temperance Bill was likely to 
be reintroduced. (3) Temperance related speeches made by the likes of Lloyd George were 
constantly referred to and the political fortunes of the Temperance Movement remained 
linked to those of the Liberal Party, but still there was little likelihood of action. In the 
second general election of 1910 the Liberal Party had lost its parliamentary lead, and relied 
on the Irish Nationalists for its majority. Unable to get its main political demand of Local 
Veto on to the statute book and realising that its membership was decreasing, the 
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Temperance Movement needed a fresh impetus that would focus both government and 
society back on to a temperance agenda. The unfortunate answer to the Temperance 
Movement's fortunes came with the outbreak of the First World War. 
The issue of wartime control has been investigated by historians, as has the American 
experiment with Prohibition and the growth of leisure in the inter war period. All, however 
are central aspects of this study and must be considered. Large portions of this chapter, 
therefore, are necessarily of the nature of a review. Within this, however, the response of the 
Temperance Movement to the developments will be examined, particularly the important 
changes in temperance thinking formulated in the 1920s. 
Regulation 
In the political decision making process the phrase 'in the national interest' has been a 
get out for politicians for decades but with the outbreak of war its use was meaningful. Drink 
was seen as being against the national interest and Lloyd George's speeches repeatedly 
condemned drink as being a continual threat to the war effort. (4) Despite some contrary 
indications he also believed that industrial production levels, particularly munitions and 
shipbuilding were threatened by worker absenteeism caused by excessive drinking. Lloyd 
George toyed with the possibility of nationalisation but settled for control, apparently a 
temperance measure but which in fact sidelined the Temperance Movement. 
War was declared on the 4 August 1914 and the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) was 
introduced on the 12 August 1914, followed by the Intoxicating Liquor (Temporary Control 
Act) which came in on the 31 August 1914. Control of the liquor industry was seen as 
essential to the prosecution of the war and the British government pondered on the most 
effective solution. In 1915 and again in 1917 the government almost decided to buy out the 
whole of the licensed liquor trade in the UK. In 1915 state purchase was to have helped to 
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reduce absenteeism, and thus increase munitions production. In 1917 it was to have 
conserved food stuffs and saved shipping from the submarine crisis. (5) Negotiations for the 
purchase of the Trade took place in April 1915 and lasted three weeks but eventually broke 
down Central to the breakdown of the talks was the estimated costs involved of £225 
million. This huge cost quickly diminished any fervour that nationalisation supporters may 
have had. Asquith dubbed nationalisation the 'great purchase folly.' Lloyd George was also 
aware that the Temperance Movement was up in arms against the abhorrent suggestion that 
'the state should sully its soul by becoming the manufacturer and distributor of alcoholic 
poison.' (6) Lloyd George had considered prohibition and the closure of distilleries but the 
consequential loss of industrial alcohol for munitions purposes persuaded him otherwise. He 
then moved to a policy that did not include outright State purchase of the drinks trade, 
favouring State purchase and management of the liquor traffic on a small scale in designated 
locations and higher taxation on all alcoholic liquors. (7) 
Collapse of the purchase policy in 1915 led to an extension of the Intoxicating Liquor 
(Temporary Control Act) with the enactment of the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic 
Act) on the 14 May 1915. The pursuit of the national interest was the principal reason for all 
this legislation as it was deemed necessary to reduce the danger of members of the forces 
and munitions workers soaking themselves in alcoholic drink and thereby lessening the 
efficiency of the war machine. (8) The Board decided that immediate action was needed in 
at least ten areas of the UK where there was a concentration of industrial and armed force 
personel. The restriction of the hours of sale and the elimination of treating were the first 
actions. This was later followed by the establishment of canteens and also by the direct 
control of drinking places. Primary emphasis was given to regulating the liquor supplied to 
the armed forces. Attention was then focused on the areas surrounding the munitions centres. 
High wages and the influx of migrant workers had served to push up the rate of drunkenness 
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in these areas; one of the worst places was Carlisle, where it was alleged, 'almost every alley 
was littered with prostrate drunken men.' (9) Taken further, contemporary observers noted 
that shortfalls in the supply of munitions to the Army, and setbacks to the shipbuilding and 
repair programmes, were due to worker absenteeism caused by excessive drinking. 
In his memoirs of the war, Lloyd George was convinced that one of the most serious 
obstacles in the way of increasing industrial production was the heavy drinking in those areas 
identified by the Board. Such thoughts were given credence by the amount of alcohol 
consumed and a philosophy that orthined many to 'eat and drink for tomorrow our comrades 
may die.' (10) At the same time earnings were increasing with the corollary that drunkenness 
rose, particularly in those industrial conurbations devoted to the manufacture of munitions. 
The Employer's Federation had suggested to Lloyd George that drunkenness was the main 
reason for the consistent absenteeism and low levels of production. A government white 
paper, published on 1 May 1915 confirmed the view that drinking habits in certain districts, 
chiefly Northern Shipyards presented an undeniable problem. The correlation between 
delayed output and drink was never precisely established, but the assumption of cause and 
effect was sufficient for subjective criticism. Labour members of Parliament accepted that 
excessive drinking should be condemned, but that other causes of lost time and absenteeism 
shoWd be considered. Later investigations by Dr. H. M. Vernon on behalf of the Ministry of 
Munitions showed fairly conclusively that persistently long hours and the loss of rest periods 
were the major cause of absenteeism and inefficient work. (11) Turner believed that the 
evidence suggested that 'there is little to convince a disinterested observer that drinking had a 
serious effect on munitions production or shipping.' (12) Lloyd George's papers and the 
cabinet papers of the period before 4 March 1915 do not indicate the drink was a cause of 
lost production. (13) Industrial relations in engineering, shipbuilding and merchant shipping 
were historically bad. It is difficult therefore to take seriously a complaint from the 
go 
shipbuilders Cammel Lairds, 'that drink is more responsible than anything else for a certain 
truculence in some.., which leads to bad work and stoppages.' (14) Whatever retrospective 
judgments may have been reached on the true nature of the drink problem during the war, 
there was the contemporary perception that alcohol was hindering its prosecution. 
The powers of the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) were wide and varied. By far its 
most powerful armament was its authority to close any licensed premises or club and to 
regulate hours. They could do anything they pleased within the confines of the Act, and could 
call upon the police to implement their orders and enforce regulations. The Board did not 
rush headlong into action preferring gradually to introduce restrictions. Despite such wary 
action by the Board it did not prevent widespread resentment. Local club and pub meetings 
proclaimed that they were unnecessary: drunkenness was in long term decline anyway and 
consumption had been reduced by enlistment and by the fact that people were working day 
and night. (15) Jennings suggests that this resentment reflected the fact that the restrictions 
outlawed traditional practices regarded by pub goers, at least, as perfectly acceptable; 
treating - buying drinks for people either singly or in rounds - was an indispensable part of 
pub cultuse. Night workers could no longer have a drink on their way home from work. The 
Board's appointment and subsequent actions did therefore arouse some discontent, but the 
discretion and circumspection with which it went about its tasks was a powerful example of 
social engineering. Among the powers conferred on the Control Board were those of 
purchasing and carrying on licensed premises and businesses which meant, in effect, State 
purchase. The efficiency of the war machine was dependent on a constant supply of 
munitions and any threat to these production levels caused by excessive alcoholic intake was 
unacceptable to the Board. Attention focused on Carlisle and the Scottish district of Oretna 
where a huge munitions factory was constructed. The Gretna Estate witnessed an influx of 
some 10,000 to 15,000 hard drinking navvies, hired to build a new munitions factory. (16) 
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At the same time, State purchase was being considered in the Cromarty Firth area where 
drunkenness was rife amongst the increasing numbers of navy personnel. The Board also 
purchased public houses near a munitions factory at Enfield Lock in London. 
Effectively in charge of the means of production and distribution of the liquor industry 
in the Carlisle area, the Board's first policy was to attempt to reduce the levels of 
drunkenness within its area. Undesirable and excessive numbers of public houses were high 
on the Board's hit list but, not involving itself in total prohibition, the Board invested in new 
public houses. This new style of public house offered a more congenial atmosphere 
providing meals and minor refreshments and the opportunity for rational recreation other 
than the consumption of alcoholic beverages. As an extension of this new thinking the Board 
appointed managers rather than tenants. This experiment in 'disinterested management' was 
made possible by the Board rewarding its staff through anything but the sale of intoxicants. 
At the end of 1918, out of 221 licensed premises in the Carlisle area owned by the Board and 
engaged in trade, 164 had been placed under management, and 57 were still in the hands of 
fled tenants. (17) Briefly put, disinterested management meant a scheme for carrying on the 
trade of alcoholic beverages, not for profit but for the 'public good,' but it was not the 
panacea that many had hoped for. In the Dumfries and Galloway district of Annan, the 
conditions under disinterested management so alarmed the bench that they issued stem 
warnings to the managers that 'no excessive consumption of liquor would take place on their 
premises.' (18) Such warnings were possibly due to the way the new establishment at Annan 
was constructed and operated. The building was specifically intended for the use of navvies 
who resorted to it in large numbers. (19) Other experiences of the disinterested management 
theory were not entirely successfiul. Many public houses in the restricted districts did provide 
food, but after a prolonged trial found that such provision failed to meet any demand. (20) 
In the Board, however, State control had come to be regarded with more and more favour as 
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being the policy which offered the most rapidly effective and best permanent solution of the 
'drink problem.' (21) Full control of the drink traffic for the period of the war was considered 
by the Board as a forerunner to purchase at a later date. 
Lloyd George too had not entirely abandoned the idea of nationalisation and in 1917 the 
second phase of state purchase was prompted not by excessive drinking, but by the fear that 
shortage of food would force the govermnent to restrict the output of beer. (22) A public 
campaign was initiated and in May 1917 committees were set up to work out financial 
details. A two-clause bill to provide funds was approved and the decision made to assume 
control immediately the bill was passed. Details of the scheme were, however, mysteriously 
played down by Lloyd George who presented an alternative plan, to increase beer output 
without taking control, and argued that the parliamentary situation was wrong for large 
schemes. (23) The following year at a Brewer's Society meeting, its chairman told a general 
committee that he 'regarded State Purchase as dead.' (24) Though it may have been dead in 
the eyes of the brewers, the Control Board remained convinced on the merits of state 
involvement. In its 1920 report the Board stated categorically that by extinguishing private 
interests in the sale of liquor and establishing a strict system of control and inspection of 
public houses, it had been possible to reduce excessive drinking to a very marked degree. 
Restrictions imposed by the Board's orders were seen as being acts whose applications would 
have been impossible under conditions of private management. (25) Reports from the 
Carlisle district general manager showed that the transfer from private to public ownership 
had been successful. (26) This belief was supported by the Chief Constable of Carlisle and 
Labour Party activists who, together with trade union colleagues, extolled the virtues of the 
Carlisle experiment. From the evidence provided to them and their choice on what they 
wanted to hear, the politicians made out a good case for control of the liquor industry but 
remained unconvinced though not entirely dismissive about outright state purchase. It 
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remained a strand of thinking in the drink question and resurfaced at intervals through the 
inter-war period. 
Not wishing to be left out of the debate altogether the Temperance Movement saw an 
opportunity for quickening their usual activities into an intensive campaign which took two 
forms, propaganda for individual abstinence and political pressure in favour of drastic 
legislation prompting renewed concern in the Trade. Predictably, the UKA, spying a 
foothold for prohibition, declared that the time had clearly come for wartime prohibition to 
be introduced as a 'non-controversial' measure. (27) The National Trade Defence 
Association (NTDA) thought this political opportunism and that it was a gross interference 
with the rights of the public. (28) There were those in the Temperance Movement who were 
clearly in favour of a moderate approach to the dilemmas attributed to the misuse of alcohol, 
but used the advent of war to press for demands that they would not normally have 
considered. Legislative proposals for a Control Board were seen as too mild. In the early 
months of the war restrictions on personal liberty were sanctioned and without protest by the 
public, as most war measures were, and the Temperance Movement argued that dramatic 
action would be accepted. In their defence signs in public house windows publicans enticed 
would-be consumers with the opportunity to view 'war news' and exploited increased beer 
taxes to encourage the consumer to 'Be a patriot! Support the flag! Drink the national 
beverage and thus defeat our enemies.' (29) The Alliance News responded through an article 
called 'Drink Drama,' a column which pictorially portrayed examples of dereliction of duty 
caused by alcohol. (30) 
The prohibition campaign continued unabated with staunch believers such as the UKA, 
supported by a new prohibitionist group, the Strength of Britain Movement. The 
Movement's chief protagonist, Arthur Mee, focused his attack on the use of scarce materials, 
especially grain, by the drink trade. His tracts, published under such titles as 'The Fiddler' 
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and 'The Parasite' were intended to leave no doubt about the damage drink was doing to the 
country. (31) The Trade's response was through the Whisky Association, which accumulated 
a fighting fund of £100,000 and formed a new pressure group 'The Freedom of Britain 
Movement.' (32) The Trade was well aware of its need to be seen as welcoming any 
reasonable demand made upon it, particularly when it came to the defensive forces of the 
country and the maintenance of public order, but threats of prohibition under the guise of a 
national crisis was seen as unduly interfering with the rights and liberty of the public. The 
Trade also protested against imposed drastic restrictions. In a leading article of the 3 April 
1915, The Times suggested to its readers that a more sober view should be taken of the 
problem and there was a need to put the question of drink in the right place. The article 
recognised that 'the evil was serious enough, but that any talk of total prohibition, which has 
been proposed, is in our opinion out of proportion to the object.' (33) 
The Alliance News was extremely active in temperance propaganda and used the war to 
its full advantage. The pledge taken by the King and Field Marshall Kitchener, war minister 
1914-1916, was repeatedly highlighted and the Strength of Britain Movement was a constant 
reminder to Parliament. (34) One of the first actions of this movement was the publication of 
a petition with more than than 2,000,000 signatures. This petition was an appeal to the 
government to prohibit liquor traffic during the war. The Temperance Movement placed a 
great deal of weight on the harmful and physical effect of alcohol. The licensed trade, on the 
other hand, placed a great deal of emphasis on the health giving properties of beer. 
Meanwhile the Central Control Board produced pamphlets in 1918 entitled, Alcohol: Its 
Action on the Human Organism. This showed that alcoholic drinks had only limited 
nutritional value and their action was narcotic rather than stimulant. On the other hand it 
showed that temperate consumption of them was physiologically harmless to 'normal' adults. 
(35) 
Wartime control and especially the Carlisle experiment were central to the debate 
around drink and temperance both during and after the war and will be considered further 
below and in the next chapter. Whatever the precise causes, there was undoubtedly a 
dramatic decline in alcohol related issues. By 1929 convictions for drunkenness in England 
and Wales had fallen to 27.5 per cent of the 1913 level and in Carlisle to 22.8 per cent. 
suggesting that factors other than direct control may have had an effect. Between 1915 and 
1918 beer production fell from 33.1 million standard barrels to 13.8 million and spirits 
distilled declined from 50.1 million to 37.1 million gallons over the same period. 
Consumption per head of beer fell from 25 to 10 gallons and of spirits from 0.74 to 0.31. (36) 
From 1914 to 1918 the convictions for drunkenness in England and Wales fell from 183,828 
to 29,075. (37) Shadwell concluded that the absorption of men in the services, restrictions on 
conditions of sale and the reduced supply of drink cannot be held solely responsible for the 
increase in national sobriety, but together they produced the desired effect. Despite the way 
many Chief Constables interpreted intoxication there was, nevertheless, a dramatic decrease 
in the levels of drunkenness. Shadwell was of the opinion that, 'the decline in drunkenness 
was a more striking success than any other control measurement.' (38) The Temperance 
Movement acknowledged this movement away from alcoholic consumption, but perhaps 
recognising its own limited contribution still believed that 'our teaching, preaching and 
argument have influenced the drinker but very slightly,' ... and 'the temperance world needs 
to get out of its present self-satisfied and self-congratulatory mood as it has made little 
impression upon the drinking public.' (39) The Temperance Movement wanted the abolition 
of the drink traffic not state control and the realisation that its aims and ambitions went 
unheeded provoked uncertainty. The ultimate object of control was to increase national 
efficiency, and through this an increase in the production of war materials; the control of 
drink was only a means to this end. Thus it was the necessities of war which dictated the 
debate, not so much temperance or prohibition proclivity. Carver makes the point that almost 
every official statement regarding drink control, and all the leading newspapers comments 
upon it, condemned the Temperance Movement to the sidelines. (40) 
Prohibition and Deregulation 
The ending of the war signaled a demand for a return to normality and an ending to 
restrictions. As expected, the Temperance Movement demanded that there be a careful 
consideration before any return to a pre-war situation was contemplated and made many 
suggestions, including the imposition of prohibition. By 1919 however shorter hours, higher 
prices, more civilised public houses and all the other control measures which had been tried 
had achieved a near miracle. The consumption of all forms of drink, in terms of absolute 
alcohol, had dropped from 89 million gallons in 1914 to 37 million in 1918, and the number 
of cases of drunkenness in England and Wales from 184,000 to 29,000 whilst deaths from 
alcoholism had been cut by five-sixths. (41) The need for continued, much less further, 
stringency seemed unnecessary. 
While wartime restrictions in the UK began to be removed, in the United States the 
Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcohol, 
became law, which only encouraged the more radical sections of the Temperance Movement. 
As we have seen, the British government did contemplate drastic action, at least for the 
duration of the war, but industrial considerations, financial restraints and the lack of public 
support made the government unenthusiastic. What was it then, that made the USA embrace 
prohibition and the UK accept limited control? It is worthwhile briefly to consider how 
Prohibition caine about in the United States to highlight the differences. From Professor T. 
N. Carter's perspective, differing moral ideas demand some moral cohesive force that can 
bring about an homogeneous attitude towards legislation. Such moral unanimity requires a 
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country inspired by a high enthusiasm for a particular creed, be it tied to that of national 
efficiency, religious Puritanism or facist patriotism. To such ideals, prohibition could be 
more readily fashioned. (42) This set of conditions materialised in the United States where 
there was also the romanticism and teaching that sober country life was good, while city life 
was wicked. (43) 
The factors identified by Professor Carter, in one form or another, gave a dynamic to the 
prohibitionist cause. Although the main areas of prohibition were the areas where the 
Methodist and Baptist churches had their greatest strength, the Anti-Saloon League made 
sure that its doors were open to all denominations. In seeking to represent a united religious 
force it was able to focus its attention on its central idea of utilizing the organised churches 
as a political battering ram. (44) The Methodist Churches were the largest Protestant body in 
the country, and they worked closely with the Anti-Saloon League. The League, founded in 
1893, claimed to be the political machine of the Protestant Churches in the matter of 
prohibition. The strength and fortitude of the Anti-Saloon League was formidable. Between 
1911 and 1925 the average number of churches affiliated to the League was some 30,000 
rising to a maximum of 60,000 at the peak of the League's influence. Through these churches 
the League collected up to two million dollars a year in revenue and called out dry votes 
against wet candidates in political elections. (45) In response to the accusation that it was a 
political machine, the League made it clear that 'the Church is a machine and the League is a 
machine within a machine ... constructed so that all personal advantage is submerged to the 
task of establishing sobriety in the nation. (46) The League was organized to give church 
people an effective political organization to fight the liquor traffic. From 1915 the 
Anti-Saloon League became the representative of the American Temperance Movement and 
in so doing became the official voice of the 'thousands of citizens who are opposed to the 
saloon and who have no interest in the churches as such.' The League did not want to be 
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seen as a rival to the church or to any other society but as a 'clearing house for church and 
temperance societies.' (47) 
There is no doubt that the Anti-Saloon League became one of the most powerful political 
machines in the early twentieth century. Through its propaganda machine it mobilized 
support and concentrated its attention on the voters. T. M. (uilmore, president of the National 
Model License League suggested in 1908 that the Anti-Saloon League was 'the most 
dangerous power ever known in the politics of this country.' (48) As in the UK the 
Temperance Movement in the USA began with appeals to the individual to abstain from 
alcoholic drink. The message was the same; 'alcohol was a beverage that was not merely 
injurious when used in excess but was bad physically, mentally and socially, in any quantity.' 
(49) But waiting for the numbers of individual abstainers to reach a level, where they could 
be seen as a political threat was not the style of the League. The League set itself the task of 
creating through powerful propaganda, an emotional abhorrence of the saloon and the liquor 
traffic. The saloon was represented as the rendezvous of the criminal, as the office of the 
political manipulator and purveyor of drugs. Political corruption became strongly associated 
with the saloon and the League tirelessly argued that for politics to be purified, 'the saloon 
must be destroyed, we can never get the saloon out of politics so long as we get our politics 
out of the saloon.' (50) The emotional propaganda of the League was designed to frighten 
parents into the Anti-Saloon ranks and against saloon keepers who threatened millions of 
lives with their efforts to attract new customers. Notwithstanding the fact that the League 
insisted that its campaign was against the saloon and not a demand for prohibition, its 
propaganda made little effort to keep the issues distinct. The League suggested that, 'the 
liquor traffic has never obeyed the law and it never will.' (51) 
The war gave the League a rare opportunity to deal the liquor traffic a mortal blow. As 
with the UK, there was an emphasis placed on the misuse of scarce materials like grain, and 
the frantic appeals to sacrifice everything to win the war were contrasted with the criminal 
waste by the liquor traffic. Although its propaganda was, in some instances educational, its 
main message was political as its primary concern was with the voter. In an effort to reach a 
maximum audience, the League began to publish the American Issue. This temperance 
journal became the official organ of the League, and by 1914 its eight presses were printing 
more than forty tons of temperance literature each month, including thirty-one state editions 
of the American Issue, with an aggregate monthly circulation of more than 500,000. The war 
did force the League to reorganise its publishing work but in 1920 a total of 18,386,642 
copies of the American Issue were printed. It is not surprising therefore that this deluge of 
information profoundly modified the behaviour of the American people toward the liquor 
traffic. By comparison, the UK Temperance Movement with temperance journals such as the 
Alliance News and the Advocate never came anywhere near this outpouring of temperance 
propaganda. The League's political objective was to hold the balance of political power. 
Actively to enter the contest as a political party would have destroyed this possibility. With 
the virtual control of a large block of votes, through the political organisation of the 
churches, however, the League could frequently force the major parties to nominate 
candidates friendly to its interests. Political defeat stared many a politician in the face if 
they chose to oppose the League and those seeking reelection did so at their peril. The 
powerful Anti-Saloon League was able to convince the American public that it was in its best 
interests entirely to prohibit the manufacture, sale and distribution of all alcoholic beverages. 
Organisational coherence gave a clear direction to the considerable energy behind 
temperance sentiment in the US which, when focused on obtaining a balance of political 
power allowed Prohibition to be achieved in a manner which U.K. prohibitionists might have 
envied but could scarcely emulate. 
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Wartime restrictions began to be reconsidered in the UK from February 1919 just when 
the US was about to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment. Enforced prohibition came into force 
in America on the 16 January 1920, inevitably giving the UK prohibitionists fresh hojie. and 
causing the Trade many anxious moments. Encouraged by the efforts of the Anti-Saloon 
League, a campaign for prohibition by Local Veto was launched in London in November 
1919. Many Americans came to the UK to join the campaign for prohibition, principally W. 
E. (Pussyfoot) Johnson. With financial backing from America, he established an office in 
Fleet Street, London, aiming to explain the many reasons why prohibition had become a 
central issue in American politics and why the Anti-Saloon League had been so successful. 
Fearful that the success of the Anti-Saloon League could be echoed in the UK, 
representatives of the Trade combined to form an anti-prohibition organisation. The country 
was flooded with literature and temperance meetings were broken up. The Brewing Trade 
Journal referred to Johnson in almost every issue in scathing terms. (52) Prohibitionists had 
expected hostility from publicans and brewers, but not from many MPs, prominent 
intellectuals and a large proportion of the press. Many drinkers testified to the blessings that 
drink had brought them, and their heavy expenditure was claimed as proof of public 
spiritedness; they were generously keeping the country solvent, while the teetotalers were 
meanly evading their fair share of taxation. (53) In retrospect it is small wonder that the 
principle of prohibition met with such hostility. Many people readily accepted the need for 
curtailment of beer production due to the demands made by the Food Controller, but 
prohibition was excessive. 
Authoritative figures like Viscount Curzon MP regarded the Control Board regulations 'as 
being quite intolerable.' In correspondence with the Secretary of the Temperance League, 
Curzon suggested that it was right 'to be as severe as you like with those who offend against 
society by drinking to excess ... but do not rivet Control Board restrictions round the necks of 
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English people for all time.' (54) 	 In 1921, The Licensing Act (11-12 Geo. 5.c.42) 
incorporated the principles as to 'Permitted hours' for the sale and supply of drink and the 
State ownership of the liquor trade in the Carlisle area, both of which had been èentral 
features of the Board of Control's action. (55) The introduction of the 1921 Act did, 
however, put an end to the Control Board, restoring full jurisdiction to the justices; retaining 
as it did some meritorious sections of the Board's conditions. These included early morning 
closing and a break in the afternoon and restricting clubs to the same regulations as licensed 
houses. The Home Office was made responsible for the administration of the State controlled 
districts. Through the Act, licensing hours were lengthened in the controlled areas and 
shortened in the uncontrolled areas. In areas where the hours were most extended and in 
particular, the permitted closing time prolonged to 11.00 PM, there was an increase in 
drunkenness. Such increases were achieved despite disposable income being reduced by 
high prices, falling wages, and growing unemployment. Further evidence that it was the 
length of opening times that dictated levels of drunkenness. 
The Times noted that, 'the strength and acceptability of the new legislation lay in the fact 
that it was a partial return to prewar and a compromise at that.' (56) At the UKA annual 
meeting held in October of 1921, however its president, Leif Jones accused the government 
of not fulfilling its pledge that it would put into legislation the lessons gained during the war. 
He argued that the reforming energies of the present House of Commons had been exhausted 
as far as drink was concerned by the Licensing Act passed that year. (57) He continued to 
demand, however, as did other speakers, that prohibition was still their ultimate, but not 
immediate goal and advised them not to talk prohibition at the moment, but to concentrate on 
Local Veto. Further news of the prohibition campaign from America gave the English 
prohibitionist cause some hope as it was reported that a Salvation Army spokeswoman, 
Commander Evangeline Booth, had stated that since prohibition was enacted 'drunkenness 
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among the poor has almost entirely disappeared.' (58) Speaking at a meeting on the 
Responsibilities of Free Churchmen, Lloyd George addressed the topic 'Drink and 
Efficiency.' Lloyd George thought that drink expenditure was 'poisoning the national 
efficiency.' He made reference to all the drink experiments that had taken place over the last 
fifteen years and that the most remarkable was the one taking place in America. 'It was no 
use,' he suggested, 'indulging in the slapdash condemnation of the prohibitionists even 
though many had suggested that prohibition in America was the craze of cranks. Lloyd 
George went on to suggest that when he went to America he had found that there was not 'a 
vestige of truth in that view,' and that wherever he went he never met a man who would give 
a vote in favour of the saloon. As far as public opinion in America was concerned, 'the beer 
house was a thing of the past.' (59) However that same year The Times, in its usual 
'American supplement' declared that 'on prohibition, we learn that in violation of the law 
there is still much drinking; that those who know the ropes can get liquor.' (60) 
In America there had been a focused and determined temperance crusade. The minds of 
children had been influenced in church and Sunday schools. Texts taught the virtues of thrift, 
labour, obedience to God and temperance. By 1902 the majority of states had passed laws 
requiring temperance teaching in the public schools. In the eighty years before the passing of 
the Eighteenth Amendment, the dxys had a near monopoly of the means by which results of 
research on alcohol reached the voters. The minds of a whole generation had been 
conditioned to feel guilty every time they took a drink of liquor. (61) The Anti-Saloon 
League wanted individual abstinence and part of its propaganda campaign was to frighten 
parents. The saloon was portrayed as the rendezvous of the criminal and the drug dealer and 
its demise only achievable through prohibition. Parents were therefore encouraged to protect 
their children through the elimination of the saloon and with it the abolition of the liquor 
industiy. The tendency in the UK was to look upon alcohol as either harmless or beneficial 
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when taken in small quantities and to condemn only the excessive use of it. In America 
alcohol was viewed as being harmful absolutely and any talk of measurable quantity was 
treated with complete indifference. In the UK the Temperance Movement was divided and 
had no coherent aims and objectives. It was politically weak and outdated and it was up 
against a political system which favoured the anti-prohibitionists as there was no positive or 
agreed action from the major parties on a complete solution to the drink question. We have 
seen that the Conservatives acquiesced to almost all of the Trade's demands and the Liberal's 
failure to win elections on the weakest of prohibition causes, Local Veto, informed the 
politicians that the public would not accept prohibition. The Labour Party flirted with Local 
Veto and there some in the Labour ranks who believed in the American Experiment but 
neither options became firm Labour policy. An American commentator in 1929 noted that 
British efforts to control drink contrasted to the position with her native country: 'the liquor 
interests are far more powerful than they were in the US because they are finitely more 
respectable. The brewers and distillers are not rich but they are of the socially elect.' (62) In 
the US, prohibitionists had succeeded in becoming part of the mainstream; in the UK they 
had become outsiders increasingly divorced from political priorities and cultural trends. 
Hearts and Minds 
By the late 1920s it was clear that a profound change had taken place in the nation's 
drinking habits. Many factors had contributed to this change including higher taxation and 
prices, reduced drinking hours and the diminished strength of beers. A quadrupling of the 
excise after 1918 which raised beer prices to 7d a pint by 1922 (double the pre-war level) 
obviously contributed significantly to reducing total beer consumption as did the fall in 
disposable incomes. Explaining this fall in consumption in purely economic terms is 
inadequate, however, as people' s attitudes towards leisure had fundamentally changed and 
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the public house no longer retained its centrality as a social institution. (63) While the nation 
became more temperate, paradoxically, the Temperance Movement declined. It could not 
compete with new forms of entertainnent and increasing secularism undermined its previous 
allies in the churches. Its political supporters, moreover, were also on a long term decline. In 
these circumstances a number of prominent temperance spokesmen began to develop a new 
approach to the drink question based on an analysis of wartime control, which attracted 
support from some in the churches. Even some in the IJKA began to question their position 
but the result was only too predictable, further division and gloomy introspection. This 
section reviews some of the wider factors affecting temperance. 
The Licensing Act of 1921 was clearly a disappointment to many temperance reformers 
and if they were to continue with their campaign drastically to reduce or even eliminate the 
consumption of alcoholic beverages, they had to have a new strategy. One important 
problem was that despite valiant efforts to achieve permanent legislation, their main allies in 
Parliament, the Liberals, were now the opposition party and not that keen to propose any 
temperance reforms that would interfere with the liberties of the 'working man.' The war 
had strengthened the position of organized labour and many trade union leaden had a status 
and bargaining position which they had never had before. These union leaders also realised 
that their social ambitions would be more achievable through a Labour government. 
Meanwhile the Conservative Party wanted a return to 'straightforward' government by a 
single political party after the wartime coalition. (64) Life for the Conservative Party was 
never to be the same either as the political progress of the Labour Party continued to gain 
momentum. Although its leaders had suffered defeats in 1918, it fielded nearly five times as 
many candidates as its previous maximum. (65) Ramsey MacDonald was elected leader in 
1922 and in January 1924 the first Labour government was formed. MacDonald was unable 
to stay in office and a general election in October of that year returned an overall 
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Conservative Majority. What this signaled was a return to a two-party system, with Labour in 
the position formerly occupied by the party of temperance, the Liberals. 
For the Temperance Movement to retain the focus of animosity towards the liquor trade it 
needed to keep and recruit new members. This became increasingly difficult for the 
Temperance Movement and the many church organisations due to the growth in leisure 
pursuits. Yeo's study of Reading highlights the many participatory activities like swimming, 
cycling and rowing clubs that mushroomed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Reading was described as a town whose 'social activities and amenities are of the highest 
power possible for a town of its size and population.' Religious bodies provided only a 
fraction of these amenities (66) Although spectator sports such as football and cricket 
continued to attract huge followings the biggest new attraction was the cinema. The cinema 
attracted members of all classes including the working class. Not only were the cinemas 
warm and comfortable; they were cheap, making them attractive even to the unemployed in 
the depressed areas. Roebuck suggests that the cinema became so popular that it 'wove itself 
into the fabric of social life at all levels.' (67) In 1931, it was estimated, on the basis of total 
weekly cinema attendance, that one third of the population of London went to the cinema. 
(68) In 1934, the first year for which reliable statistics exist, there was an average 18.5 
million admissions to cinemas every weekend, a total of 963 million admissions for the year. 
(69) Traditional institutions such as the church and the pub found it difficult to compete 
with its ever growing popularity. The precise relationship between one form of escape and 
another is impossible to assess, suggests Roebuck, but it is probable that there had been 
some form of connection between the popularity of the cinema and the low level of 
drunkenness after the First World War. 
Temperance decline would not have been helped by journals, such as the Alliance News 
and the Advocate, which failed to keep pace with modern times. They appealed to only a 
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limited readership, they nearly always ran at a loss, and they failed to attract and keep 
advertisers. Their format did little to encourage new readers focusing as they did entirely on 
the machinations of the drink trade, the unreliability of the politicians and the sometimes 
lukewarm response of the Church. But above all else they each had their owii agenda and did 
nothing to encourage a union of temperance forces. Wilfred Winterton (an executive member 
of the 1.JKA) in an open letter to all temperance reformers suggested that the new need of 
today was cohesion and concentration. Winterton did not make too much of nineteenth 
century divisions suggesting that it was the 'loss of the Licensing Bill of 1908' that had 
'plunged the temperance reformation into the slough of despair.' (70) Despite this set back he 
was of the opinion that the Temperance Movement had begun to get its act together only for 
it to be dissipated by the outbreak of war in 1914. War had changed peoples attitudes and 
Winterton fully understood the need for the Temperance Movement to adapt to meet 'modem 
needs.' Many breweries had merged but the major temperance societies such as the UKA, 
BU and the CETS still proclaimed their independence. This division of effort and enterprise 
was, in Winterton's opinion, counterproductive and should be replaced by one national 
temperance society. 
Winterton's hopes flew in the face of the many fissures that began to appear in the 
relationship between the religious and temperance forces in the UK, which formed only part 
of a general cynicism that was a feature of a growing secularism. It has been shown that the 
Temperance Movement did rely upon the churches when recruiting and keeping members 
and when the religious firmament of England began to wane there was a similar result on 
temperance. Explanations for this fall in 'non-church-going' varied and in an effort to justil' 
their social involvement 'relevance' became the watchword. Alderman Sheppard, first 
Labour lord mayor of Bristol, told a conference on religion in the Labour movement that 
some of the finest Christian workers he knew 'rarely attended church or chapel' and many 
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true numbers of abstainers. (74) In a controversial move, Carter had been appointed to the 
Central Control Board in 1916 and in this capacity would have been privy to all the 
discussions on control and public ownership. Carter would have been aware of the CJKA5 
prohibition demands but was entirely opposed to such ideas. He believed that as the sense of 
social responsibility deepened, progress towards acceptable legislation may become 
practicable, but that 'it would be a fundamental error to reverse this order of factors and 
demand drastic legislation for which the nation is unprepared.' (75) 
Carter's moves towards a more moderate engagement with drink control was repeated in 
other analyses, especially of war-time experiences.. Stuart dismissed the view that 
disinterested management was responsible for the falls in consumption and drunkenness, but 
acknowledged that Spiritless Saturdays extended Sunday closing, liquor curtailment and 
dearness brought had enormous betterment. (76) Carver with uncomfortable perception 
noted the irrelevance of the Temperance Movement, 'almost eveiy official statement 
regarding drink control and all the leading newspapers published regarding it, and never 
suspect that there was or ever had been a distinct Temperance Movement in Great Britain.' 
(77) Stuart is probably right to claim that reduction in licensing hours was the main reason 
for the falls in consumption and not disinterested management. Carver may be correct in the 
lack of attention given towards the Temperance Movement by the media and reference to it 
in official papers. He is also correct in suggesting that the Movement wasn't distinct, as each 
society did approach the drink question from different angles. 
Shadwell's investigations into the causes of lost time during the war concluded that 
though drink was one of them, and a serious one in particular districts, there were several 
others much more important than the official reports allowed and no matter what was done 
with drink, there would always be some lost time in large establishments. Shadwell believed 
that men stayed away from work because they were unwell, over tired and really in need of 
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rest, or unable to face exposure in bad weather; in short suffering from temporary 
indisposition. (78) Such claims were reinforced by others who showed that only a small 
number of munitions workers drank to excess, and that over pressure and over fatigue were 
responsible for absenteeism not liquor. (79) Such were the vitriolic remarks made by some 
employers on the levels of drunkenness that many British workers suspected that they, not 
drink, was the target. Shadwell also concluded that excessive drinking could be effectively 
checked and the disability caused by it proportionally reduced by appropriate measures. This 
still allowed a degree of liberty sufficient to avoid a widespread revolt against the law or a 
resort to wholesale evasion. The police returns and the medical statistics confirming each 
other attested to the improvement of public order and public health in so far as they were 
drink related. Testimonies by employers and employees who called for control in the 
interests of industrial production and safety at work, proved that the object was achieved 
without provoking a dangerous reaction. All this work suggested that control and regulation 
would effectively combat the worst aspects of the drink question and reinforced the 
developing moderate social responsibility wing of the Temperance Movement. Prohibition 
moreover, was seen by many as an intolerable interference with personal liberty and 
dangerous because it was capable of indefinite extension. This was a major factor that was to 
prove insurmountable, for the prohibitionists. 
There is evidence that prohibitionists too were questioning their approach. Many made 
reference to the Liquor Traffic Prohibition Bill, introduced by Edward Scrymgeour on the 20 
April 1923. The UKA had published the following resolution to the Bill: 
That this committee, believing that the traffic in intoxicating liquors as common beverages is 
inimical to the interests of individuals and destructive of the order and welfare of society, 
and being convinced that the ultimate solution of the Drink problem can only be found in the 
total extinction of the liquor traffic upon public welfare. Believing, however, that the 
principle of prohibition is the same whether the area of its operation is local or national, this 
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committee is of the opinion that a measure for securing local veto yields for the moment the 
largest advantage to the cause of temperance in as much as while it does not prejudice the 
future, it enables the advance of public opinion to be registered, and at the same time secures 
to progressive localities immediate protection against the evils which inevitably attend the 
common sale of intoxicating liquors. (80) 
The IJKA had always taken the line that the abolition of the drink traffic was its prime 
objective. A more tolerant approach is adopted in the resolution when it declares that the 
only solution has been replaced by the ultimate solution. Local Veto may have been seen as 
a sounding board to test public opinion but for it to work on any meaningful scale it would 
have needed widespread acceptance. Since its inception, the UKA had fought long and hard 
for prohibition and the number of times that Local Option bills appeared before Parliament is 
a measure of its fortitude. 
Leif Jones, President of the UKA, suggested that it had 'never contemplated forcing 
prohibition on an unwilling people.' An understandable statement when it knew that the 
adoption of any prohibition policy could only be achieved through the ballot box. Leif Jones 
suggested that the objective of the UKA was now to 'enlighten people as to the nature and 
effects of alcohol, and to secure for the people the power to vote out the traffic if they wished 
to do so.' (81) Here again a somewhat naive statement as the effects of alcohol were widely 
known and he does not mention how voter apathy towards Local Veto was to be overcome. 
Despite the encouragement of the American Experiment he had reluctantly accepted that the 
prospects of getting a similar prohibition law through Parliament were remote. This left the 
UKA in a dilemma It was a prohibitory organisation and its aims were prohibition 
legislation. Local Veto can only be seen as a partial solution as drinking could go on in 
private houses. It seems that the UKA was barely paying lip service to its stated objectives 
and instead limited itself to public education, which it was hardly enthusiastic about. 
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Conclusion. 
This chapter has examined the way the UK was forced to recognise the need for serious 
Jjink legislation during the First World War. Reasons for the legislation were manyand in 
some instances not entirely convincing, but the final conclusion reached, was that 'excessive' 
consumption of alcohol was disrupting the prosecution of the war. Some temperance 
reformers may well have claimed responsibility for the introduction of the legislation but the 
evidence suggests differently. Certain sections of the Temperance Movement continued to 
make a case for prohibition, but prohibition was seen by many as an extreme and unrealistic 
measure, supported by only a minority of the Temperance Movement, rejected by the Control 
Board and opposed by public opinion. A detailed comparative study of the way both 
American and British societies saw the 'drink dilemma' is beyond the scope of this work, but 
a brief examination has highlighted the vast differences between the two approaches. In 
America, a single-minded and unified Anti-Saloon League was determined to gain maximum 
political support in which it was aided by a powerfi.il propaganda tool; the American Issue. 
The League had huge financial resources and was able to act in a comprehensive and 
cohesive manner. By comparison the Temperance Movement was divided; its propaganda 
machine weak by American standards, and its political aims constantly thwarted by the 
British political system. 
In 1921, the government removed the controls set in place by the DORA and despite 
dire warnings from the Temperance Movement there was no sharp increase in alcoholic 
consumption. Serious erosion to the Temperance Movement's religious foundations, brought 
about by an ever increasing growth in secularisation and leisure, also added to its growing 
problems. Its literature voiced a view of the world that retained its nineteenth century 
perspective and as such, left the Temperance Movement with declining support. Some 
temperance advocates recognised the changing nature of the issue and developed a new line 
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of approach. Hard line prohibitionists also began to speak differently, but seemed unable to 
convince themselves. If the Temperance Movement still had a message to get across to an 
increasingly sceptical audience, remarkably an opportunity to do so arose with the 
appointment of another Royal Commission in 1929. 
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Chanter 4. 	 The Royal Commission 1929-1931. 
Introduction. 
The legislation introduced at the start of the First World War was not brought about by the 
Temperance Movement. That the law succeeded in its task can be seen in the falling 
conviction figures for drunkenness, the falling liquor consumption figures and the decline in 
the number of public houses. (1) With the introduction of the 1921 Licensing Act it might 
have been expected that this decline would have been reversed but, again the figures show 
that this was not the case. (2) The Temperance Movement was understandably happy with 
this decrease in the drink traffic, but were not entirely pleased with the introduction of the 
1921 Act. Forever pessimistic on the ability of society successfully to control its demand for 
alcoholic substances, the Temperance Movement continued to press for Local Veto. Brian 
Harrison suggests, however, that 'temperance ceased to be a live political issue after the First 
World War.' (3) With its falling membership numbers, the continual fall from grace of the 
Liberal Party and the continual warring between the many temperance factions, this 
statement has great validity. Yet it was found necessary to appoint a second Royal 
Commission in 1929 to investigate licensing legislation. 
By the time of the commission, however, the Temperance Movement seemed unwilling to 
co-operate. The UKA claimed that it continued to 'fight the battle started over a century ago' 
but suggested that efforts were being made to use the Commission as a means of diverting 
the Temperance Movement from their main duty which, according to the UKA, 'was to 
educate the people so that they will make an end of the liquor traffic by the influence of their 
personal habits and by their political power.' (4) What is noticeable from this statement is 
that prohibition or local Veto seems to have disappeared from their vocabulaiy and had been 
replaced by the 'need to educate the people.' That the UKA clearly disliked the Royal 
Commission is put beyond doubt when the UKA suggested that, 'whatever qualities the 
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Report of the Royal Commission may possess it bluntly rejects those ideals which form the 
foundation of the Temperance Movement.' It was also made very clear by the IJKA that it, 
in common with other temperance Societies, 'never asked for a Royal Commission and had 
no special reason to place any particular confidence in the majority of its personnel.' (5) It 
appears that temperance organisations, accepting their marginalisation had begun to 
marginalise themselves. Despite their scepticism temperance reformers did not reffise to give 
evidence before the Commission but realised that it would be in a social atmosphere totally 
removed from when they last appeared before the Peel Commission. 
This chapter will consider the place of temperance in the political situation of the 1920s 
and the early 1930s. 
  This period brought a new factor, the Labour Party, more permanently 
into play, which was actually responsible for establishing the Amuiree Commission, and we 
must view the position of the labour movement with respect to temperance. The Amulree 
Commission offered yet another, probably undeserved, opportunity for the Temperance 
Movement to influence the drink debate. Some elements did contribute to the Commission, 
in developing strand of drinic as part of a much wider social question. The Victorian 
mainstay, however, refused to engage with the changing situation; simply reiterating their 
position which they now did not even hope to see implemented. 
The Labour Party and Temperance. 
With the decline of the Liberals, the Temperance Movement shifted its attention to the 
Labour Party to see how far it might be prepared to support temperance Measures. It was in 
fact a Labour government that appointed the Amuiree Commission and it is important to 
consider the Labour movement's position on drink. Temperance advocates could be found in 
the trade unions, the co-operative societies and the political parties. From Chartism and the 
Rochdale Pioneers, continuing through to the formation of the TUC and the modern Labour 
party, temperance ideas played an important part in policy formation. Socialist opposition to 
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alcoholic drink was, however, constrained by a number of influences. Most important of all, 
of cause, was the fact that masses of workers were dependent upon drink and the public 
house for their social life, and supporters of temperance in the Labour movement had to be 
careful not to alienate working-class constituents. (6) By 1914, many socialists had also 
rejected the notion that poverty was caused by drink, asserting that poverty was directly 
attributable to the economic system of capitalism but drink remained an important issue. (7) 
In 1905 a Trade Union and Labour Officials' temperance Fellowship was organised under the 
auspices of the National Temperance League (NTL). This group survived the war and lasted 
into the 1920s. Indeed, a feature of the TUC conferences during the twenties and thirties was 
the annual temperance demonstration, at which members of the NTL and trade union 
functionaries discussed drink-related questions. (8) 
Jones suggests that there were three distinguishable socialist approaches to the drink 
question. Firstly, state purchase, the transfer of ownership and control of the liquor trade 
from private to public hands; secondly, the libertarian or club view, that there should be little 
interference with personal drinking habits; and finally personal abstinence. (9) With the 
abandonment of the Central Control Board, a Labour campaign for the Public Ownership and 
Control of the Liquor Trade was formally launched in 1919. One of its secretaries, Arthur 
Greenwood suggested, that 'organised labour is solidly and overwhelmingly in favour of 
public ownership and control of the liquor trade.' (10) Greenwood believed in the 
contemporary medical evidence regarding the 'narcotic influence' of drink and its 
relationship, no matter how tenuous, on disease, crime and destitution. In this he would have 
found support from the Temperance Movement, but not that of state ownership. Since the 
consumption of beer was widely acknowledged as a central working class leisure activity, 'to 
which the Public House has contributed very largely,' the notion of prohibition was rejected 
as being fundamentally against the Labour interest. Rather than focusing on the inherent 
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characteristics of drink, emphasis was switched to the question of ownership, for it was the 
conditions of sale that were said to be injurious. (II) The Labour Campaign for the Public 
Ownership and Control of the Liquor Trade, in the years immediately after the war, was 
influential. In early 1920 the executive committee of the Labour Party appointed an advisory 
committee on temperance policy. This committee recommended that the party 'actively 
pursue' a policy of state purchase, and at the same time a number of Labour and socialist 
Labour organisations declared themselves in favour of such a policy. (12) 
The main assumption behind the case for public ownership was that drink when sold 
under conditions of private enterprise and freedom, could destroy individual responsibility 
and citizenship. There was however, large numbers in and around the Labour movement who 
disagreed with such an analysis. 'Libertarian Socialists' believed that moral action and 
individual habits, such as drinking, were essentially personal, and if a worker who drank 
could not afford a decent standard of living this was the fault of capitalism; a system, which 
it was suggested, denied the individual an equitable wage. In Yorkshire, 'bureaucratic' 
control of the drink trade was regarded as 'Frankenstein,' which 'was economically, 
commercially and socially wrong.' (13) In their opinion, workers should be entitled to decide 
exactly when, where and how much alcoholic drink they consumed. Though sobriety was 
applauded, curtailment of personal drinking habits, by state control or by prohibition, was 
resented. The most hostile section of the working class to come out against anything that 
threatened the loss of individual rights was the Working Men's Club and Institute Union 
(Cll.J). The CITJ and especially its supporters on the left, had an overall philosophy which 
stressed freedom in matters relating to individual leisure preference. (14) 
To these three approaches identified by Jones there must be added a fourth. Evidence that 
is available suggests that temperance socialists did not have a uniform approach to drink, and 
in the 1920s many of them believed in prohibition. In June 1920, the Labour Party declared 
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in favour of local option thus giving the electorate the opportunity to decide whether liquor 
should be prohibited, licences reduced, or ownership put under private or public control. (15) 
This was a noticeable victory for temperance, and showed that prohibitive measur'es had 
some Labour support. Ethel and Phillip Snowden were representative of those ethical 
socialists who would have nothing to do with the Labour Campaign for the public ownership 
of the liquor trade. Their rebuke of the Campaign was based on the premise that state 
purchase 'would prevent the full use of any power to prohibit the liquor traffic either 
nationally or locally, and so jeopardise the chance of achieving total prohibition.' (16) 
Phillip Snowden's proud boast of 1921 was that: 
Labour is unmoved by the argument of the liquor trade that Local Option is an unwarranted 
interference with personal freedom. Labour regards freedom to indulge in a practice which 
ruins health, which destroys industrial efficiency, which lowers moral stamina and is the 
greatest obstacle to the success of social reform, as the negation of true liberty. Labour 
believes that the community has a right to restrain personal freedom where its exercise is 
manifestly injurious to the individual and the community. (17) 
Inevitably, the existence of these conflicting ideas led to controversy and to a certain 
degree of internal dispute. There was, in short, a marked difference of opinion in the Labour 
ranks towards temperance reform. As one local newspaper expressed it; 
The Labour Party is thoroughly mixed in its opinions. There are prohibitionists in the party, 
there are men in favour of the nationalisation of the drink traffic; there are opponents of 
nationalisation ... and there are large numbers of members ... who will not take up definite 
attitude at all, because they are afraid of losing the club vote. (18) 
In an effort to open up the debate regarding the drink question several socialist authors 
rehearsed the various potential benefits that were supposed to follow the conquest of 
excessive drinking. Some accrued directly to the individual and the family, for example, 
better mental and physical health, improved diet, furniture, clothing and housing. (19) Some 
accrued to society, for example, smaller expenditure on hospitals, poor law institutions, 
courts and prisons. (20) Some were political such as the belief that 'a drunken democracy' 
was incapable of social reform and that the only sober intelligent workman would fight for 
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better conditions. (21) Some offered a solution to Britain's lack of industrial competitiveness 
through lower absenteeism and higher productivity. (22) Some, reflecting changes in 
economic theory, promised that a world devoid of expenditure on alcohol would be a world 
without unemployment. Some were quite simply dotty and ignored the frailty of human 
behaviour in non-alcoholic directions: 'If you get rid of drink the doors of the Divorce Courts 
would be almost closed.' (23) Temperance could thus still be seen almost as a universal 
panacea for the problems both of the individual and the whole of society. (24) Arthur 
Henderson promised in 1921 that given, 'an army entirely dissociated from strong drink ... it 
would not be long before they crush the very life out of capitalism.' (25) Temperance might 
not have been, in itself the solution of poverty, but it certainly removed an influence which, 
as the 1923 Labour and Liquor Trade Report recognised, compounded it. (26) Drink both 
impoverished and demoralised. The North Ham constituency party in 1919 urged that here 
should be no drinking facilities at the new Labour Hall, since the need of the movement was 
clear thinking, which was not encouraged by alcohol. (27) Gordon Lang declared in 1922: 
'The ideals of Labour will never fructify amidst unchecked whisky palaces and its 
intellectual appeal will fall in vain upon a drunken democracy.' (28) 
Conscious that the drink question was still unresolved, delegates at many Labour 
meetings and conferences tried to test the water with mischievous resolutions on prohibition. 
At the Labour party conference in 1921, for instance, there was what the local press called a 
'prohibition uproar,' when amidst 'accusations of trickery' the Executive Committee was 
compelled to withdraw a contentious motion on prohibition. (29) Delegates attending the 
Conference would have been aware of the growth in working men's clubs since the turn of 
the century and the pressure they could bring. They were generally seen as valuable social 
and recreational facilities for working men, rather than drinking emporiums, as the 
denominational press tended to suspect. There was also the political dimension from those 
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who were perhaps keen to avoid the active opposition of the clubs in their constituencies. 
Cost factors also diminished the enthusiasm for state control of municipalisation of the trade, 
in order to make public houses places of refreshment and recreation rather than intoxication. 
(30) 
Attitudes to drink in the party clearly varied considerably. Many sections of the Labour 
movement were equally likely to call for an extension of licensing hours than the passing of 
temperance legislation. Some constituency parties and trade councils were as unhappy about 
the temperance activities of their MPs as were the clubs organisations. J. H. Hudson was 
even reprimanded for temperance advocacy in the constituency of another candidate by the 
NEC in 1929. (31) Snowden, one of the most fervent of teetotallers, was nevertheless able to 
report, 'some of the most energetic of my workers are members of clubs and respect me for 
my attitude.' (32) Not all Free Church Labour MPs were willing to put this to the test by 
opposing the will of the clubs. This was as likely as not because the clubs had no formal 
position within the party structure from which to attack temperance MPs. (33) This tension 
was increasingly reflected in the fudging of Labour's temperance policy. At the 1924 and 
1929 elections all it offered was a Royal Commission. The Alliance News on the later 
occasion was in no doubt that this offer merely reflected the extent to which the party was 
divided on the issue. (34) 
The Royal Commission 
The Labour Party went into the 1920 general election without a stated policy and activists 
did not know how Labour would 'deal with the drink problem when it came to power.' (35) 
The party chose the easy option - they promised to appoint a Royal Commission to make full 
enquiry into the matter. (36) In its manifesto for the 1929 election entitled Labour and the 
Nation the Labour Party declared that: 
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A Labour government would appoint a Royal Commission to enquire into the developments 
and changes which have taken place both at home and abroad in recent years, and to report 
what modifications in the law and what changes in the method of control should be made 
with a view to the necessary legislation. (37) 
As George Buchanan astutely commented: 'We will funk coming to a decision, and will fling 
to a RC.' (38) In September 1929, a Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of Lord 
Amulree, began its enquiry into: 
'the workings of the law relating to the sale and supply of intoxicating liquor and into the 
social and economic aspects of the question, and to examine and report upon proposals that 
may be made for amending the law in England and Wales.' (39) 
From the outset, the Commission was aware that social habits had changed in the 
direction of society and a lower consumption of alcohol. Evidence to support this view came 
in the many reports published about the national consumption of intoxicating liquors. These 
were due to changes of social standard, the growth of greater attractions to drinking, the 
reduction of licences, restriction of hours and the taxation of drink. G.B.Wilson estimated 
the total drink bill for England and Wales as £128,581,925 in 1909, £137,041,000 in 1913, 
and £213,000,000 in 1932. The figures for national consumption of beer, sprits and wine 
however show a different picture: (40) 
1909(UK) 1913(UK) 1932(GB&M) 
Beer (standard 32,290,000 
bane Is)  
35,250,000 14,024,000 
Spirits (gallons) 31,060,000 31,790,000 9,600,000 
Wine (gallons) 11,400,000 11,370,000 12,272,000 
There was still the perception, at least within the Temperance Movement that the levels of 
drunkenness remained a problem. The figures produced by Wilson show that there may have 
been at the beginning of the century, but it was apparently much diminished at the end of 
1932. 
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I909(JK) 1913(UK) 1923(GB&NI) 
Proceedings 190,495 213,188 35,407 
LConvictions 169,518 188,877 30,146 
Convictions per 47.85 
10,000 population  
51.16 7.5 
An anomaly exists however in the recording of such cases as the Commission acknowledged 
and as the Temperance Movement continually claimed: 
The figures of convictions cannot be taken as an accurate measure either of the total amount 
of sobriety at any given time, or - having regard to the considerable variations in police and 
magisterial practice - of comparative conditions in different locations. (41) 
In a written statement to the Commission, N. Kendal, Assistant Commissioner 
Metropolitan Police submitted: 
In practice we never charge a man for being drunk unless he is either (a) disorderly or (b) 
incapable ... the chance of getting any doctor to certilS' as drunk, or any magistrate to convict 
as drunk, a man who can look after himself and has not caused any trouble to his fellows 
does not exist. (42) 
The written statement from R.L. Mathews Chief Constable of Leeds confirmed: 
In practice it is very difficult for the police to discriminate as to whether a person is 'drunk' 
and I am afraid that it would be very difficult to obtain a conviction for this offence unless 
the person in question had been taken to a police station and medically examined. (43) 
In his evidence to the Commission W. Hamilton Whyte, an economics lecturer at Bristol 
University, presented the results of his investigation of the effect of alcoholic consumption 
on industrial efficiency. In a wide ranging survey, Whyte interviewed 150 employers, 
representing over 100,000 employees in the shipbuilding and coal mining industries. Those 
interviewed had declared that drunkenness amongst the work force had dramatically 
decreased since 1914. The reasons given for this change were (a) Legislative and Fiscal - 
restrictions of the hours and higher prices due to higher taxes. (b) Industrial - Trade 
depressions and changes in the organisation of industry. (c) Social - Education and improved 
living standards of living. (44) High on the list of the Temperance Movement's arguments 
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against the liquor industry was the economic havoc caused by drunkenness. This evidence 
shows that it was increasingly difficult to prove drunkenness and dramatic falls in alcohol 
consumption removed the perceived threat to industrial efficiency. 
Understandably, the Carlisle experiment was a subject of particular interest. Giving his 
evidence before the Commission, Sir John C. G. Sykes, on behalf of the Home Office had 
suggested that the objective of the 'Carlisle Scheme' was to supply liquor in such a way as to 
meet public demand under the best possible conditions. It was also envisaged that this would 
discourage excessive drinking and help in the promotion of sobriety. In the hope of getting a 
much clearer picture of the levels of drunkenness in a scheme which had at its heart 
'disinterested management,' Sykes was asked if he thought that there had been a decrease in 
the levels of drunkenness when compared to other districts in England. His response was to 
conclude that it would prove difficult to make a fair comparison, but when pressed thought 
that 'State Management had been conducive to sobriety.' (45) The former General Manager 
of the Carlisle and District State Management Area, Sir Edgar Sanders was also of the 
opinion that there was 'no real drunkenness problem at present.' (46) The Very Rev Henry V. 
Stuart, Dean of Carlisle believed that there was no doubt that the 'responsible citizens of 
Carlisle generally consider that the present system is infinitely superior to what preceded it.' 
(47) 
In his evidence to the Commission, A. A. Johnstone, the Chief Constable of Carlisle, gave 
background evidence as to the effect the Central Control Board had on the city. On the 1st of 
July 1916, the Board commenced to acquire breweries and licensed premises in the city and 
at the end of 1916 the number of licensed premises had been reduced from 119 to 95. Many 
of the houses closed had been situated in narrow lanes and back streets, and many of the 
main public houses had been reconstructed, rebuilt or improved. Such architectural changes 
had improved supervision by the manager and his staff and had given more air, space and 
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light for the customers. In his evidence, Johnstone emphasised the importance he attached to 
the take over by the Board on the reduction in convictions for drunkenness. These had 
peaked in 1916 at 953 convictions for drunkenness but by 1929 had fallen to 54. Johnstone 
made it clear to the Commission that he did not differentiate between State controlled houses 
and ordinary licensed premises. He assured the Commission that as far as he was concerned, 
'there was no collusion between the State and the police in Carlisle. If there are any offences 
to be dealt with they are dealt with accordingly to the law in the ordinary way.' (48) 
In sharp contrast was the evidence given by the Rev A. J. Courtney, a Wesleyan Minister 
and formerly Temperance and Social Welfare Secretary for the Carlisle District Synod of the 
Wesleyan Methodist Church. He was also asked to appear on behalf of the UKA to give 
evidence on the character of the Carlisle Scheme. (49) Courtney made reference to the 
Carlisle Temperance League who had suggested in 1926: 
That this League, taking all things into consideration, and after close observation, has 
concluded that the Carlisle Scheme of State Control of the drink trade has proved a failure as 
a measure of temperance reform, and has in no way provided a solution to the drink problem. 
(50) 
Courtney believed that the Central Control Board had provided no evidence that (a) there was 
less drinking or less drunkenness in Carlisle than any other town; (b) there was a greater 
reduction in convictions compared with 1913 than in any other cities; or that the people of 
Carlisle had, on the whole, benefited by the State management and State sale of drink; (c) a 
better use made of wages in Carlisle than in any other towns; (d) the tradesmen (grocers, 
drapers, bakers, butchers, shoemakers or house builders) had profited; (e) the women and 
children were better fed and clothed or the children better supplied with milk. (51) 
Disinterested Management was, for Courtney, 'a more mischievous form of vested interest 
than those of the private monopolist.' (52) He was also of the opinion that those who 
believed that taking liquor out of private hands would take liquor out of politics, were sadly 
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mistaken. He believed that the 'so-called disinterested State publican will not have his trade 
politics extinguished.' (53) The basis of this evidence was that over a period of eighteen 
months from January 1925 to August 1926, Courtney had visited many Carlisle houses 
dressed as near as possible to public house clients. 
Courtney noted that it had been claimed by the Central Control Board that by 
extinguishing private interest in the sale of liquor, and by establishing a strict system for the 
control and inspection of public houses, it would be possible both to reduce excessive 
drinking, and ensure that restrictions, such as those imposed by the Board's orders, would be 
effective. It was also claimed that this would be, to an extent, impossible under conditions of 
private management and of ill-regulated competitive trading. In his survey however, 
Courtney found that the 'inspection' of public houses proved to be ineffective. Police 
witnesses claimed that as the public houses were State controlled, it was a State affair if the 
licensing laws were not being followed. One witness had suggested that 'they have their own 
inspectors, who go round every night; they are no use, (54) In Courtney's opinion the selling 
of drink in England ought to be under the absolute and individual control of the justices, and 
that private ownership was preferable to private ownership. (55) What Courtney appears to 
be suggesting is that pub inspection would be far more rigorous under private ownership. 
Despite the fact that his anecdotal evidence to the Commission was clearly based on close 
observation, no questions were put to Courtney on what precisely drunkenness was. From 
Courtney's point of view it was difficult to reconcile the many instances of drunkenness that 
he had witnessed in Government houses in Carlisle with their supposed improvement. 
'Drunkenness' he asserted, 'does exist in Carlisle, on the streets and in the houses.' (56) For 
a temperance campaigner, that was enough to condemn the whole Carlisle experiment. 
Leif Jones, president of the UKA, when called to give evidence was questioned on the 
probability of extensive Local Veto being implemented. In the new line being developed by 
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the UKA, Leif Jones replied that Local Veto would help, but also suggested that 
'enlightenment should be the aim.' His answers to the Commission were vague and 
unresponsive, preferring to skirt around the questions put to him. 'People will on1 keep 
straight in the end if they wanted to do so' and he believed that this is what was happening. 
(57) Evidence from the Rev Wilson Stuart was very similar to that of Courtney's and Leif 
Jones. This is not that surprising, as Stuart was for a time on the staff of the UKA, and was 
therefore in sympathy with its aims that, 'the State had no moral right to allow justices to 
licence the sale of alcoholic liquor.' (58) From Stuart's perspective, his investigation of the 
Carlisle Scheme was conducted with objectivity, despite the fact that the Commission had 
questioned his bias towards the subject. (59) When pressed by the Commission, Stuart 
declared that 'he was totally opposed to disinterested management under every form that had 
been proposed.' (60) He believed that despite the alterations that had been made to many of 
the public houses in Carlisle, he was of the opinion that the 'average public house in Carlisle 
was very unwholesome.' He declared in aprecis to the Commission that, 'no decent working 
man would ever consider taking his family into such places.' (61) Stuart considered that this 
answer was based on the results of observation and conversation. There is not much doubt 
however, that his response to the probing questions from the Commission on what he deemed 
to see as the 'decent working man, led to his answers becoming more and more convoluted 
and patronising. 
Also called to give evidence was the Political and Literary Secretary of the UKA, G. B. 
Wilson who stated that the task of any reformer would be enhanced if it were possible 'to 
assign specific causes for social evils.' Although he acknowledged that there was 'a poverty 
due to economic conditions and accidental circumstances.' (62) Wilson reiterated the 
familiar theme that directly and indirectly, drink was responsible for the 'greatest part of the 
poverty, crime, incompetence, sickness and early death which afflicted the great mass of 
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poorer people.' (63) Wilson was a declared prohibitionist who wanted to get rid of the liquor 
traffic in a 'proper time and place.' (64) When asked, however, if he could not get 
prohibition what would he do, he declined to answer. (65) He did believe however, that the 
'improved public house' could never be successful as a universal plan of dealing with the 
drink question. The improved public house policy he suggested, 'is one for capturing the 
young people.' (66) 
Speaking on behalf of the whole of the organised temperance forces in the country, Dr C. 
Weeks was in no doubt that the Conmiission offered the Temperance Movement an ideal 
opportunity to present the facts upon which the Movement based its case and enthusiastically 
relaunched the attack. He spent a great deal of his initial evidence to the commission 
refuting the brewers claims that 'a glass of good beer is as good as a glass of milk.' (67) 
With backing of the medical profession, the Temperance Movement did not need to convince 
anyone on the health problems associated with 'heavy drinking.' Weeks attacked the custom 
of farmers in Herefordshire and elsewhere to pay their workers part of their wages in the 
form of free cider, condemned the custom of allowing children of such districts, to bring 
cider to school for their midday meal. Weeks was also convinced that one of the results of 
cider drinking in Herefordshire was, 'a good deal of insanity.' (68) Weeks also believed that 
with regard to the Army, Navy and Mercantile Marine, that it had been long established that 
there was a causal relationship between excessive drinking and venereal disease. (69) 
Moderate drinking also came under Weeks' scrutiny, claiming as he did that, it interfered 
with industrial and commercial efficiency and ignoring evidence to the contrary. He also 
made reference to the work undertaken by Dr Vernon during the war who had investigated 
the effect that alcohol had had at certain large factories and concluded 'that the accidents 
dwindled as the consumption of alcohol dwindled.' (70) This statement had been well 
supported by evidence from the prohibitionists in the United States, who had shown that 
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prohibition had cut down the industrial accident record. What Weeks sought was the 'utter 
and entire elimination of alcohol from the life of the nation by the educated will of the 
people.' (71) Yet he could not say how this was to be achieved. When questioned on his 
prohibitionist attitude, the Commission made reference to his statement in the 'New 
Campaign' in 1928 when Weeks had declared that he could not support State prohibition 
because the country was not ready for it. (72) Weeks believed that if the public could be 
educated to such an extent that they would realise the danger of alcohol, and be prepared to 
prohibit it, then he could agree. 
While the Victorian temperance associations continued to labour their familiar themes, 
albeit with somewhat less enthusiasm, a different, and rather more positive approach was 
indicated by church organisations. Representing the Temperance Council of the Christian 
Churches was the Rev E. Benson Perkins, Superintendent Minister of the Central Mission, 
Wesleyan Methodist Church. The Council was formed in 1915 and was a Federation of the 
Temperance Executives of all the Churches, namely the Church of England, the Roman 
Catholic Church, and all sections of the Free Churches. The Council had advocated four 
legislative reforms. One was the exclusion of young people from liquor bars; a reform 
achieved by the enactment of the Intoxicating Liquor (Sale to persons under Eighteen) Act, 
1923. The other three were, restrictions upon clubs, Sunday closing and local option. Of the 
three remaining programmes of agreed reforms it was local option that was highest on the 
Council's agenda. Local option was defined as: 
The power vested in the electorate in a defined locality to decide, by the exercise of the vote 
(by such a majority as may be determined), questions affecting the local liquor traffic, and, in 
particular, the question of the continuance or extent of the retail sale and supply of 
intoxicating liquors within that locality. (73) 
The idea of local option had been given renewed currency by the rapid development of. 
new housing areas in and around the main centres of population since the war. Perkins 
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believed that these 'new housing areas provided an opportunity to face an entirely new set of 
social circumstances.' (74) In his statement to the Commission, Perkins suggested that there 
was an intimate association between the crowded and depressing housing conditions and 
excessive drinking. Such excesses were, he suggested, almost entirely due to those areas 
which had congested or redundant licences. (75) The procedure with regard to the question 
of licences for the sale of alcoholic liquors in the new housing estates varied in different 
centres. Liverpool Corporation, in laying down the lines of their housing policy in 1926, 
adopted a resolution that no site on the new estate should be leased or sold for licensed 
premises. The Anglican Bishop of Liverpool suggested that: 
To admit ordinary licensed houses in this district now would be to impose on the inhabitants 
a set of conditions which will be for many years fixed by vested interests. When they are 
able to choose for themselves they must have a free choice in the same conditions that were 
promised them when they first came. (76) 
Since 1907, the authorities in the new Garden City Letchworth had left the decision on 
whether there should, or should not be a licensed house within a new estate to the people 
resident in the area. On five occasions since 1907, the majority had been against a licence. 
In other centres like Birmingham, however, it had been assumed that provision needed to be 
made for the sale of alcoholic beverages in the customary way. Where this had been done, 
attempts had generally been made to secure the erection of 'improved public houses.' 
Perkins was eloquent in his defence of local option, as a fair and equitable method for 
dealing with a difficult and challenging problem. Responding to those like Baldwin, who 
believed that interference with the free behaviour of individuals should be minimal; Perkins 
suggested that 'Unfettered individual liberty is a fiction of the imagination.' (77) Local 
option was, for Perkins, an opportunity to place the power of control in the hands of the 
people themselves, giving them 'the opportunity to use their liberty of action for ends that are 
conceived to be in the highest interest of all.' (78) Local option was not put forward 
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specifically as a temperance measure, nor was it put forward by the Council of Christian 
Churches as such, nevertheless if the majority in a community agreed to Local Option, then it 
was possible to advance temperance reform. 
One of the most forceful and commanding witnesses was Viscount Astor and his evidence 
is worth considering in some detail, even if it failed to move the Commission. Astor had 
been a Conservative Member of Parliament since 1910, and had opposed the policy of the 
Temperance Movement. He was also proprietor of the Observer which he used to his 
advantage. Circumstances then forced him to study the drink problem which dramatically 
altered his perception, and in 1915, he was made a member of the Liquor Control Board. 
Astor had previously been of the opinion that: 
Temperance reformers are apt to be extremists and cranks; they are usually Liberal; brewers 
and publicans are good fellows and usually Conservative; the temperance people do not work 
for you even if you adopt their policy; individual brewers support your Conservative 
Association which cannot afford to lose their subscriptions, any more than you want to do 
without votes which they influence. But if you wish to identify yourself with the trade leave 
the question alone. (79) 
The evidence submitted by Astor was by far the most voluminous. Between 1917 and 
1918 Astor was involved with licensing legislation when acting as an arbiter between the 
Trade and temperance organisations. As a member of the Methcal Research Council, 
1914-1919 and Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health 1919-1921 he became 
cognisant of the medical consequences of excessive drinking. When his wife became an MP 
in 1919 and piloted a bill to keep the young (under 18) out of drinking bars, the Trade 
consistently sought her removal from public life. (80) Contemporaries who had also felt 
Trade aggressiveness related their experiences to Astor and as such he became extremely 
versed in the tactics adopted by the Trade when it chose to persecute those who threatened its 
existence. Such practical life experiences made him entirely suitable to give evidence and 
his role as a newspaper proprietor would not have done him any disservice when the 
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Commission was faced with who to call as witnesses. Equally, the fact that he was an 
aristocrat gave an added piquancy to his choice as the titled still commanded respect and 
awe. 
Astor had also been attracted to the 'improved public house' and had been a member of 
the True Temperance Association founded in 1909, which acted as a protagonist for the 
Trade. His conversion to temperance, however, opened his eyes to the magnitude of the 
Trade's power, and his evidence was a damning indictment of a surreptitious and 
manipulative interest group. Astor then went on to describe lesser know pressure groups 
against temperance, like the Anti-Prohibition League, launched in 1919 and called itself a 
temperance society, founded by the British men and women to oppose prohibition The 
United Kingdom of Temperance Crusaders was mainly used to help the Trade in London 
municipal politics. They urged club members to 'utilise their clubs to their full endeavours 
to turn out of Parliament every MP who is anxious to deprive them of their privileges.' (81) 
Apart from the emergence of these 'pseudo temperance societies,' financed by the Trade to 
disrupt the prohibition movement, the Trade also made effective use of those who openly 
declared themselves drinkers. The heavy expenditure on alcohol was claimed as 
public-spiritedness; the drinkers were generously keeping the country solvent, while the 
teetotallers were mainly evading their fair share of taxation. (82) 
The Trade had at its disposal therefore, a vast and powerful propaganda organisation. It had 
been claimed at a Licensed Victuallers Association meeting that 'each member of the Trade 
was sufficiently powerful to command 10 votes.' (83) Astor estimated that the Trade could 
therefore influence and control 1,000 to 2,000 votes per constituency. This was, he 
suggested, 'a most dangerous power for an industry whose commercial and political activities 
and interests conflict with the public interest.' (84) The Trade's expenditure also came under 
Astor's scrutiny. He claimed that the yearly expenditure by the Trade on political 
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organisation and propaganda was, on average, about £400 per parliamentary constituency. 
The money spent on advertising alcoholic beverages averaged out to £4,000 per constituency. 
(85) The average annual total expenditure of the Trade on political organisatin and 
propaganda was between £200,000 and £250,000. These amounts were in sharp contrast to 
the amount of money available to the Temperance Movement. The annual average total 
expenditure of the Temperance Association organisations was something under £20,000. (86) 
Astor was convinced that the Trade could not reform itself and suggested that they (the 
Trade) could not retain the status quo and remain passive. The Trade could not try to reduce 
consumption or reduce the strength of beverages as they had consistently opposed such 
measures. Astor suggested to the Commission that there were only three possible systems for 
dealing with drink. (1) Private Ownership. Improving the public house was a solution if it 
was coupled with public ownership as at Carlisle. (2) Public Ownership. The control and 
supply of drink would be vested in a public body, whose accounts would be subject to public 
audit. Benefits of such a system would be in 'Disinterested Control' and the lack of funds 
available from the system to 'influence' politicians or the press. (3) Prohibition. Against the 
total prohibition of the manufacture and sale of all intoxicants by Act of Parliament for the 
whole country. Astor suggested that there was no great demand for State purchase, at the 
moment, and that it would be more difficult to carry through Parliament in peace time than 
during the war. He too reached a rather negative conclusion that history had proved that it 
was practically impossible to pass a Licensing Bill through Parliament without the support of 
the Trade, or the Temperance Movement (or a strong section of it). Equally it would be 
impossible to drive a bill through Parliament against the opposition of both these interests, 
and without the fighting drive of one of them. 
In an equally remarkable turn round, many of the statements made by Astor were 
repudiated by E. J .F .Oldmeadow, Editor of The Tablet since 1923 and since 1920 honorary 
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adviser to the Wine and Spirit Trade Defence Fund. From 1890 until 1900 Oldmeadow had 
been a Wesleyan Minister, and had accepted the opinions of his temperance colleagues. 
Theological doubts however, culminated in his resignation from his pastoral office and he 
was then able to satisfy his travel ambitions. Extensive travel through eighteen European 
countries gave him the opportunity to visit many inns and refreshment houses, leading him to 
believe that there was nothing wrong with 'a good tavern or inn.' (88) As an adviser to the 
Wine and Spirit Trade Defence Fund he had recommended that they renounce to the public 
'Our Trade our Politics.' 'A Briton can come out of a particular trade but he cannot cease to 
be a Briton. Our country comes before our trade.' (89) This statement had been included in 
a document posted to 15,000 temperance workers, clergymen, legislators and other public 
men and Oldmeadow was quick to point out Astor's lack of reference to it. Oldmeadow also 
believed that temperance reform had been brought to deadlock, largely by Astor's use of the 
Observer. (90) Under the guise of his 'Correspondent' Astor was accused of bringing the 
names of those men and women connected with the fi.znd into disrepute, a technique used by 
the Anti-Sal000n League in America when it sought to discredit its opponents. 
Other witnesses appearing before the Commission were questioned on their stance on 
prohibition. The Right Rev The Lord Bishop of Barling was not in favour of prohibition, but 
'if the people wanted it he was in favour of it being implemented.' (91) The industrialist, Sir 
Arthur Balfour, a seasoned traveller of America and Canada and an anti-prohibitionist 
believed that 'you cannot make people good by legislation, and I think the prohibition laws in 
America prove it.' (92) Because of his YMCA experience Sir Arthur K. Yapp appeared on 
behalf of young people. He also believed that you cannot make people good by Act of 
Parliament. Yapp suggested that any ideas about prohibition would not get past the English 
press, and that the press believed that 'the people of America are longing to get this thing 
[Prohibition] of their shoulders.' (93) 
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The traditional temperance advocates maintained their position on prohibition yet 
seemed resigned to the unlikelihood of its implementation. Weeks perhaps enjoyed the 
opportunity to assault the trade yet it is doubtful whether the Commission was impressed. 
Leif Jones fell back on the long term education project yet refused to have anything to do 
with more direct measures which fell short of full local prohibition. On the other hand many 
more temperance advocates were prepared to accept moderate measures. The Commission 
accepted the dangers to health from habitual insobriety and believed that the influence of 
immoderate drinking aggravated a variety of social evils such as poverty, bad housing and 
neglect of children. (94) It did not accept the contention that the questions relating to the sale 
of intoxicating beverages were especially suited to local decision by popular vote. (95) The 
attitude seems to be captured by the Police witnesses. If a drinker was a nuisance neither to 
himself or his fellows, then there just wasn't a problem, and the number of cases was 
manifestly declining. 
Conclusion 
In a statement on the Royal Commission Report, the UK.A did join forces with others in 
the Temperance Movement, when the call was made for 'the people to be educated so that 
they may make an end to the liquor traffic by the influence of their personal habits and by 
their political power. (96) In the opinion of the UKA however, despite any qualities that the 
Royal Commission may have possessed, it had bluntly rejected many of the ideas which were 
held in such high esteem by the Temperance Movement. The Rev H. Carter, who was a 
member of the Commission, suggested, as did many other witnesses that to enact the UKA 
ideal of Prohibition would be counter productive as to 'put down drunkenness by puffing 
down the traffic in strong drink was an inadequate proposal.' (97) The failure of the 
American experiment in prohibition had blunted the enthusiasm of the UKA for it to be 
introduced into this countiy. Witnesses like Leif Jones and G. B. Wilson were only lukewarm 
138 
in their commitment to prohibition, acknowledging that it could only be achieved by the will 
of the people. Temperance witnesses continued to argue for the introduction of Local Veto, 
but this was considered a non-starter by the Commission. In its response to the Final keport 
the UKA believed that its main appeal was to those who wished to see, as a permanent 
feature of the social landscape, the sale of intoxicants. The TJKA declared its total lack of 
confidence in the majority of the Royal Commission personnel, pointing out that it had never 
asked for a Royal Commission in the first place. The UKA suggested that the 
recommendations of the Report made no attempt to get to the real root of the drink problem, 
believing that 'most of the temperance societies in the country look forward to the thy when 
then drink traffic will be swept out of the country.' (98) With that they retreated into 
themselves. The Temperance Council of the Christian Churches, however, were sympathetic 
to the general tones of the Commissions conclusions. The Council declared that they were of 
the opinion that the scientific evidence, respecting the nature and effect of alcohol, and the 
social and economic factors of the contemporary national drink problem were 'investigated 
with care and skill.' The Council however, did not accept the Commission's rejection of the 
use of the popular vote for determining the sale of intoxicating liquor in localities, and it did 
not accept the unqualified statement of the majority of the Commissioners that Sunday 
closing would not be acceptable to the general public in England. The Council also believed 
that the Conmiission' s valuable legislative and educational recommendations which rested 
(as regards England) on the signatures of no less than sixteen out of the nineteen Royal 
Commissioners was extremely important. It gave, suggested the Council, a mandate for 
Parliament to turn the progressive recommendations of the Royal Commission into law. (99) 
This moderate response was, unwittingly perhaps, echoed by Weeks who suggested that: 
IMJ 
Through one cause and another, coupled with the driving force of the temperance 
organisations, we have seen vulgar and criminal drunkenness materially reduced, much of the 
more sordid drink-caused poverty and misery has disappeared, drink-caused cruelty to 
children and animals has been greatly decreased, certain crimes (intimately associated with 
drink) against morals have diminished, whilst the general level of life has been materially 
and, we believe, permanently raised. (100) 
The simplicity of the phrase 'through one cause and another' calls into question the true 
dilemma that has always faced the Temperance Movement's raison d'etre. It is 
understandable that Weeks should emphasise the Temperance Movement's ability to act as a 
'driving force' for change, but throughout its history that ability has always been difficult to 
measure. In its long campaign the Temperance Movement had always relied upon the belief 
that many of the problems affecting society were drink related. Dramatic falls in the levels 
of consumption and drunkenness, increases in other forms of leisure pursuits, improvements 
in living standards and the falsehood of drink being the main cause of poverty and crime, all 
contributed to the erosion of the Temperance Movement's ability to effect change. The 
Royal Commissions Final Report did offer some comfort to the Movement when it concluded 
that 'the health of the individual would suffer from habitual insobriety.' The Royal 
Commission also accepted, in principle, that the influence of immoderate drinking 
'aggravated a variety of social evils, such as poverty, bad housing, neglect of children, 
matrimonial troubles, prostitution and certain forms of crime.' It concluded however, that it 
may 'sometimes prove difficult in tracing such a connection, to distinguish cause and effect.' 
(101) 
Similarly, influenced both by the falls in alcoholic consumption and drunkenness and by 
pressure from the clubs, Labour in the 1920s was ceasing to, have much of a temperance 
policy. Labour did not cease to have keen advocates amongst its Free Church Labour MP's, 
who played a prominent part in the opposition to any further liberalisation of the licensing 
legislation. In the budget of the same year Snowden as Chancellor significantly raised the 
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duty on, and thus the selling price of beer. (102) The deliberations of the Royal Commission 
on Licensing meanwhile seem to have inspired the founding of the Worker's Temperance 
League (WTL) in 1931. (103) Its foundation perhaps also reflected the increasingly marginal 
place temperance had within the labour movement as a whole. The improved public house, 
and the failing of Prohibition in the USA, made this issue appear both less urgent and less 
susceptible of legislative solution. As a pressure group within the party it therefore had little 
success in persuading Labour to adopt, 'a legislative programme which shall include the 
Temperance Recommendations in the RC on Licensing.' (104) By the early 1930s the Labour 
movement had in fact come to terms with the drink question. This fact, the division and 
demise of the Liberals, and the electoral dominance of the National government, all 
contributed to a lessening of temperance legislative initiatives in the 1930s and the coalition 
government took no action over the recommendations of the 1929-1931 Royal Commission. 
The Royal Commission had observed that: 
We have found a remarkable consensus in favour of restriction ... we think that a vast section 
of the public, including public house clients, the present scheme is acceptable and is 
becoming more so, not less so. That such is the case is in our opinion vital. (105) 
Licensing Laws and the regulations of drink had come to reflect the vast majority of public 
opinion. While drink did not cease to be a social issue it was no longer a great evil; the drink 
debate had closed. 
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Conclusion. 
This study has explored the activities of the Temperance Movement between 1895 and 
1933 as it sought to 'abolish the drink evil.' (1) From its early nineteenth century beginnings, 
temperance campaigners attempted to persuade through moral suasion, but with the 
inception of the radical UKA and its approach through prohibition, divisions were created 
within the Temperance Movement and doubt as to how the prime objective could be 
achieved. This basic division and the further fragmentation of temperance advocates into 
many sects and societies, prevented the Movement from presenting a united front in the 
continuing discussion on drink. As the principal demand of prohibition was repeatedly 
rejected, yet could not be abandoned, the Movement became increasingly introspective and 
marginalised from the debate in which it thought it had most to say. In the conclusion, I shall 
review the main features of the study, highlighting some of the central issues and areas where 
further research would be helpful, especially in relations to US Prohibition and the role of the 
Labour Party. 
The Liberal Party had been convinced that its support for Local Veto was a vote winner, 
and it entered the 1895 general election pledged to its enactment. The crushing defeat of the 
Liberals at the election came as a bitter blow to the more radical temperance reformers and, 
according to Dingle, marked the end of the UIKA's hegemony in the Temperance Movement. 
(2) There is much justification in this statement as the Liberal Party renounced the Veto as a 
political pledge and comments by many leading liberals at the time justify the reasons and 
the action. It did not stop the UKA from continually pursuing its prohibition propaganda but 
it was clear that any hope of prohibition enactment was dead in the water. Since 1864 many 
Direct Veto bills had appeared before Parliament but they failed at second reading. Each time 
the UKA supposed that this was a temporary political setback and carried on as before. The 
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1895 defeat was different as it was a public test of prohibition but the UKA still assumed that 
its position was recoverable. Such recovery was deemed likely as the UKA assumed that it 
could still count on support from leading members of the Liberal Party. What they seemed 
unable to grasp after 1895 was the realisation that fundamental changes had eroded the 
foundations on which its political effectiveness was based. Despite being inward looking, it 
would have proved difficult for the UKA to surrender its immovable position on prohibition 
as it did not believe in licensing at all. 
The announcement of the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate the licensing 
laws in 1896 gave the Temperance Movement and the UKA an ideal, albeit unexpected 
forum in which to plead their case. The fact that the Commission found it necessary to 
publish a Majority Report and a Minority Report is proof that solutions to the drink question 
were not clear cut. The Temperance Movement found some consolation in the Minority 
Report, but it did not result in any actual temperance legislation. Prohibition, however, was 
only the most extreme of many possible approaches and the public decline in its popularity 
as a solution should not be construed as a diminishing concern about the drink question, but 
rather as an increasing awareness of its complexity. In many ways the Peel Commission took 
a very traditional approach towards the drink question; its members divided along political 
lines when it came to decisions on the Veto and compensation. After 1895 even the Liberal 
Party, consistently the party most favourable to temperance causes, approached the drink 
question with great caution: the Temperance Movement appeared too fragmented; the Trade 
too strong and electoral opinion uncertain. (3) 
Between 1830 and 1900, Parliament had addressed the liquor question on innumerable 
occasions but with only limited effect. The elections of 1900 and 1904 went in favour of the 
Conservatives and in 1904 the Conservative Party finally succeeded in the implementation of 
a Licensing Act which had as its main component compensation, apparently a temperance 
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measure but one which struck at the heart of the Temperance Movement. The Act aimed to 
compensate those licensees whose licences had been revoked by zealous magistrates intent 
on reducing the number of licences and hence the number of pubs. The Conser'atives 
claimed that the closure of so many superfluous establishments was conducive to social order 
and was therefore a temperance measure. Brewers surrendered licences quite willingly on 
those public houses with poor accommodation and poor trading returns and were 
compensated for doing so. It is small wonder that the Trade found itself even more indebted 
to the Conservatives and a Temperance Movement seething with resentment. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century the study shows a Temperance Movement hopelessly 
divided with a depleted membership but, ironically, coupled with falling levels in reported 
cases of drwiicemiess and consumption of alcoholic beverages. Whilst the Temperance 
Movement applauded the decreasing levels of drink associated problems, it nevertheless left 
them embanassed and undecided on their next plan of action. 
Their uncertain position was further demonstrated during the First World War. The 
outbreak of war in 1914 witnessed the introduction of the DORA and with it draconian 
licensing legislation but in 1921, the , 
 enactment of a licensing act designed to restore many 
pre-war liberties. During the hostilities the Temperance Movement had persistently promoted 
the merits of prohibition and in petitions and carefully worded propaganda sought its 
enactment. After the war the Movement demanded that there be a careful consideration 
before any return to a pre-war situation was contemplated. By 1919, however, the drink 
control measures that had been put in place had achieved apparently miraculous results and 
the demand for prohibition became muted. Exacerbating the decline of the Movement's 
aims and ambitions was the effect of a changing political scene, which began to witness the 
slow demise of the Liberal Party, and the emergence of an electable Labour Party. 
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This was not so in the United States where the performance of the Anti-Saloon League in 
getting full prohibition enacted for thirteen years is the ideal example of a pressure group 
success; that it failed to stop drinking is another story altogether. Further comirative 
research, expanding on the reasons for the success of the League and the failure of the 
Temperance Movement would prove illuminating. That the USA decided on a denial 
approach rather than a controlled one is certainly the major difference between the two. The 
DORA, introduced during the First World War, contained some measure of denial but the 
perception of the time that the prosecution of the war was being jeopardised by drink 
demanded draconian rather than prohibitive action. Total prohibition was considered but 
ruled out as being out of proportion to the objectives, and studies conducted after the 
implementation of the DORA support the view that many employers, particularly those in the 
ship building and ship repair industries had over-stated the industrial problems caused 
through drink. Those solutions of a more moderate nature, like the uniform restriction of 
facilities, the substitution of light for heavy alcoholic liquors, and, to some degree, the 
Carlisle experiment, all proved their worth. Excessive drinking was checked, and the 
disability caused by it proportionally reduced, which allowed sufficient liberty to avoid a 
widespread revolt against the law or a resort to wholesale evasion. Drunkenness and 
alcoholic consumption never returned to pre-war levels and this success can be attributed 
largely to alternative leisure pursuits, shorter hours and the levels of taxation. There is 
however doubt as to the efficacy of state ownership and control, the reduction of licensed 
houses, alteration of premises, disinterested management and supply of food failed to exert 
any perceptible influence on sobriety and public order. What the Carlisle experiment did do 
however was to raise the status and function of the public house from a mere drinking bar to 
a place of family refreshment. Although this failed to appeal to the generation used to smoke 
filled snugs, it began to appeal to a new generation and in doing so may be seen as real 
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temperance, natural not forced and therefore lasting (4) All this placed the Temperance 
Movement in a difficult position as drink policy passed them by. 
The end of war time restrictions and the enactment of the 1921 Licensing Act severely 
tested the Temperance Movement's ambitions as it continued to offer solutions to the drink 
problem The study has shown that the Temperance Movement had tended to move away 
from its reliance on moral suasion and to rely upon education and legislation. Classical 
reasons for abstinence such as poverty and physical well being had been proved 
unsustainable and had robbed moral suasionists of their pivotal arguments. At the same time 
falling temperance memberships coupled with a religious fallout meant fewer disciples to 
convey this abstinence message. Temperance moderates fully understood the need for 
compromise and continuously pursued a set of moral and educational objectives which 
included legislative reform. The setting up of institutions such as the Police Court Missions 
and the educational programmes of the many Bands of Hope are prime examples. Many hard 
line prohibitionists accepted that prohibition could not be implemented without legislation 
and continually lobbied for changes to the law but were unsuccessful. Prohibition, whether 
local or national, demanded legislation but, even hard line prohibitionists seemed to 
recognise that the chances of getting it implemented were negligible. Consequently they 
began to pull back on a public education argument, although they were hardly enthusiastic 
about, indeed it must have been a dispiriting position to have to resort to a long term grass 
roots campaign which had already failed in more propitious circumstances. The great 
Achilles' heel to any radical temperance programme was moderate drinking and it is possible 
that many prohibitionists had realised this and knew that legislation was the only answer. 
With the demise of the Liberal Party, a Conservative Party still sympathetic to the 
Trade, how could temperance achieve political support? It could not sponsor Parliamentaiy 
candidates, so it had to rely upon an amicable Labour Party. The symbiotic relationship that 
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the Trade had with the Conservative Party should have perhaps acted as a spur to the Labour 
Party, as it continually campaigned against Tory action, no matter how tenuous. Socialists 
however had rejected the Victorian analysis of the relationship between drink and poverty, 
attributing poverty to the economic system of capitalism. In the early 1920s, the Labour 
Party's advisory committee on temperance policy recommended that the party 'actively 
pursue' a policy of state purchase. The powerful Working Men's Club and Institute Union 
(CIU) opposed public ownership and the temperance ideas of many socialists. In June 1920 
however, the Labour Party declared in favour of Local Veto. The issue of drink was still 
therefore 'politically sensitive, socially significant and unlikely to disappear from the 
forefront of controversy overnight.' (5) In 1923 the Labour Party produced a Report in 
which it suggested that a new approach was needed to resolve the temperance debate. (6) 
What the Report didn't say was how this was to be accomplished. Growth in trade unionism 
at both national and local level strengthened class confidence which may well have affected 
changes in temperance attitudes. This may have been brought about by the necessity of many 
unions to hold branch meetings in public houses. Equally a confident and pragmatic Labour 
Party also recognised the pitfalls waiting for the organisation which was able to declare a 
solution to the drink question. The Labour Party knew that it had to tread carefully when it 
came to discussing the fate of the public house as it did not want to alienate its supporters or 
promote mass indifference to temperance. This stop and go policy shows the complexity of 
the issues involved and a full explanation of Labour's true position towards temperance has 
proved difficult. What is fairly conclusive is that the Labour Party was uncertain as to the 
best course of temperance action and left it to a Royal Commission to decide for them. By 
the time the Commission reported, Labour no longer held office. 
In spite of having high profile witnesses, like the influential Lord Astor, to plead its case 
and proclaim the virtues of temperance before the Amulree Commission, the Temperance 
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Movement, once again, failed to convey a coherent and comprehensive temperance strategy. 
In 1933 there was an agreed temperance programme which proclaimed a unity of action 
within the Temperance Movement and a published manifesto called for a 'programme of 
educational and legislative reform' which became known as the Twelve Point Plan. (7) It was 
the Movement's comprehensive response to the Amulree Commission and marked the end of 
effective action for temperance reform since none of the Twelve Points were achieved nor, it 
seems, did the Movement expect them to be. The Temperance Movement had become 
skilled in the art of non-persuasion and should perhaps have heeded the advice of William 
Black of the UKA who was frequently quoted as saying that the right policy for the 
Temperance Movement to adopt in respect of legislation was 'to ask for what we want and 
take what we can get.' And they did not do that. Balfour's 1904 Licensing Act giving 
statutory right to compensation - the only licensing bill enacted between 1872 and 1921 
became law despite the opposition of virtually the entire Temperance Movement. Alcohol 
has been the subject of controversy virtually throughout the whole of history and the fragile 
fabric of English society was deemed under threat from it at the beginning of the 1830's. 
Joseph Livesey became convinced that the solution to the drink question was through moral 
suasion but radical prohibitionists had other ideas. Neither of these two approaches could 
claim success as they never came near achieving the prime objective. It has to be concluded 
that throughout its history the Temperance Movement demanded much, received very little 
and was therefore not so much a force but an irritant. 
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Appendix I 
Table of Dates. 
1830. 	 Beerhouse Act. 'Free Trade in Beer' began. First temperance societies founded 
in England, with a pledge of abstinence from spirituous liquors, and of 
moderation in the use of malted liquors. 
1832. 	 'Entire Abstinence' Pledge drawn up by Joseph Livesey and signed by the 
Preston seven. 
1833 	 Livesey and his colleagues heralded 'The Reform' beyond Preston. 
1834 	 Parliamentary Select Committee on Intemperance Reported. 
1836 	 Thomas Whittaker and James Tears set out from Presto as missionaries for 'The 
Reform.' 
1839 	 Sunday morning closing of public houses in London. This reform was achieved 
by a clause in the Metropolitan Police Act 
1842-8 	 Sunday morning closing extended throughout England. 
1849-50 	 House of Lords Committee on Intemperance reported. 
1851 	 A drastic Prohibition law passed in the State of Maine, USA. 
1853 	 Formation of the UKA. 
1854 	 House of Commons Select Committee on public houses reported, 
1860 	 New wine Licence (grocer's licence) created by Gladstone. 
1862 	 Permissive Bill Resolution first moved in the Commons by W Lawson NIP 
Publication of Livesey' s Free and Friendly Remarks Upon the Permissive Bill. 
Publication of Vindication of the Principles and Policy of the UKA4. 
1869 	 Wine and Beerhouse Act: 'Free Trade in Beer' ended. 
1869 	 Convocation of Canterbury Report on Intemperance presented. 
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1871 	 H A Bruce, Home Secretary, introduced a comprehensive Licensing Bill. The 
Bill was withdrawn 
1872 	 Licensing Act incorporating the 'regulative' provisions of the 1871 Bill. 
IJKA resolved on 'direct action' in the constituencies. 
1874 	 Licensing Act, amending the Act of 1872, 
Convocation of York Report on Intemperance presented. 
1876 	 Committee on Intemperance appointed by the House of Lords. 
1880 	 Local Option resolution carried for the first time in the House of Commons. 
1888 	 C. T. Ritchie, President of Local Government Board proposed to transfer liquor 
licensing to County Councils, and to empower them to pay compensation for 
redundant licenses. Proposal withdrawn. 
1889 	 National Liberal Federation at Manchester endorsed the 'Direct Popular Veto.' 
1890 	 G. J. Goschen, Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed compensation for 
redundant licences. Proposal withdrawn. 
1891 	 House of Lords judgement in Sharp versus Wakefield. 
1893 	 Sir W Harcourt introduced Local Veto Bill in the Commons. The Bill ma<le no 
progress. 
1895 	 Local Veto Bill reintroduced. The Bill made no progress. 
Heavy defeat of the Liberal Party at the general election. 
1896 	 Royal Commission on Licensing Laws appointed. 
1899 	 Royal Commission reported. 
1904 	 Licensing Act 
1914-21 	 Social Control. Defence of the Realm Act. Carlisle Experiment. 
1921 	 The Liquor Licensing Act. 
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1924 	 Finance Act. 
1929 	 Royal Commission on Licensing Laws appointed. 
1931 	 Royal Commission reported. 
1933 	 Finance Act. This Act radically changed the method of charging beer duty. 
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